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ANALYSIS OF THE  
CHINESE CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE:  
SUMMARY REPORT

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE**

---

**INTRODUCTION**

This summary report analyzes Chinese perceptions of, involvement in, and management of international and domestic crises from the inception of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949 through the end of 1978. The study of which it is a component is being conducted as part of an overall research program on crisis management sponsored by the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA/CTO). The purpose of this program is to develop transferable technologies and methodologies for improving U.S. policy- and decision-makers' capacities to manage and anticipate crises.

**MISSION**

CACI's mission in analyzing the PRC's crisis management experience was to supplement the already existing U.S. and Soviet databases by:

- Compiling a chronological list of crises from 1949 through 1978 as perceived by the PRC,
- Gathering basic descriptive data for each crisis (who, what, where, when, why, and how) using Chinese sources, and
- Analyzing these characteristics by searching for and evaluating patterns and trends.

**METHODOLOGY**

Since one of the larger aims behind this project was to permit a three-way comparison of Chinese, U.S., and Soviet crisis management

experiences, there was a need to try to structure both the research into Chinese perceptions and activities and the ensuing database so as to make such analyses feasible. The major difficulty in this was the real differences between the manner in which the term crisis has been understood and individual crisis events treated by the Chinese as compared with the United States. Further, although a moderately similar ideology reduces this dichotomy when looking at the PRC and USSR together, there should be no need to stress that the two Communist giants' perceptions of many international and domestic crises have differed greatly.

Although a complete solution to this research dilemma is not possible, a practical approach to its reconciliation was worked out, based on the principle of using Chinese sources to identify and describe crises as the term is understood in the West.

In selecting sources to be used in data extraction, there were three basic considerations: accessibility, comprehensiveness, and function. Because of the sharp lurches in Chinese policy interspersed among extended periods of self-isolation from the mainstream of world affairs, getting at, as well as making sense of, what concerned China's leaders over such a wide span of time constituted a major challenge. Then, too, there was the problem of the signaling or communication aspect of crises -- an integral part of the crisis management process. This combination dramatically reduced the methodological options. The approach chosen involved detailed data extraction from Peking Review and its predecessor magazine People's China in addition to all books and pamphlets touching on international affairs currently available from the few outlets in the United States for PRC materials; this latter included some sixty publications, among which were reports from all Communist Party of China Congresses since 1949.

#### CRISIS INVENTORY

It quickly became apparent that the problem was not going to be either a scarcity of material on international affairs or a lack of Chinese

reference to events. From a total inventory of well over 15,000 event citations, a final crisis list of 386 cases<sup>1</sup> was selected making coding and subsequent comparison with the U.S. and Soviet databases manageable.

As indicated by the following examples, these crises were described from other than a Western or a Soviet point of view:

- 1 April 1959 - December 1962: U.S. ships, aircraft continue to violate PRC territorial waters, airspace. PRC protests, issues serious warnings.
- 7-12 March 1969: Soviet authorities organize series of provocations against PRC embassy in Moscow. Rufians damage embassy, attack Chinese personnel. A Soviet major general is observed on the scene in command of the demonstrators.

#### TRENDS IN CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS

A search for broad patterns in the selected set of 386 crises revealed the following:

- The highest frequency of crisis occurrence took place during Phase II, (1958-1968) each year of which had more than the 30-year average of 13.3 crises per year.
- Over half of the set of crises took place in the Pacific-East Asia Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) region, with the PRC itself being the arena of more than one fifth of the set (22.8 percent).
- In geopolitical terms, a second fifth involved states along the PRC border.
- The most frequent type of crisis was conflict short of war/foreign intervention (24.9%), with the great majority being violent in nature and involving more than one state.

---

<sup>1</sup> Divided into three phases: 1949-1957, 1958-1968, and 1969-1978, with 78, 203, and 105 crises each respectively.

- Crises involving strategic confrontation (i.e., the PRC pitted against a nuclear power whose resources and prestige were heavily committed directly against the PRC or in a bordering state) were infrequent (7.7 percent in the early years, declining to zero in Phase III).
- That power most frequently opposing the PRC or acting contrary to Chinese interests throughout the period was the United States (36.8 percent), closely trailed by the USSR (26.2 percent). Distribution of such opposition was uneven, with the USSR finally eclipsing the U.S. as the main opponent in Phase III (35.2 percent versus 21.9 percent).
- A large majority of the crises (72.8 percent) involved at least one large power (i.e., the U.S., the USSR, or the PRC), with large power interactions being slightly more common than large-small and much more frequent than large-medium power confrontations.

#### CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN CRISES

The key choice in any state's involvement in international events -- once a decision has been made to act -- is to work out the ratio between saying something and doing something, with the former spread along a continuum from bare mention to threats and the latter from diplomacy to commitment of combat forces. In the verbal area, the PRC consistently felt it had to express an opinion, make a judgment, or attempt to influence other polities (83.9 percent).

The Chinese took physical action only slightly more than half of the time (52.7 percent); of those cases about which enough information was available to permit more explicit coding, the highest percentage (17.3 percent of the total of 386 cases) were crises where members of the Chinese military were present but combat involving military units of appreciable size did not take place. Crises resulting in the latter were rare (4.7 percent), most of them being in the early years when battles were being fought to oust the Nationalists from outlying areas like Hainan Island.

Chinese objectives throughout the period were predominately defensive in nature (64.5 percent), although there was consistent secondary interest in altering the status quo (25.9 percent). Analysis of outcomes data revealed that the PRC saw its opponents as generally getting more positive outcomes (40.4 percent versus 23.1 percent). The even less satisfactory outcome ratio for crises involving Chinese clients or allies clearly demonstrated the limitations under which the PRC has had to operate. In fact, the only consolation that could be found in outcome assessment from the Chinese point of view was a steady improvement in the outcome ratio for crises involving PRC interests across the three phases and for crises where the People's Republic was interested in one of the actors but had no specific obligations -- trends that emphatically did not hold true for crises involving PRC clients or allies (e.g., Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime).

#### THE ROLE OF OTHER ACTORS IN CRISES

Given the traditional Chinese view as to the only proper world distribution of power -- with China as the single dominant nation state -- it was inevitable that there would have been tension and dissatisfaction in a Peking confronted with powers of undeniably greater strength than that possessed by the People's Republic itself or when faced with polities which by their very nature posed a challenge to the PRC's image of itself.

Although during the period examined the above basic dilemma showed no signs of being resolved, the PRC appeared to be well able to live with the realities of the world power situation, provided that other significant polities, to include the superpowers and China's own neighbors, could make adequate allowance for her to share a place in the sun.

### The United States

As already noted, the U.S. was perceived by the PRC as being an opponent more often than any other power; however, such U.S. opposition changed in character over time from a high level of direct, hostile interaction in Phase I (30.8 percent) to a lower degree of involvement in Phase III, consisting predominantly of indirect support of other actors in crises where the PRC's interests were not at stake. While it would be inaccurate to suggest that the historic shift in Sino-U.S. ties resulted solely from adjustments in perceptions, goals, and behavior on the U.S. side, a case can be made from the analysis conducted that a key to this dramatic change has lain in the willingness -- and ability -- of Washington to accept China as she is.

### The Soviet Union

In contrast to the above, the Chinese saw a steady increase in the frequency of Soviet involvement in crises of concern to them; moreover, what they saw they liked less and less. As with the U.S., however, the PRC identified a significant shift over time in such Soviet activity from direct intervention towards a greater resort to behind-the-scenes manipulation. How much of this stems from objective fact rather than a gradual Chinese transfer to their newer Soviet enemy of their earlier obsession with the U.S. as international trouble maker is not entirely clear.

During the course of seeking pattern relationships between the frequency and nature of Sino-Soviet interactions and the amount and type of published Chinese reference to the USSR, a highly interesting anomaly was discovered, namely, an enormous upsurge of Chinese articles about the USSR in 1973 followed by an equally sudden decline in 1975. This "statistical thumb" overshadowed any similar fluctuations in Chinese reference, not only to the USSR in other years but also to any other foreign power; further, the course of international events during the period did not seem to justify

the anomaly. Based on limited research into the matter, it appears that internal turmoil -- both in power distribution among the Chinese leadership and in foreign policy perspective -- was a major factor.

#### Taiwan

As might have been expected, the Chinese Communist regime's concern over, and crisis-related interactions with, its Nationalist rival have been consistently a function of the degree of mutual acceptance of the status quo and physical efforts to alter it. The data examined paint a clear picture of the changes over time in both variables, with the last important upsurge in PRC reference to Taiwan taking place in 1970-1971, where such struggle as remained had moved into the United Nations and Chinese concerns were more over Japanese economic expansion than Taiwanese harassment of the mainland.

#### India

While statistically smaller overall, the problem presented by India was more persistent than that of Taiwan. As seen from Peking, its South Asian rival has shown an uncomfortable tendency to intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbors, whether this be the Tibetan province of China, Pakistan, or the string of buffer states along the southern flank of the Himalayas. Thus, Indian expansionism, even more than New Delhi's pretensions to a leading role in Asian and Third World affairs, has been at the heart of Sino-Indian hostility. Moreover, the Soviet Union's "traitorous" support of such untoward activities played no small part in the exacerbation of China's ties with the latter.

#### CHINESE CRISIS CONCERNS IN CONTEXT

A comparison among factors correlating U.S., Soviet, and Chinese crisis concerns revealed three points of close coincidence: level of world

conflict, strategic balance/correlation of forces, and frequency of U.S. crisis operations. The first of these, which records the overall temperature of international relations, is entirely expectable. From the second two, however, come two interesting inferences. First, although all three powers were, and remain, concerned about how they compare with other key players, it is important to note the disparity in definitions as to what constitutes strength, with the U.S. perception being far narrower than that of the other two large powers. Second, of unilateral activities on the part of one of the three large powers, only U.S. commitment of its military power in a crisis management role, as of consistent concern to all three.

On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that Chinese crisis concerns were not developed in isolation, but that they, too, tended to vary with the external political climate and, more narrowly, with the degree of active opposition engaged in among the Chinese and their major opponents. In addition, several key factors peculiar to the Chinese experience played important roles, such as changes in the internal distribution of power and phases demarcated by certain Chinese Communist Party Congresses.

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## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

---

### OVERVIEW

This report analyzes the Chinese crisis management experience from October 1, 1949 (the founding of the People's Republic of China) through 1978. It is part of a project sponsored by the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA/CTO) as part of its Crisis Management Program. This chapter reviews the DARPA/CTO Crisis Management Program and CACI's research within this Program, summarizes CACI's China crisis project, and outlines the remainder of the report.<sup>1</sup>

### THE DARPA CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Four of the major classes of products that have been produced within the DARPA Crisis Management Program are:

- Computer-based decision aids that can be employed in national and major command-level operations centers during crisis management activities to provide better crisis indications and warning.
- Databases on the changing character of U.S. and Soviet crisis management operations including crisis characteristics, the actions that the two superpowers have employed in these incidents, the objectives they have pursued, and the crisis management problems encountered.
- New quantitative methods for crisis advanced warning, monitoring, and management.

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<sup>1</sup> This project is part of a broader research effort. Progress on other tasks is reported in a separate Interim Technical Report (CACI, 1979).

- Reports summarizing:

- U.S. and Soviet crisis management activities and concerns from 1946 through 1976,
- The typical problems encountered in crisis management,
- Current opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and
- Research gaps in planning for better national security crisis management.

Wide-ranging research has been directed toward each of these areas by DARPA since 1974. Initial work through 1976 was directed toward certain basic research themes prerequisite to effective technology development in the social sciences. Characteristic of this type of research were CACI's attempts to inventory past U.S. crises (CACI, 1975) and to identify the major patterns of problems encountered in past U.S. crises (CACI, 1976).

By 1976, however, a corner had been turned in the research needs for crisis management. Significant new information had been developed directly applicable to producing user-oriented, computer-based aids to:

- Assist defense operations centers in identifying what indicator and warning patterns signal the onset of a crisis, and
- Develop option generation and evaluation aids to assist crisis managers after the crisis has begun.

#### CACI'S ROLE IN THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

CACI's efforts within the Crisis Management Program contribute to four classes of research products:

- Computer-based decision aids applicable to national and major command centers during crisis management activities.

- Databases on the changing nature of crises, problems likely to be encountered, types of objectives sought, actions taken, and results achieved.
- New quantitative methods for analyzing U.S. and foreign crisis experiences.
- Substantive reports summarizing the problems of crisis management, opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and research gaps in the field of planning for better national security crisis management.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among these various classes of products in DARPA's Crisis Management Program. CACI's initial attempts to reconceptualize crises and to develop an inventory of U.S. crises began in FY75 (CACI, 1975). These efforts were continued and expanded during FY76 in CACI's major assessment of the background characteristics and problems encountered in a sample of U.S. crises between 1946 and 1975 (CACI, 1976).

Analysis during FY76 indicated four major directions for additional research. First, one tangent of the research (Shaw, et al., 1976) identified terrorist-induced crises as a growing area of concern. Subsequent analyses have identified research and development gaps in this area (CACI, 1977a). Second, a need was identified to reduce crisis management problems by determining the most effective set of actions for different crisis contexts and policy objectives. Accordingly, CACI's efforts during early FY77 focused on examining the relationships among U.S. crisis actions and policy objectives and developing a prototype computer-aiding system for crisis managers that incorporates these empirical relationships (CACI, 1977b). During FY78 this prototype system was developed into CACI's executive aid for crisis managers (CACI, 1978a). The executive aid provides national security planners with ready access to data concerning U.S. crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems over the span 1946-1976. The design characteristics of this aiding system (described in CACI, 1978b) allow planners to have ready access to




Figure 1. Selected CACI Crisis Management Program Research Efforts

these data in the course of searching for precedents when planning for ongoing or anticipated crises.

During FY78, significant research progress was made on two fronts. In the Crisis Problem Analyzer project, CACI (1978c, 1978d) expanded the database of cases coded for U.S. crisis management problems to 101 crises. This provided a richer set of precedents for crisis planners. Taking advantage of the more reliable statistical base provided by the expanded dataset, CACI analyses focused on the relationships between the characteristics of the crisis events and the types of crisis management problems most often encountered by U.S. decision-makers. A new executive aid module was developed that allowed users to examine the historical associations between types of crises (defined in terms of user-specified sets of descriptive attributes) and crisis management problems.

Crisis management is not a solitaire game. Accordingly, the second thrust of CACI's Crisis Management Program-sponsored research during FY78 (CACI, 1978e, 1978f) focused on the Soviet Union's crisis management experience, 1946-1975. In this research Soviet sources were used to identify the political-military crisis events that were of concern to the Soviet leadership during the postwar period. Using a combination of Soviet and Western sources, the basic characteristics of 386 crisis events were coded; crisis problems, actions, and apparent objectives were coded for a sample of 101 crises. Analyses of these data revealed trends and patterns in Soviet crisis concerns and behaviors. Incorporation of these data into executive aid programs comparable to those previously produced for the U.S. allowed U.S. planners and decision-makers to have access to these data as inputs into their assessments of likely Soviet responses to crisis situations.

As shown in Figure 1, during FY79, CACI's Crisis Management Program research involves several interrelated tasks:

- Updating the U.S. and Soviet databases through 1978, to provide planners with up-to-date information.

- Analysis of U.S. and Soviet crisis outcomes (1966-1978), focusing on outcomes defined in terms of goal achievement.
- Development of the executive aids for crisis managers, including incorporation of the results of the other research thrusts being conducted during the fiscal year into the aiding system.
- Analysis of Chinese crises and their characteristics from the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1979 through 1978.

This volume deals solely with the last task; the other components of the research are discussed in CACI (1979).

#### OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

This volume is divided into eight chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the methodology employed to identify crises of concern to the Chinese leadership since the foundation of the People's Republic in 1949. Chapter 3 lists the crises identified using this methodology. Chapter 4 examines general patterns in these data with emphasis on the evolving character of Chinese crisis concerns. Chapter 5 deals with China's relations with the two superpowers while Chapter 6 focuses on China's interests in key regions (for example, the Middle East) and with neighboring powers (for example, India). Chapter 7 locates the events of concern to the PRC's leadership within the broader context of postwar international relations. Chapter 8 illustrates the capabilities of the Chinese component of the Executive Aid for Crisis Management, which allows policy community users to have ready access to the database of crisis characteristics developed by this project.

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## CHAPTER 2. IDENTIFYING THE CHINESE CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE

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### INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the research strategy employed to identify the international crises of concern to the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from its foundation on October 1, 1949 through 1978. Application of this strategy has produced a set of 386 incidents plus data on their characteristics. This set of cases is presented in Chapter 3 and analyzed in subsequent chapters.

The research strategy was developed with two partially conflicting ends in mind. The first was to use Chinese sources and Chinese perspectives on crises and crisis management in order to identify the perceptions that were likely to prompt and correlate with Chinese policy actions. Previous DARPA-sponsored research (Bobrow *et al.*, forthcoming) had already demonstrated that both Chinese source materials and Chinese vantage points regarding crises and crisis management differed substantially from their Western counterparts.

The second objective was to produce data concerning Chinese crises in forms similar to those used in Western crisis studies (for example, CACI, 1978a). Doing this would allow comparison between the U.S. and Chinese crisis management experiences.

These two ends clearly posed a dilemma because, as noted previously, Chinese and Western approaches to the analysis and practice of crisis management differ substantially. While the dilemma in its starker form could not be solved, a practical resolution was possible building upon the successful experience of a previous (CACI, 1978e) analysis of Soviet crisis behavior (like the Chinese, Soviet perspectives on crises differ from those found in the West). This practical resolution involved using

Chinese sources to identify the crisis events (and, to the extent feasible, the basic descriptive characteristics of the incidents), while defining crisis events in terms similar to those used in Western crisis studies.

The sections of this chapter deal with:

- Western approaches to the definition and analysis of crises,
- The way in which the Chinese define crises, and how this differs from Western practice,
- The Chinese approach to crisis management, which differs markedly from the operational perspectives and practices of some Western powers,
- The ways in which the two criteria for reflecting Chinese perspectives and producing data in forms similar to those used in Western analyses were reconciled, and
- Definitions and sources.

#### BRIEF SURVEY OF WESTERN APPROACHES TO CRISIS ANALYSIS

Recent Western studies dealing with the identification and definition of international crises have approached the subject from two markedly different vantagepoints.<sup>1</sup> The first approach, which predominates in the academic political science literature, defines crises in terms of the

<sup>1</sup> A certain amount of intellectual nationalism is evident in this section, which cites only American studies. For the purposes of this quite brief review this is justifiable, since the major parameters of the research being discussed have been set by and/or are notably reflected in the American scholarly literature. It will also be evident that only the "mainstream" body of crisis management literature (for example, that encompassed by the review of Daly and Andriole, forthcoming) is being considered here. Other Western crisis analyses (for example, Marxist studies) would not necessarily share these orientations and would be more similar to the Chinese vantagepoints to be presented in subsequent sections.

measurable properties of events. In some cases intra-actor factors are emphasized, as with Hermann's (1972) emphasis on threats to important national goals, short decision time, and surprise as definitional criteria. Alternately, inter-actor factors are stressed in analyses such as McClelland's (1972) with crises being defined in terms of certain patterns in the interflow of activity between nations.

An alternative approach is represented in what Daly and Andriole (forthcoming) term the recent swing to more operations-relevant crisis management research in studies conducted by the Brookings Institution (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978), CACI (1976), and the Center for Naval Analyses (Mahoney, 1977a). These studies use organizational processes within the U.S. Government to identify cases/crises. In two of the efforts, event-type approaches are employed, with crises being defined in terms of certain intentions and actions on the part of the U.S. National Command Authorities (Brookings) or extraordinary military management activity (CACI). In the case of the Center for Naval Analyses study, a source-based definition is used, with "international incidents and crises" consisting of those events cited in certain policy documents.<sup>2</sup> Regardless of these differences in approach, these studies share their attempt to capture the perceptions of the Washington policy community regarding crises, in which "crises" are events that interrupt normal decision-making routines and call for extraordinary organizational responses.

Finally, whether they define crises in terms of the properties of events or by means of organizational processes, most Western approaches to the

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<sup>2</sup> The difference between event-type and source-based definitions is far from absolute. The types of events cited by Brookings and CACI have characteristics that make them likely to occur in the policy documents used in a source-based approach. Similarly, policy documents are likely to highlight events involving the types of policy actions emphasized in the Brookings and CACI efforts. For a comparison of the U.S. crisis lists generated by the three projects, see CACI (1978e). Gillespie, Zumes, et al. (1979) present an alternative taxonomic structure for the literature.

analysis of crises and crisis management share a number of key emphases:<sup>3</sup>

- Crises are seen as unusual events that trigger out of the ordinary responses by both organizations and decision-makers.
- Crises are seen as creating stress for individuals, organizations, and the international system.
- Crises are viewed as resulting from abrupt changes in foreign actors' behaviors and present anomalous, irregular, low-probability problems for decision-makers.
- Crises are regarded as disturbing what would otherwise be an ongoing, stable set of interstate relationships.
- Crises are seen as involving threats posed by a foreign party to one own's interests.
- Crises involve acts of conflict and violence, with emphasis upon political-military threats and actions.
- Crises are short-term phenomena, more readily measured in hours or days than months or years.

Furthermore, though this point is seldom explicitly noted, most Western discussions of the topic share one additional point. Crises and crisis management are usually discussed (at least implicitly) from the vantage-point of the United States and other major Western powers, who have structured their military forces so as to be suitable for certain types of crisis operations and who have developed distinctive organizational styles of response to crisis situations, (cf. Williams, 1976). "Abstract" discussions often only draw upon cases involving the various major Western participants in postwar crises, with the different crisis management problems and operating styles of non-Western powers receiving little attention.

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<sup>3</sup> This listing is based on Bobrow et al. (forthcoming).

#### CHINESE DEFINITIONS OF CRISIS<sup>4</sup>

As might be expected, Chinese analysts of political-military affairs work within a framework of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought.<sup>5</sup> Working within this perspective, Chinese analysts and policy-makers approach questions of international policy in ways that differ significantly from "mainstream" Western analytical approaches.<sup>6</sup> For example, Western commentators often draw sharp distinctions between "political" and "military" affairs that allow them to characterize some events as military crises, others as political incidents, and yet others as mixtures of the two. In the case of the Chinese, the opposite view holds. As early as 1929, just 2 years after the founding of the Red Army (the predecessor of the current People's Liberation Army), Mao (1929) vigorously argued against those cadre in the Communist Party of China (CPC) who wished to make sharp distinctions between the two spheres of political and military policy. This emphasis on the dialectical unity of the two continues to the present day.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The analysis in this section is largely taken from a previous DARPA-sponsored study of Chinese crisis perceptions and behaviors conducted by Bobrow *et al.* (forthcoming).

<sup>5</sup> The People's Republic of China has recently adopted the pin yin system to replace earlier methods of transliterating Chinese names from characters into the Roman alphabet. Since most of the sources used by this project were produced in the period in which the pin yin system was not employed and because most of our audience will be more familiar with the older forms for the names, we have elected to use the older forms in this report.

<sup>6</sup> While recent Soviet commentaries are quite critical of Chinese claims to be orthodox Marxist-Leninists (for example, Sladkovsky *et al.*, 1972) there are striking similarities between the two in the ways in which they differ from contemporary mainstream Western approaches to the analysis of political-military phenomena in general and crises in particular.

<sup>7</sup> Soviet analysts place similar emphasis on the necessary unity of political and military considerations; see CACI (1978e) for further details regarding Soviet perspectives.

The specific differences between Chinese and Western approaches to the analysis of crises and crisis management have been elucidated by Bobrow et al. (forthcoming)<sup>8</sup> as:

- Whereas Western analysts tend to regard crises as unusual events that trigger extraordinary responses by both organizations and decision-makers, Chinese analysts tend to see crises as differing from noncrisis situations only in the level and intensity of actions and signals.
- While crises are seen in the West as causing stress and danger, the Chinese also emphasize the opportunities that are provided for the advancement of actors' interests.
- In contrast to a Western tendency to see crises as the result of abrupt changes in foreign actors' behaviors that produce unusual decision-making problems, Chinese commentators see crises as instances of contradictions resulting from long-term processes and as reflections of the normal competitive and antagonistic process of international relations.
- Instead of seeing crises as disturbing what would otherwise be an ongoing, stable set of interstate relationships, the Chinese tend to see crises as representative of an inherently dynamic international system, one which can never be stable given the dialectics of the processes in operation in the global system.
- Rather than seeing crises as being based primarily on threats posed by foreign parties, Chinese commentators placed stress on domestic causes and influences, at least during the initial stages of incidents.
- Instead of an emphasis upon conflict, violence, and military-political threats and actions, crises as seen from a Chinese vantagepoint entail the controlled use of confrontation and compromise; moreover, economic factors, rather than political-military ones, are the central elements, with the latter being the <sup>g</sup>reflections, concomitants, or consequences of the former.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> This presentation parallels the summary of common Western emphases presented at the end of the preceding section.

<sup>9</sup> To fully understand this point, it is important not to construe the term "economic" too narrowly. From the Marxist or Marxist-Leninist

- In contrast to the Western focus on events of short duration, to Chinese eyes crises can extend over considerable periods of time.

#### THE CHINESE APPROACH TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT

When compared to either major Western powers (the United States, United Kingdom, and France) and/or the Soviet Union, China's approach to crisis management and, more generally, all aspects of political-military policy, differs substantially in terms of the position from which the Chinese have faced world affairs, the ways in which they have structured themselves to handle policy questions, the goals they have sought, and the means they have employed to seek these goals.

##### Position

Few starker contrasts exist than the positions from which the United States and the People's Republic of China approached the postwar era. The United States emerged from the Second World War as a superpower in every sense. It was the only major combatant whose economic base had not suffered serious damage during the conflict. It was the first atomic power. Moreover, wartime production and postwar procurement had equipped it with substantial amounts of general purpose forces of the type that would become the predominant military tools for Western crisis management operations (for example, Marine amphibious units, Army airborne troops, and carrier-based aviation).

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viewpoint it is the economic base which, in the final analysis, determines or conditions all other elements in the social order, and which consists, at the most fundamental level, of the totality of production relations within a society. At this very general level, this is tantamount to saying that social resources set limits on what can be done, with "social resources" being defined as the ways in which a society is constituted to produce material goods and to supply the day to day needs of its populace. "Economics," in the narrower Western, non-Marxist sense, is only a subset of what is being referred to here.

China, on the other hand, entered the postwar era only to engage in the final round of the civil war between Communist and Nationalist forces that had been waged almost continuously since the 1920's.<sup>10</sup> The combined effects of internecine conflict and Japanese invasion on China's small industrial base were severe. Finally, the types of forces required to successfully prosecute the civil war (and within the capability of the Communist forces to produce) were predominantly leg infantry and artillery units, forces clearly not suited to distant crisis operations. Indeed, the limitations of China's logistical capabilities made even operations in contiguous regions nontrivial undertakings (a situation that, judging by their recent incursion into Vietnam, does not seem to have altered significantly).

Another sharp contrast in position has to do with comparative levels of economic development. While hard data are often difficult to obtain (Chen, 1975), China has never been in modern times a "developed" nation as this term could be applied to the United States or the Soviet Union. Indeed, in their own assessments Chinese commentators do not even place China on the same level as Japan, Western European states, or Canada (Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism, 1977). Instead, they locate China in the Third World, along with all Asian states other than Japan and the nations of Africa and Latin America.

Like many less developed countries (LDC's), China is primarily an agricultural nation (Seymour, 1976). While not poor in any absolute sense (the PRC's gross national product (GNP) in 1977 was estimated to be \$373 billion), China is relatively poor in per capita terms (1977 gross domestic product (GDP)/capita estimated at \$390) (National Basic Intelligence

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<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the wrap-up phase of the Civil War continued well beyond the founding of the PRC in 1949, with significant combat against remnant "bandit" forces continuing into the early 1950's.

Factbook, 1979).<sup>11</sup> This has affected the Chinese regime's ability to set aside resources from the economy to apply to foreign policy ends such as crisis management. Defense expenditures entail substantial opportunity costs and have continued to be a considerable burden on China's economy (Jammes, 1975).<sup>12</sup>

The final aspect of China's position differing markedly from that of the major Western powers and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Soviet Union is a fundamental geopolitical factor. China shares a border with the nation that recent Chinese writings identify as their number one opponent -- the Soviet Union. No major Western power has been in this situation since World War II with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the latter has not been an active crisis participant outside of the European theater.<sup>13</sup> Beyond this, however, is the equally basic reality of power asymmetry between the Chinese and their neighbor to the north. Even granting the major strategic advantage derived from its geographical location and its ability to do considerable damage to its Soviet rival, the fact remains that the PRC is simply not in the superpower class.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The distinction between GNP and GNP/capita is an important one. The gross product gives a rough estimate of the pool of resources that are available to national leaders. The GNP/capita figure, on the other hand, gives a very rough estimate of the potential demands that might be placed on these resources. A nation with a large GNP and a small GNP/capita, while capable of carrying out very expensive defense programs such as China's nuclear deterrent force, can do so only if willing to accept high opportunity costs.

<sup>12</sup> One way in which the Chinese have been able to reduce, while not eliminating, some of the costs of their armed forces, is by employing large numbers of ground forces (population being in ample supply) equipped at a level far below Soviet or Western standards.

<sup>13</sup> The U.S.-Soviet border at Alaska is an obvious exception. Few if any incidents in the postwar period have taken place in this subtheater.

<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that characterization of the Soviet Union as a "superpower" is a Western notion, one which is resisted by the Soviets themselves.

### Structure

China's economic and political orders have been deliberately organized in ways that are quite different from the West, a circumstance that affects the ways in which the Chinese can and do practice crisis management.

In the early years (roughly through 1957) China attempted to emulate the Soviet Union's "top-down," highly centralized system of economic planning (Lardy, 1975). In reaction to what were viewed as the deficiencies of centralized planning, since about 1958 the Chinese appear to have adopted a much more decentralized approach to economic affairs in which individual provinces have been delegated substantially enhanced decision-making authority (Seymour, 1976). While there is substantial disagreement in the Western analytical community as to the extent to which this decentralization operates in practice as opposed to theory (for example, Lardy, 1975), a reasonable assessment is that trends since the late 1950's have served to allocate relatively more resources toward provincial-level economic development projects. To the extent that this trend operates (and, given the limits of available open-source data, our ability to clearly delineate trends is quite limited) the net effect is likely to be one that reduces the resources available at the national level for certain types of defense efforts.<sup>15</sup>

The Chinese also differ from Western powers (while resembling the Soviets) by having two spheres of political policy: party and government. In a way that is not true in the West, China as a Marxist-Leninist party/state complex has two sets of overlapping policy goals reflecting

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<sup>15</sup> Boyd (1979) argues that a similar sort of "regionalism" operates in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), with regional commanders not always being completely responsive to central directives and with few signs of cooperation between separate regional commands. To some extent this condition may be one aspect of the post-Cultural Revolution recovery, in which the PLA became very much involved in the governance of China.

both national and ideological concerns. While it is easy (albeit somewhat ethnocentric) for Westerners to discount the importance of ideological considerations to Marxist-Leninist actors, this would appear, on balance, to be a mistake. For example, the two sets of considerations interact intricately in China's relations with Southeast Asian nations. Here the Chinese have employed what Sutter (1978) terms a "dual-track" policy. Chinese "state" interests are reflected in recent efforts to establish normal relations with the non-Communist regimes in this area.<sup>16</sup> At the same time, however, China continues to lend support to Maoist Communist parties in Thailand, Malaysia, and Burma working to overthrow the very regimes with which the People's Republic is attempting to normalize relations. On a more general level, while China's interests as a nation are primarily regional, her ideological concerns have a more global scope. Thus, the latter are likely to be one of the factors behind extraregional policies, such as China's programs of economic and military aid in sub-Saharan Africa and her support for Maoist Communist Parties throughout the world.

#### Political-Military Goals

Chinese policy goals differ from those of Western states in ways that parallel the differences between the two in structures of governance. At the same time, Chinese goals tend to be both narrower and broader than comparable Western concerns.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> It is important not to draw too strong of a contrast between the spheres of party and state. The Chinese would insist (as good Marxist-Leninists) that the party provides the guiding mechanism for the state. Nevertheless, in reviewing China's political-military policies, different (and at times apparently conflicting) emphases similar to the one highlighted here are found that seem directly linked to the potential tension that can exist between the two spheres of policy.

<sup>17</sup> Once again, while it is useful for analytical purposes to make a distinction between Party and State concerns, it is important not to draw the distinction too sharply. While the Chinese might see some potential

The "narrower" aspects of Chinese goals reflect China's position in world affairs and its own revolutionary heritage. As an underdeveloped country with limited resources and very limited force projection capabilities, it is not surprising that China's foreign and defense policy concerns have a strong home theater focus. Within this "region" are the nations of Southeast Asia (including many countries with significant numbers of ethnic Chinese citizens and residents), South Asia, Japan, the two Koreas, and the Soviet Union. Neighboring states are consistently the actors of primary concern insofar as China's core national security interests are concerned.<sup>18</sup>

Besides geopolitical considerations, China's revolutionary heritage also affects the goals that it adopts in international affairs. One of the most striking features of Chinese commentaries on international crises and other political-military events is the extent to which they are couched in terms of the Chinese revolutionary struggle (Boyd, 1978). Given the Chinese leadership's image of this struggle as a protracted conflict that succeeded because the Chinese relied primarily on their own resources, it is not surprising that they offer similar counsel to friendly movements in other nations, in distant regions as well as around their own periphery. Chinese military assistance has been provided to foreign actors, but at levels far below those of many U.S. or Soviet assistance efforts (Fogarty, 1978).<sup>19</sup> The Soviets for their part have criticized the Chinese for their sparse assistance (Astafyev and Fomichova, tensions between the two, they would also regard them as bound together in a dialectical union.

<sup>18</sup> There is at least one additional "extraregional" component to China's state interests, for example, Chinese concern with the balance of forces on the Soviet Union's European flank (Sutton, 1978). This is, of course, a natural outgrowth of concern about the Soviet "threat."

<sup>19</sup> As suggested in the next section, China's ability to provide such material is also constrained by the limited capabilities of its armaments industries and degree of sophistication of its military technology. Thus, China's emphasis on revolutionary self-reliance is to a measurable extent making a virtue out of necessity.

1972), contending that such behavior is a departure from correct Leninist proletarian internationalism.

The "broader" aspects of Chinese policy goals pertain to the PRC's status as a Marxist-Leninist state attempting to survive in a largely capitalist/imperialist world while expanding the scope of the revolution and the application abroad of China's unique historical heritage. As Simon (1978b) has noted, the Chinese define their ideological interests fairly broadly, to include the fate of important national liberation movements as well as the course of the international Communist movement. The national liberation struggles are important because they weaken the political and economic control of the imperialist states over the Third World, thereby affecting the global balance of power. The course of the international Communist movement<sup>20</sup> is of concern for other reasons, the most important being the need to counter Soviet efforts to dominate other Communist regimes and movements and the impact of Soviet ideological revisionism and its spread. This latter problem of orthodoxy is fundamental since to the Chinese the success of "correct" parties and movements, in addition to being desirable in an absolute sense, influences the overall global correlation of forces in ways that favor Chinese security interests.

The other "broad" dimension of Chinese foreign and defense policy goals is provided by China's unique cultural and historical role in East Asia. As the traditional, dominant culture in the region, China has had considerable influence on the belief systems and practices of most of the surrounding societies. Concomitant with this cultural impact has been a minidiaspora of ethnic Chinese throughout the region. The net result of thousands of years of history is that the Chinese leadership perceives

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<sup>20</sup> The Chinese leadership is also concerned with interparty affairs as an avenue through which foreign revisionists might work to collude with dissident elements within China itself. Mao Tsetung (cited in Schram, 1974: 151, 292) raised this problem in 1959, criticizing those elements of the CPC maintaining covert contacts with foreign provocateurs.

itself as having an interest in and a responsibility for the well-being of all overseas Chinese, a concern reflected in the set of crises of concern presented in Chapter 3.

#### Policy Style

As was the case with crisis goals, the ways in which China has responded to crises since 1949 both resembles and differs from Western and Soviet practices. The key differences, which involve the types of armed forces developed by the Chinese and the ways in which they are put to use, have already been largely foreshadowed in the preceding discussion of position, structure, and goals, and hence need not be elaborated in detail.

Western-style crisis management in the postwar era -- at least as practiced by the United States -- has tended to involve the frequent employment of certain types of general purpose forces, notably surface naval combatants, seaborne tactical air, land-based tactical aviation, substantial sea and airlift capabilities, and highly mobile light infantry units (Marine and airborne) (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978). The Soviets have also tended to use some of these same types of units in their crisis operations.<sup>21</sup> When Chinese order of battle data are reviewed, the absence of exactly these types of "crisis managing" forces is striking (for example, Strategic Survey, 1978). Apart from their four airborne divisions, the Chinese have made almost no substantial efforts to acquire these types of "crisis managing" units.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, even in contiguous regions, the weakness of the Chinese naval and air forces place constraints on the types of operations that could be successfully prosecuted (both the naval and air arms of the People's Liberation Army, the omnibus Chinese armed

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<sup>21</sup> In comparison to the United States, the Soviets have placed less emphasis on Marine units and seaborne tactical aviation and slightly more emphasis on ground-emplaced antiaircraft units in such areas as the Middle East.

<sup>22</sup> Further, recent Chinese writings suggest that the PRC's leadership does not place a high priority on the future development of naval forces suitable for larger scale out of area operations (Romance, 1979).

service, are significantly out of date by Soviet or Western standards). Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that the Chinese armed forces have not been structured for long-distance power projection.

An obvious consequence of this force posture is that the Chinese often do not have the option of conducting a large scale Western-style crisis response to events in foreign theaters. This is not to say that extra-regional events are of little concern (Chinese writings suggest quite the opposite) nor that the PRC is completely passive in such cases, since China has used other means, notably advisory training and economic and military aid in such circumstances.<sup>23</sup>

While Chinese crisis management style in extraregional crises differs substantially from that practiced by major Western powers (particularly the U.S.), resemblances are much stronger when Chinese participation in actual armed conflicts on the periphery of China itself are reviewed (for example, the Korean War; Quemoy, 1958; the Sino-Indian border war of 1962; the 1964-1965 escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam; and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes). Chan's analysis (1978) shows that Chinese behaviors in these "local" conflicts closely approximates the rules set forth by George et al. (1971) for the practice of coercive diplomacy:

- Centralized control over military operations,
- Extensive use of both verbal signals and demonstrations in the language of deeds involving armed forces, and
- Employment of graduated escalation (the Sino-Indian clash of 1962 being classic in this regard).

While Chan's analysis shows some areas in which Chinese practice departs from these norms (notably, difficulties in sending clear verbal signals due to the high rhetorical "noise level" in Chinese crisis communications,

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<sup>23</sup> This approach is also quite consistent with China's emphasis on revolutionary self-reliance.

and a failure to provide opponents with adequate reaction time to allow them to adjust their behaviors in desired directions), the overall fit is fairly close. In addition, this emphasis on communication during crises has another, broader potential implication. It is conceivable and consistent with these findings (though by no means proven at this point) that the Chinese may also engage quite deliberately in another, broader type of crisis signaling -- using their open-source literature translated for foreign consumption to communicate their principal concerns to both allies and adversaries.

#### RECONCILIATION OF THE DILEMMA

##### Approach

The methodological strategy developed for this project is designed to reconcile two conflicting objectives:

- To identify crises as perceived by Chinese observers in order to obtain a Chinese perspective on the PRC's crisis management experience, and
- To develop an inventory of Chinese crises and attendant data on their characteristics in a form compatible with previous data files developed by CACI dealing with U.S. (1978a) and Soviet (1978e) crisis behaviors and concerns so as to facilitate comparison.

Based on the preceding reviews of Chinese crisis definitions and the ways in which the Chinese have approached crises and crisis management since 1949, the nature of the dilemma is clear: Chinese and Western perspectives and approaches share little in common.

Since the dilemma is a true one, no absolute solution is possible. Instead, a practical resolution has been developed involving the use of

Chinese sources to identify Western-style crises. Major elements taken from the Western perspective include:

- Treating crises as discrete episodes (in contrast to the Chinese tendency to focus on longer-duration events).
- Defining crises in terms of their actual or potential negative impact on Chinese political-military policy, interests, or values (similar to one of the criteria specified by Herman (1972)).
- Using an organizational process (citation in a Chinese source) to identify cases, much as was done in the Center for Naval Analyses' International Incidents project (Mahoney, 1978).<sup>24</sup>

Major elements taken from the Chinese perspective include:

- A focus on political-military rather than simply military events.
- Presentation of the distinctive crisis management position, structure, goals, and style of the People's Republic, achieved by not focusing exclusively on overt Western-style resort to military intervention.
- A fairly broad view of the various types of negative events that might affect Chinese policy interests (for example, maltreatment of overseas Chinese) and hence would be of concern to the PRC's leadership.

Like all compromises, this research strategy is by no means perfect. While comparable in form, the Chinese and U.S. crisis databases developed by CACI differ in focus, with the U.S. information dealing with more overt forms of extraordinary military management operations and

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<sup>24</sup> Since Chinese sources are published and approved by Party and State apparatuses, they are part of organizational processes in a way that is not true for the Western open-source literature.

the Chinese data dealing primarily with crisis concerns. Given the nature of the problem, it is, however, the best technical solution available.<sup>25</sup>

#### Reliability of Chinese Sources

Since Chinese materials are being used to identify the crises of concern to the People's Republic of China, it is necessary to address the inevitable questions that arise concerning their reliability. All of the materials to be employed are published by Party and State organs. As a consequence, selective perception and presentation of material is quite likely. The Chinese would, after all, have little reason to engage in the considerable expense of preparing publications for foreign dissemination if they had nothing new to add to foreign discussions. Given that the materials to be employed have been produced with quite deliberate aims in mind, can we place any credence in them?

The answer to the question is a qualified yes. Chinese sources are employed to identify events of concern to the Chinese leadership. There is a very high likelihood that the Chinese appreciate the need to communicate their concerns to a wide variety of audiences (foreign and domestic).<sup>26</sup> The works used are explicit attempts to communicate with foreign audiences (all of the materials employed have been translated by the Chinese into Western languages), and an obvious expense to China has been incurred in producing these publications and arranging for their dissemination in the West suggesting that they are not a casual undertaking.

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25 Use of a similar approach to analyze Soviet crisis behaviors and concerns (CACI, 1978e) has demonstrated the practical merits of this type of strategy.

26 It is important to remember that one of the foreign audiences to whom the Chinese attempt to communicate through these media are the Communist parties and movements in the West and Third World in addition to more obvious targets such as Western powers. While we doubt that the materials reviewed present the complete Chinese perspective on events of concern, we also doubt that they would deliberately mislead foreign support groups as to the types of events that have been of concern to them.

We believe that such sources are adequate for the task of identifying those events (out of all world crises since 1949) of particular concern to the Chinese leadership.

In the research strategy adopted, Chinese sources are used in two deliberately limited roles: to identify the crises of concern to the Chinese leadership and to provide information concerning the basic characteristics of these incidents (what actors were seen as being involved, temporal and spatial scope, and so forth). Western sources were also used to provide supplemental information concerning the characteristics of the events themselves. This strategy eliminates or ameliorates many problems that would otherwise arise. For instance, the question of censorship is not a concern; indeed, to the extent that it functions to ensure better consistency across Chinese sources it works to the benefit of the project.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, any deliberate or unconscious misrepresentations of the crises in Chinese materials are not relevant, since Western sources were used (both as cross-checks and as an independent source of information) in coding. Finally, there is no reason to be concerned with the extent to which the writings reflect the "true" beliefs of Chinese leaders. Short of psychotherapy, there may be no way in which the true beliefs of any leaders (Eastern or Western) can be determined. Officially published Chinese perspectives have an objective existence simply by virtue of being published as they are signals that will be received by a variety of audiences of concern to the PRC.

#### Selection of Chinese Sources

The specific materials employed to identify Chinese crisis concerns were selected on the basis of several criteria:

- As an unclassified project, only open-source materials were employed.

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<sup>27</sup> Much as is the case in Western unclassified statements, it is quite conceivable that individual crises/operations of relatively greater

- Materials published by the Chinese in foreign (Western) languages were desired, because these sources make up the PRC's explicit attempts to communicate its concerns to foreign audiences.
- To the extent feasible, the sources reflected Chinese priorities (those materials that they recommend and/or make special effort to disseminate in the West) and the dynamics of the Chinese policy process.
- Material collection was limited by the resources available for this component of the project (the scope of the entire research effort is outlined in Chapter 1).

Using these criteria, four sets of sources were identified and employed:

- Chinese books and pamphlets dealing with international affairs,
- The records of all postwar Congresses of the Communist Party of China,
- Chronologies published by the Chinese, and
- Peking Review (and its predecessor, People's China).<sup>28</sup>

Chinese books and pamphlets on international affairs were obtained by examining the offerings of the major U.S. importers of publications

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sensitivity might not be cited by the Chinese. Since the focus of this project is primarily upon aggregate patterns, this is not a major concern.

<sup>28</sup> The selection of sources was also influenced by CACI's previous experience in a similar project that examined Soviet crisis concerns (1978e). In that earlier effort, Soviet statements in the United Nations and Krushchev's memoirs were also employed in addition to the types of sources listed. Since China did not assume its seat in the U.N. until the 1970's, it was decided not to use U.N. materials. Some "informal" publications that are in some ways analogous to Krushchev's memoirs (1974, 1970) were available to the project and were employed in the evaluation of the reliability and validity of the list of crises presented in Chapter 3 (see Appendix A). However, since these materials (for example, Schram, 1974) were not formally published by the Chinese and did not appear to have undergone the same type of informal review that Krushchev's memoirs received, they were not included in the primary set of sources.

from the PRC and the major outlet for Chinese materials in the Washington, D.C. area. Any item that appeared to deal in any conceivable fashion with international affairs was ordered and coded for relevant materials -- 60 items in all.<sup>29</sup>

Party Congresses play a unique role in the policy processes of Marxist-Leninist states. Accordingly, the records of all postwar Congresses of the Communist Party of China (CPC) were obtained and coded.<sup>30</sup>

Two chronologies published by the Chinese dealing with international events were uncovered during the search for sources: a listing of events during the first decade after the founding of the PRC presented in Peking Review and a chronology of "imperialist states'" involvement in crises and conflicts employed in a previous DARPA-sponsored analysis of Chinese crisis perceptions.<sup>31</sup>

Peking Review is a weekly magazine published in China since 1958, (prior to 1958, the bimonthly People's China served a similar role). This series of publications specifically constitutes one of China's major communications outlets to foreign nations. In the words of the United States outlet advertisement:

Peking Review...(is)...a journal of political affairs expressing the views of the Chinese government on important domestic and foreign issues...

29 The implicit effect of this sampling strategy is that, to the extent that the Chinese "line" on international events changes over time, the books and pamphlets reflect only the most recent views. Since these are also the views with the highest salience for the U.S. policy community audience for whom this report is written, this was viewed as acceptable.

30 Like the Soviets, the Chinese keep only the last Party Congress' materials in print. The records of previous Congresses are public documents and readily obtainable, in English translations published by the PRC, in the holdings of the Library of Congress.

31 The latter chronology has not been disseminated in the West by the Chinese. Given its unique value, and the previous successful employment

Use of Peking Review/People's China allowed for continuous coverage of Chinese views since 1950.<sup>32</sup>

In their analysis of Chinese publications over the period 1973-1974, Bobrow, et al. (forthcoming) found that Peking Review and the Peking Radio Foreign Service gave more comprehensive attention to foreign actors than other materials reviewed. This focus on foreign events coupled with the recommendation of China's principal outlet for publications in the United States led to the inclusion of Peking Review in the set of sources reviewed.<sup>33</sup>

#### DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

##### Definitions

Based on the preceding discussion, crises of concern to the People's Republic of China are defined as:

- Events involving foreign nations (internal or international),

of it by Bobrow et al. (forthcoming), it was included in the sample of sources.

32 Chinese books dealing with international affairs provide, on the average, less material dealing with Chinese perceptions of international crises than is true for comparable Soviet publications used in CACI (1978e). As a result, it was necessary to use a source such as Peking Review to provide additional coverage.

33 Bobrow et al. (forthcoming) have found that Peking Review's coverage of international actors, as assessed in terms of thematic attention, tends to be different from other Chinese media such as People's Daily and daily Peking broadcasts. As they suggest (p. 328), this may be due to audience considerations. For our purposes the differences between Peking Review and other sources are not a crucial concern. Unlike Bobrow et al., we are not attempting to articulate in detail Chinese belief structures. For our purposes, the clear indication by the Chinese that Peking Review is their signaling medium for foreign audiences is the crucial point of concern.

- Involving conflict (violent or nonviolent) significant trends, and "structural" changes that might negatively affect Chinese political-military interests, and
- That are cited in certain classes of Chinese sources.

The first term identifies the geographic scope of the events. Crises internal to China have been excluded because there appear to be no data sources (Chinese or Western) that provide reasonably systematic and consistent accounts of such incidents. Partial exceptions to this rule are events in Tibet prior to the establishment of central Chinese control in that region; events in Tibet and other outer provinces involving the activities of foreign nations; and incidents involving the province of Taiwan, which has remained outside China's control.

The second term refers to three generic types of events that are of interest. The first are violent and nonviolent conflict events, the stuff of which dialectics are made. Concern here is with the character of the events themselves rather than with Chinese conflict behaviors per se. The second set includes dangerous trends and turning points (for example, the Soviet Union's shift to revisionism and later to social imperialism). The third category encompasses what the Chinese see as serious structural threats, for example, the formation of anti-Chinese alliances.

The final term refers to the sources used to identify the events of concern to the Chinese, which are described at greater length below.

#### Sources

Four sets of sources were used to identify the foreign crises of particular concern to the Chinese leadership since October 1, 1949:

- Periodicals (Peking Review and People's China),
- Chinese "state of the world" messages,
- Chinese books and pamphlets dealing with international events, and

- Chronologies published by the Chinese.

The general character of these materials has been considered previously. The specific sources used are listed in Table 1.

Like all operational definitions, this one serves to bracket, rather than precisely delimit, the focus of interest. Because a weekly source (Peking Review) was included in the set of materials consulted, it would have been possible, using a fairly narrow definition of an "event," to identify literally thousands of "crises." To avoid analytically fruitless proliferation of incidents, several criteria were employed in the survey:

- All cases in which China was directly involved and/or expressed considerable interest were included.
- Cases in which the Chinese were likely to have at least a strong indirect interest were always included if at least one of three conditions held:
  - States along or near the Chinese border were involved.
  - Communist parties or regimes were involved.
  - Overseas ethnic Chinese were parties to the incidents.<sup>34</sup>

Wherever practical, (that is, consistent with the character of the crises being examined) separate weekly reports were combined to produce one summary entry for each crisis. Exceptions were made when the Chinese themselves, in the course of discussing an ongoing event, identified break-points, such as the various stages of the Korean conflict. Where necessary, Western sources were used, in an adjunct role, to find more exact starting and termination dates for incidents and to identify additional crisis characteristics.

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<sup>34</sup> These criteria reflect Chinese descriptions of their self-defined interests, as presented in Peking Review and elsewhere.

TABLE 1

Sources Employed to Identify Crises of Concern to the PRC<sup>a</sup>

PERIODICALS

Peking Review, 1958-1978.

People's China, 1949-1958.

CHINESE "STATE OF THE WORLD" MESSAGES

Documents, the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.  
(1977) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Documents, the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China.  
(1973) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Documents, the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China.  
(1969) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Documents, the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China.  
(1956) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

CHINESE BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

Apologists of Neo-Colonialism -- Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU. (1963) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism Leninism. (1977) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Carry the Struggle Against Khrushchov (sic) Revisionism Through to the End.  
(1965) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Cheap Propaganda. (1974) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

A Comment on the March Moscow Meeting. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

The Communist Party, Leader of the Chinese Revolution. (1951) Peking:  
Foreign Languages Press.

<sup>a</sup> As noted previously, older (non-pin zin) forms are employed in this report because of their familiarity. Moreover, some characteristic Chinese Spellings -- such as Khrushchov for Khrushchev are also presented, since that is how the Chinese titles read.

Continued

Table 1  
Sources Employed  
Continued

Confessions Concerning the Line of Soviet-U.S. Collaboration Pursued by the New Leaders of the CPSU. (1966) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Down With Revived Japanese Militarism. (1971) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Down With the New Tsars! (1969) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Fifty Years of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. (1978) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Fighting Cambodia -- Reports of the Chinese Journalists' Delegation to Cambodia. (1975) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Great Changes in Tibet. (1972) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Great Historic Victory -- Celebration of Chairman Hua's Becoming Leader of Communist Party of China and Crushing of the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao Anti-Party Clique. (1976) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

The Heroic Korean People. (1972) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

The Historical Experience of the War Against Fascism. (1965) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Irresistable Historical Trend. (1971) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

The Leaders of the CPSU are Betrayers of the Declaration and the Statement. (1965) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated June 15, 1964. (1964) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated July 30, 1964. (1964) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

A Mirror for Revisionists. (1963) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

A New Page in the Annals of Sino-Japanese Relations. (1972) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Continued

Table 1  
Sources Employed  
Continued

On Khrushchov's (sic) Phony Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World. (1977) Montreal: Red Flag Publications; Reprint of July 14, 1964 People's Daily and Red Flag edition.

Peaceful Coexistence -- Two Diametrically Opposed Policies. (1963) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

People of the World, Unite and Struggle for the Complete Prohibition and Thorough Destruction of Nuclear Weapons. (1971) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement. (1963) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Sino-U.S. Joint Communique. (1975) Peking: Foreign Languages Press; Reprint of February 28, 1972 communique.

Smash the Big U.S.-Soviet Conspiracy. (1967) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Strive for New Victories. (1972) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Total Bankruptcy of Soviet Modern Revisionism. (1968) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Twenty-sixth Anniversary of the "February 28" Uprising of the People of the Taiwan Province. (1973) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Ugly Features of Soviet Social-Imperialism. (1976) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

We Will Always Remember Premier Chou En-Lai. (1977) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Why Krushchov (sic) Fell. (1964) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. (1976) Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Chiao Kuan-Hua (1974) Speech by Chiao Kuan-Hua, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the Plenary Meeting of the 29th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Chou En-Lai (1974) Premier Chou En-Lai's Letter to the Leaders of Asian and African Countries on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question. Peking: Foreign Languages Press; Reprint of 1962 edition.

Continued

Table 1  
Sources Employed  
Continued

Chung Jen (1969) Ugly Performance of Self-Exposure. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Hsi Chang-Hao and Kao Yuan-Mic (1977) Tibet Leaps Forward. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Hua Kuo-Feng (1977) Continue the Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to the End -- A study of Volume V of the Selected Works of Mao Tsetung. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Lo Jui-China (1965) The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. Imperialism Too. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1978) Talk at an Enlarged Working Conference Convened by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Peking: Foreign Languages Press; publication of speech given on January 30, 1962.)

Mao Tsetung (1977a) On the Ten Major Relationships. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1977b) Selected Works of Mao Tsetung Volume V. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1972) Selected Military Writings of Mao Tsetung. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1971) Selected Readings From the Works of Mao Tsetung. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1970) People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1968a) In Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1968b) Speech at Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1967a) Carry the Revolution Through to the End. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1967b) The Present Situation and Our Tasks. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1966a) In Memory of Norman Bethune; Serve the People. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Continued

Table 1  
Sources Employed  
Continued

Mao Tsetung (1966b) On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1966c) Where Do Correct Ideas Come From? Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1966d) Quotations From Chairman Mao Tsetung. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1965) On the People's Democratic Dictatorship. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Mao Tsetung (1961a) On the Chungking Negotiations. Peking: Foreign Languages Press

Mao Tsetung (1961b) Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Shih Chan (1976) A Brief History of the United States. California: Chinese Translation Group (reprint and translation of Chinese edition).

Strong, A.L. (1976) When Serfs Stood Up in Tibet. San Francisco, 1976. Reprint of 1965 New World Press, Peking Edition.

Wei Chi (1978) The Soviet Union Under the New Tsars. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

CHRONOLOGIES

"A Chronology of Events: Ten Years of New China." Peking Review, September 28, 1958.

Imperialism is the Highest Stage of Capitalism: Summary and Annotation. (1974) Shanghai: People's Publishing House (reprinted and translated in Bobrow et al. (forthcoming)).

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CHAPTER 3. CRISES OF CONCERN TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1978

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CRISIS LIST

Using the methods and sources presented in Chapter 2, 386 crises of concern to the People's Republic of China were identified over the period 1949-1978. These incidents are listed in Table 1.

To the extent feasible, the events presented in the following pages have been written from a Chinese perspective in order to capture (to the limited extent this can be done with such short entries) some of the "flavor" of the events, as perceived in the People's Republic. In the interests of brevity, a number of standard abbreviations are used in the entries, for example:

- CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance),
- CP (Communist Party),
- CPC (Chinese Communist Party),
- CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union),
- DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, sometimes presented as No. Korea or NK),
- DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam: North Vietnam),
- FRG (Federal Republic of Germany),
- KMT (Kuomintang: the Nationalist Party regime on Taiwan and some of China's offshore islands),
- PLA (People's Liberation Army: the Chinese armed forces),
- PRC (The People's Republic of China, also referred to simply as "China"),
- ROK (Republic of Korea; also "SK", for South Korea),

- SVN (South Vietnam),
- U.N. (United Nations),
- VN (Vietnam: both North and South), and
- WP (Warsaw Pact/Warsaw Treaty Organization).

TABLE I  
 Major International Crises of Concern  
 to the People's Republic of China, 1949-1978  
 (as seen through Chinese eyes)

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
001	491001	People's Republic of China established; USSR plays valuable role.
002	491001-491208	Following establishment of PRC, Chiang Kai-shek retreats to Taipei, Taiwan. 23,0000 KMT troops withdraw into French Indochina.
003	491000-501025	Following victory of CPC in Chinese civil war, Mao notes Stalin acting suspicious of Communist victories of the "Tito" type. Where local CP's achieve victory on own. Soviet pressure on the PRC to conform to Soviet desires becomes very great. Chinese intervention in Korea reduces Stalin's fears.
004	491129	Chou En-lai warns all countries harboring KMT bandits that they will bear all consequences arising from this policy.
005	500103	U.S. signs secret agreement with KMT to provide aid. U.S. takes full charge of political, military, and economic affairs of Taiwan.
006	500100-500700	Armed conflict between PLA and KMT forces continues following major evacuation to Taiwan. 500516: Hainan Island is liberated.
007	500221-500303	KMT air raids on Shanghai, Hangchow, Tsingtao, Nanking, Canton, Foochow, Nanchang, resulting in severe casualties,

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
008	500228-500000	Anti-KMT uprising in Taiwan; many patriots killed.
009	500420	U.S. vessel wantonly rams Chinese ship in Pohai Bay; 70 Chinese die.
010	500400	U.S./KMT agents destroy 7 PRC civil aircraft at Kai Tak airport.
011	500517	UK authorities detain 70 Chinese aircraft in Hong Kong. PRC protests.
012	500625-500905	U.S. imperialists openly instigate ROK puppet regime to attack Korean People's Democratic Republic. Part of plan to strike at Vietnam, Philippines, PRC. U.S. satellites under U.N. guise involved. U.S. attack directly menaces China's security.
013	500627	U.S. dispatches 7th Fleet to Taiwan Straits to protect Chiang Kai-shek clique. Seen by PRC as long-prepared, direct armed attack by U.S. on PRC.
014	500627	U.S. President announces U.S. intervention in Indochina.
015	500600	U.S./KMT agents in Hong Kong seize 5 PRC fishing craft with connivance of UK authorities.
016	500727-500817	British authorities conduct series of deliberate border violations with aircraft, ground forces operating out of Hong Kong.
017	500800	Overseas Asian minorities (Chinese, Indians, others) in South Africa

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		wage struggle against racial discrimination. Mao expresses full support of PRC.
018	500901-520400	Numerous French aircraft, ground forces violate PRC-Indochina border. City of Hokow, other population centers bombed, strafed. French airdrop supplies, equipment to KMT troops operating on PRC-VN border. PRC warns French, orders PLA to deliver counter-blows.
019	500915-501024	U.S. actions cause Korean People's Army to withdraw from Seoul. U.S. aggression in Korea a direct threat to PRC; China warns U.S., satellites not to antagonize PRC further.
020	501007-510523	PLA begins liberation of Tibet. U.S., UK make hostile moves to obstruct benevolent Chinese effort. Liberation completed on 23 May.
021	501025-530627	PLA, Chinese People's Volunteers join Korean People's Army in routing American, Rhee puppet forces, liberating Pyongyang. Enemy flee in confusion with heavy losses. PLA intervention a necessary response to U.S. bombing of Chinese border cities. Ceasefire finally agreed upon.
022	500000	People's armed struggle expands in Burma.
023	500000	Armed struggle in Malaya. UK colonial authorities begin mass repression of Chinese residents, clashes

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		with people's armed forces. PRC denies providing any support to insurgents, protests UK persecution, demands halt.
024	511023	Mao claims U.S. scheming to occupy DPRK, invade PRC mainland.
025	510100-541200	U.S., KMT continue agent infiltration into PRC; many killed, captured.
026	510200-511000	Thai government starts anti-Chinese campaign; newspaper editor arrested, plans made to expel all Chinese from restricted areas. PRC protests strongly, but mass arrests, deportation, terror continue.
027	510412	Hong Kong authorities seize Chinese oil tanker; PRC accuses UK of provocation, warns UK of consequences.
028	510908	U.S. excludes PRC, signs separate peace treaty with Japan. PRC denounces U.S. move.
029	511200	Tibetan reactionaries demand PLA withdrawal from Tibet.
030	510000	While PLA is liberating Tibet, India makes massive incursions, occupies nearly 90,000 km <sup>2</sup> of Chinese territory, evicting local administrators.
031	511100-540600	PRC still having problems with internal opposition; campaign to eliminate counter-revolutionaries continues. All KMT bandits eliminated from coastal provinces by June 1954.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Events</u>
032	520100	UK authorities deport 8 Chinese cinema workers; send groups of armed bandits into PRC to rob, sabotage, spread propaganda. PRC protests strongly.
033	520301	Delegation from Canton fired upon by UK police, soldiers in Hong Kong. Several are wounded, over 1,000 are arrested. PRC warns UK about consequences.
034	521028	UK authorities continue seizure of PRC aircraft in Hong Kong. PRC protests.
035	521214	Major riot at U.S. POW camp on Pongam Island; numerous Chinese, Koreans killed, wounded. PRC lodges stern protest with U.N. over maltreatment of prisoners.
036	530205-530216	U.S. represses disorders in POW camp on Koje Island; PRC, North Korea protest U.S. killing of prisoners.
037	530219	Local PRC official protests UK authorities' seizure of PRC fishing vessel in Hong Kong.
038	530200	U.S. attempts to block Finnish merchant ship from sailing to PRC, orders KMT puppets to seize same.
039	530305-530900	Following Stalin's death in March 1953, Khrushchev and his counter-revolutionary group seize leadership of CPSU, USSR by coup d'etat. Usurpers work towards restoration of capitalism in USSR.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Events</u>
040	530000	Local opposition to rule from Peking begins when Lo Kongwa, a Tibetan noble dismissed by the Dalai Lama, organizes foreign contacts, support; KMT airdrops, aid from India received by rebels.
041	540200-540507	U.S. dispatches USAF personnel to participate in military operations in Vietnam; U.S. prepares to fill vacuum later created when French withdraw after 7 May defeat at Dien Bien Phu. U.S. policy a serious threat to Asian freedom, security. Geneva accords signed.
042	540626-540800	PRC accidentally shoots down UK transport aircraft near Hainan Island; U.S. dispatches naval units to scene, USN planes over-flying island shoot down 2 PRC patrol craft; 2 other U.S. planes strafe 2 Polish merchant ships, Chinese escort vessel. PRC protests strongly, warns U.S. of consequences.
043	540908	SEATO formed; PRC condemns act.
044	540900-550226	Chiang Kai-shek group carries on war of harassment, destruction against SE coast, islands of PRC. U.S. shields, abets KMT crimes, supports KMT blockade of PRC, concludes Mutual Security Treaty. PLA liberates Yikiangshan, Tachen, Yushan, Ashan, Nanchishan Islands. U.S. helps KMT withdraw, abduct local population. PRC condemns KMT, accuses U.S. of threat to peace.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
045	541031-620318	Algerian national liberation struggle begins; French try to suppress same, using much violence. U.S. trying to supplant French. PRC pledges support, sends money to Algerian NLM, extends diplomatic recognition. After extended, bitter struggle France recognizes Algerian independence.
046	540000	India makes further encroachments in western, middle sectors of Sino-Indian border.
047	550411	U.S./KMT agents sabotage aircraft carrying PRC delegates home from Bandung Conference. Time bomb placed in aircraft while at Hong Kong. Representatives from PRC, DRV, Poland, Austria on board. 11 Chinese are killed.
048	550510	8 USAF planes violate airspace of NE China; one shot down. PRC very unhappy at continued U.S. intrusions.
049	550526-550500	Khrushchev visits Tito, attempts to settle differences. CPC eventually (1963) sees this as key contribution to Sino-Soviet differences.
050	550700	Reactionary clique of Tibetans encourages Khambas in Sikang Province to rebel. Uprising quickly, violently stamped out.
051	550900	PRC denounces armed Portuguese suppression of demonstrators in Goa, Daman, Diu demanding union with India. NATO obviously involved.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
052	550900	PRC condemns bloody French suppression of Moroccan people.
053	551100	Armed clash between PLA and Burmese military along boundary. Incident seen by PRC as unfortunate misunderstanding.
054	551225	ROK navy vessels shell, attempt to seize PRC fishing vessels on high seas. One fisherman kidnapped. PRC lodges strong protest.
055	550000	U.S.-supplied KMT bandits in northern Burma continue to cause trouble to PRC, Burmese government.
056	550000	Emergency resolution by Congress authorizes U.S. President to use armed forces in Taiwan Straits.
057	550000-720717	USSR takes advantage of Egyptian difficulties, uses aid as front, worms way into Egypt.
058	550000-560000	Members of Dalai Lama's retinue tour Tibetan monasteries in Western Szechuan, instigate Kangting rebellion, murder of Han Chinese. Limited KMT airdrops to rebels suppressed by end of 1956; a few bandits remain in area.
059	560109-560207	U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft, balloons violate PRC air-space over mainland, off-shore islands. PRC protests strongly.
060	560214-560221	CPSU holds XX Congress in Moscow; CPC sends delegation. Khrushchev attacks errors of Stalin in secret

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		speech. PRC partially approves at first; later (1963) publicly reverses opinion, sees Khrushchev as throwing away Stalin's "sword," indirectly encouraging Gomulka, Hungarians to take advantage of situation; new policy aims at uniting USSR with U.S. imperialism to dominate world.
061	560200-560900	PRC resists Japanese pressure to return 40,000 Japanese civilians, soldiers missing in China since World War II, but waives prosecution of last group of alleged war criminals.
062	560300	U.S. tacitly supports start of anti-Chinese persecution campaign by Diem regime in South Vietnam.
063	560400	KMT fighter lands in Hong Kong after making sortie over PRC mainland; PRC protests.
064	560400	U.S. continues to prevent Chinese students from returning to PRC.
065	560529	PRC rejects Filipino claim to Nansha Islands, attempts to justify attempts to invade, occupy islands. PRC also claims Paracel, Spratley Islands, warns against encroachments on PRC sovereignty.
066	560616-561215	Last foreign troops evacuate Egypt. Nasser nationalizes Suez Canal. 31 Oct: UK, France, Israel attack. PRC supports Nasser, condemns invasion, warns France, UK about possibility of war, sends money to

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		Egypt, offers volunteers to help run canal. Imperialists withdraw under pressure. U.S. trying to supplant UK in Middle East.
067	560600	CPSU leaders make grave errors in dealing with riots in Poznan, Poland following XX CPSU Congress. USSR sends troops to subdue Polish comrades, makes error of great power chauvinism, damages international movement severely. Gomulka takes advantage of situation. Chou En-lai criticizes Soviets for gross interference in Polish affairs.
068	560731-560800	PLA forces cross Burmese border into Wa State, establish outposts. PRC denies, then admits act, shows interest in border delineation negotiations.
069	560823	More U.S. air, naval intrusions, demands for compensation, PRC acceptance of responsibility. PRC rejects U.S. demands, tells U.S. to halt intrusions.
070	560901	CPC protests FRG outlawing of KPD, persecution of German Communists.
071	560900-	Japan requests USSR to return Kurile Islands seized at end of World War II. PRC indignant at U.S. for pressuring Japan on this issue.
072	561010-561100	UK authorities fail to halt KMT-instigated riots in Hong Kong, leading to loss of life and destruction of property. PRC protests, delivers stern warning to

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		UK. Chinese authorities round up numbers of KMT agents sent to Canton to organize sabotage during the same time period.
073	561000-561104	Hungarian people with Soviet military support smash counter-revolutionary attempt to restore capitalism. PRC defends justice of Soviet move but sympathizes with demands of Hungarian people, notes Soviet mistakes of past.
	561000-561104	In later evaluation (1963) the PRC reassesses the Hungarian revolution. CPSU accused of grave errors by [temporarily] adopting policy of capitulation, resulting in serious difficulties for many CP's and the international Communist movement. CPC agrees that rebellion had to be smashed but opposes great power chauvinism, criticizes CPSU's great concern over prestige maintenance.
074	570300-571230	U.S. backs coup attempt in Syria, pushes Turkey to carry out provocations, plot war. Turkish troops deploy near border; U.S. 6th Fleet moves to East Mediterranean. USSR warns aggressors; Mao declares PRC support of Syria.
075	570524	Murder of Chinese citizen leads to anti-U.S. demonstration in Taipei, Taiwan. Government intervenes massively with troops; arrests 230.
076	570721-600700	Large-scale uprising frees most of Oman; UK strikes back ruthlessly,

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		killing many, causing great destruction. National liberation struggle continues; PRC repeatedly declares support for Omani people.
077	570000	Indonesian people begin struggle to recover West Irian from imperialists.
078	570000-580000	Anti-PRC insurgency conducted by reactionary clique in Tibet. U.S., UK, India are involved. Rebellion moves into Tibet proper; U.S. air-drops weapons and supplies, rebels raid PLA, are active in Chamdo, Dinching, Nagchuka, Loka, Chinghai, Kansu. India lends printing facilities, support.
079	580215-580430	Rebellion breaks out on Sumatra. U.S., Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan are involved. U.S. aircraft bomb towns, ports, shipping. PRC supports Indonesian government, extends aid, echoes serious Soviet warnings to interventionists, the U.S. in particular.
080	580407	KMT bomber lands in Hong Kong after harassing PRC mainland. PRC lodges strong protest with UK authorities.
081	580513	Japanese fishing boats ram PRC vessels, destroy fishing nets in Chinese restricted areas; PRC demands amends.
082	580516-580530	French Union collapses; French CP supports governmental move to set up French Community. CPC criticizes French CP decision.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
083	580500-580800	UK aircraft from Hong Kong repeatedly violate PRC airspace. UK authorities prohibit local flying of PRC flag, singing of national anthem, forcibly close school, persecute PRC correspondents. PRC lodges strong protest, warns UK to halt provocations.
084	580618-581100	UK troops intervene in Jordan. PRC condemns UK action, warns UK to halt aggression, stages mass demonstrations in Peking.
085	580622-581104	U.S. troops intervene in Lebanon. PRC condemns U.S. action, demands halt, conducts mass rally in Peking.
086	580823-581020	[Second] Taiwan Straits crisis. PRC claims 12 NM territorial waters, commences shelling of Quemoy Island, sinks KMT naval vessel. After at least one temporary suspension of shelling, crisis abates. PRC rejects U.S. charges of armed aggression.
087	580825	KMT air force attack on Fukien Province; one enemy plane is shot down.
088	580900	Fifteen Indian soldiers intrude into SW Sinkiang, are sent back.
089	580929	Guinea becomes independent, rejects new French constitution. DeGaulle halts all aid; PRC declares support.
090	580900-590200	KMT forces in Laos repeatedly invade Yunnan Province; U.S. provides extensive military aid.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
091	581114-581200	PRC backs Khrushchev proposals on ending allied occupation of Berlin, GDR proposal on German peace treaty.
092	581100	Thai government searches, arrests Chinese residents, closes Chinese newspapers on charges of Communist subversion. PRC protests, demands halt to hostile acts.
093	580000	Thai-Cambodian relations become tense; Thailand falsely accuses PRC of being behind tension.
094	590101	Batista dictatorship in Cuba overthrown despite U.S. backing. PRC declares support for new regime, opposes U.S. efforts to meddle.
095	590100	South Vietnam regime massacres over a thousand political prisoners in Phu Loi. PRC protests strongly; DRV demands investigation of crime. U.S. presence leads to such problems.
096	590100	U.S. instigates Laotian government to make border claims against DRV, conduct armed intrusions across border into DRV, attack Pathet Lao. U.S. military aid, advisers pour into country; U.S. colludes with KMT remnants in Burma, Laos, falsely accuses DRV of aggression. PRC rejects U.S. accusations of subversion in Laos, denounces U.S. schemes, trial of Pathet Lao, Communist leaders.
097	590100-591000	Anticolonialist unrest leads to popular revolts in Congo. PRC supports Congolese, demands independence for Congo.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
098	590219-600816	PRC denounces UK decision to establish Republic of Cyprus.
099	590220-590405	SVN gunboats seize Chinese fishing vessels, capture fishermen, land crew on Shenghang Island, tear down PRC flag. SVN aircraft violate PRC airspace over Hsisha Archipelago. PRC outraged, demands release, return, compensation, sees U.S. as instigator, warns Saigon against infringement on PRC territory.
100	590200	Malay government suspends operations of Bank of China. PRC rejects accusations of Chinese subversive activities in Malaya, accuses U.S. of instigating troubles.
101	590200-611001	Cameroon people struggle for independence; Anglo-French colonialists oppose effort. U.S. attempting to supplant old colonialist powers. PRC supports just demand of Cameroon people.
102	590306	Thai government declares trade ban with PRC. Latter denounces same as extremely unfriendly act.
103	590310-610000	Local traitors, reactionaries, imperialists, KMT bandits abduct Dalai Lama, launch armed rebellion. 21-22 March: PLA campaign stamps out uprising in Lhasa; effort in rural areas continues through April. PRC openly denounces U.S., Indian, KMT, Ceylonese support for rebels.
104	590300-640706	Nyasaland people struggle against UK colonialists for national liberation. PRC supports same, condemns UK suppression.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
105	590401-621200	U.S. ships, aircraft continue to violate PRC territorial waters, airspace. PRC protests, issues serious warnings.
106	590400	KMT bandits in Burma continuing to harass PRC frontiers.
107	590600-600300	Greek government arrests, tries Greek Communist leader; PRC demands his release.
108	590600-650809	Singapore people wage struggle for national independence.
109	590700	Pakistani government plots to undermine Chinese sovereignty, territorial integrity, prestige. PRC protests grave provocation [KMT Moslems visit Pakistan].
110	590700-671130	Nehru encourages reactionary forces to overthrow Communist government of Kerala State, India.
111	590700-671130	South Yemeni people struggle against imperialists. PRC declares support.
112	590700-591116	India starts series of border violations, leading to several armed clashes, one of near-company size. PRC denies Indian allegations of invasion into Indian territory, lodges serious protest. PRC, India make counterproposals re: troop withdrawals; PRC unilaterally ends patrol activity. USSR straddles fence.
113	590900	Khrushchev, Eisenhower meet at Camp David; USSR begins policy of capitulationism, catering to U.S. needs.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
114	591126	Chinese diplomat is kidnapped by U.S. in Bombay. PRC denounces excuse of "political asylum," makes serious protest.
115	591200-601215	Large-scale anti-Chinese wave of hysteria launched in Indonesia. PRC demands halt or governmental action to permit ethnic Chinese to return to PRC. Indonesia signs treaty on dual nationality citizens.
116	590000-620000	Soviet revisionists initiate economic sabotage of PRC leading to temporary economic difficulties.
117	590000-740910	People of Guinea-Bissau struggle for national liberation, are eventually victorious. PRC declares support for struggle.
118	600100-600500	U.S., Japan sign mutual defense treaty. PRC very unhappy, holds mass rallies to denounce act. May 1960: over 200,000 Japanese patriots besiege government, demand abrogation of treaty, dissolution of Diet, resignation of Prime Minister.
119	600100-600809	Unrest, internal dissension in Laos lead to series of coups d'etat. 600809: patriotic coup by Kong Le overthrows U.S.-fostered traitor government. PRC denies U.S. allegations of intervention, aggression.
120	600411-600429	Mass rioting leads to ouster of Syngman Rhee regime in South Korea.
121	600428-600527	Mass unrest, government violence leads to overthrow of Menderes

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		regime. PRC denounces U.S. aid to Turkey, demands U.S. withdrawal.
122	600400	PRC denies Indian allegations of airspace violations by PRC aircraft, claims these were U.S. aircraft dropping supplies to KMT agents deep in Chinese territory. Indian charge a very unfriendly act.
123	600426	<u>Peking Review</u> publishes "Long Live Leninism," major statement of policy. PRC starts on road to ideological, foreign policy independence.
124	600501-600615	U-2 incident: deliberate U.S. effort to wreck 4-power summit conference. PRC indignant, declares full support for USSR.
125	600610-601128	Demonstrations in Japan force Eisenhower to cancel trip; during same period PLA shells Quemoy Island in armed anti-U.S. demonstration.
126	600628	PRC border guards pursue Tibetan rebel bandits into Nepal, exchange fire with Nepalese border troops. PRC denies incident took place on Nepalese side of boundary.
127	600629	Cuban government seizes U.S. property in Cuba; U.S. imposes economic sanctions. PRC establishes diplomatic relations, signs trade, other agreements, extends credits to Castro regime.
128	600630-610727	Imperialist bloc launches armed aggression against newly independent Congo. U.S. uses U.N. as tool to subvert Lumumba government, seize

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		control. 1 December: Lumumba captured. PRC repeatedly declares support of Congolese people.
129	600600	CPSU makes surprise assault on CPC at 3rd Congress of Rumanian CP in Bucharest.
130	600716	Khrushchev arbitrarily withdraws all Soviet technicians from PRC.
131	600700	PRC severs all economic ties with South Africa, condemns criminal massacres, supports struggle of South African people.
132	600700-610200	Indian government embarks on anti-Chinese campaign, evicts PRC correspondent; maltreats, deports ethnic Chinese residents. PRC protests, denounces campaign.
133	600900	Yugoslav bandits make incursion into Albania. PRC denounces Yugoslav act.
134	601215	Chinese correspondent in Yugoslavia assaulted; government is indifferent. PRC protests.
135	600000-650920	Indian armed force intrusions into PRC increase; aircraft overfly Sinkiang, drop supplies (to insurgents), ground forces make incursions from Sikkim. PRC denies Indian accusations of Chinese intrusions into Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal; protests Indian violations; warns Indians repeatedly to desist.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
136	610113-610400	U.S. breaks diplomatic ties with Cuba, launches armed aggression [Bay of Pigs], fails. PRC sharply condemns U.S. aggression, hails great Cuban victory, declares support for Cuban people.
137	610100-611209	Tanganyikan people struggle against UK imperialism; PRC supports effort.
138	610214	Lumumba murdered; U.S., Belgium implicated. PRC protests bitterly, declares support for Congolese people, holds series of mass rallies.
139	610314	KMT remnant patrol enters Yunnan Province from Laos, attempts to abduct some locals, forced to flee. PRC condemns U.S., Phoumi clique connivance.
140	610300-610900	Major unrest in South Korea; strikes, demonstrations oppose regime, U.S. presence. 16 May: military coup d'etat instigated by U.S.; new regime turns on leftists, news media.
141	610500	Thai government makes mass arrests of Thai patriots, accuses PRC, DRV of supporting insurgency. PRC denounces Thai slanders as cover for Thai outrages.
142	610500	Angolan national liberation struggle spreads; PRC resolutely supports armed uprising.
143	610600-610700	U.S. "cooks up" Berlin crisis as pretext for stepping up arms production, war preparations. PRC

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**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		supports Warsaw Pact position on German question.
144	610717	French paratroops make air drop on Bizerta; French air force attacks Tunisian positions. PRC condemns new act of aggression by French colonialists.
145	610700	Iraq claims Kuwait; UK military forces intervene. PRC demands immediate withdrawal.
146	610700-610800	CPSU leaders persuade Gizenga to attend Congolese parliament. U.S. also involved in break-up of Gizenga regime and his arrest. PRC labels arrest a setback in National Liberation struggle of Congolese people, demands his release, condemns U.S. use of U.N. to destroy patriotic forces in Congo.
147	610900	U.S. intervention forces President Quadros to resign. PRC supports independent Brazilian foreign policy, condemns U.S. interference.
148	611019	Chou En-lai attends XXII CPSU Congress in Moscow, the last to which PRC sends delegation. Meeting used by CPSU to attack other CP's, oppose Marxism-Leninism, split Socialist camp. Soviet revisionists discard dictatorship of proletariat.
149	611208	Uprising breaks out in Brunei aimed at overthrowing British rule. UK sends in large numbers of troops. PRC backs people's struggle for national liberation.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
150	611218	Indian troops invade, end Portuguese rule over Goa, Daman, Diu; PRC supports Indian move.
151	611219-620900	New phase in Indonesia's effort to liberate West Irian begins. Sukarno directs general mobilization. 6204: military operations start. Dutch send in military reinforcements, attack Indonesian patrol boats. U.S. supports Netherlands through alliances, U.N. Indonesian struggle succeeds.
152	611200	Iranian government arrests, jails Tudeh Party members. PRC supports demand for their release, sympathizes with struggle of Iranian people against massive U.S. presence, aggression, agents.
153	610000	Khrushchev breaks diplomatic, economic ties with Albania, deprives latter of rights as member of WP, CMEA. USSR instigates attempted overthrow of Hoxha regime; plot foiled.
154	620107	Imperialists instigate attempt on life of Sukarno; PRC concerned.
155	620306	Ne Win comes to power in Burma; PRC recognizes new regime.
156	620400-620500	CPSU carries out large-scale subversion in Ili region of Sinkiang, enticing tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into emigrating to USSR. PRC protests this astounding event.

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Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
157	620517	U.S. orders armed forces into Thailand. PRC denounces move as flagrant war provocation, warns U.S. that it cannot tolerate U.S. military forces in Laos so close to PRC directed against China.
158	620500	Spanish workers struggle against Franco regime; PRC declares support.
159	620612	3 Laotian princes agree on formation of coalition government; a defeat for U.S.
160	620800	USSR, U.S. sign partial nuclear test ban treaty. PRC denounces act as betrayal, superpower plot to deprive PRC of right to possess nuclear weapons, resist U.S. threat.
161	620800-631000	Taiwan sends additional groups of agents to infiltrate PRC by sea, air, conduct terrorist sabotage. U.S. instigating, supporting KMT efforts.
162	621020-621122	Indian armed forces start massive offensive in both eastern and western sectors of border. PRC denies Indian claim that it launched attack into India. 22 November: PRC declares [unilateral] ceasefire. USSR discards all camouflage, openly sides with U.S. in supporting India against PRC. India times attack to coincide with PRC economic difficulties, KMT harassment of southeastern coastal areas.

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**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
163	621022-621100	U.S. quarantines Cuba, alerts armed forces worldwide; USSR agrees to withdraw "offensive weapons" from Cuba. PRC condemns piratical U.S. crime, voices full support for Cuban people, holds mass rallies, takes offense at Tito's accusation of Socialist states' responsibility for crisis, accuses USSR of betraying interests of working people of Sinkiang, enticing tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into emigrating to USSR. PRC protests astounding event.
164	621100-621200	Bulgarian CP groundlessly attacks Albanian CP; CPC objects. Hungarian, Czech CP Congresses also used as forum for attacking other CP's to include direct vilification of Chinese party. USSR as instigator, responsible. Events of utmost gravity in international Communist movement.
165	620000	Two attempts made to assassinate President Nkrumah of Ghana; PRC condemns imperialists, resolutely supports Ghanaian people.
166	620000	Enemies of the people engineer a counter-revolutionary rebellion in Mali. PRC condemns imperialists, resolutely supports Malian people.
167	620000-	Peoples of Northern, Southern Rhodesia struggle for national independence; PRC pays tribute to struggle.
168	58000-740910	People of Portuguese Guinea struggle for national independence; PRC pays tribute to struggle.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
169	630100	UK authorities in Hong Kong illegally attempt to demolish houses in Kowloon; PRC protests.
170	630100-630800	Indian government intensifies campaign against overseas Chinese, pro-PRC leftists; thousands jailed. PRC sends ships to evacuate interned Chinese nationals.
171	630300	Iraqi government carries out mass murder of local Communists; PRC protests strongly.
172	630300-630500	Another wave of anti-Chinese incidents, riots break out in Indonesia leading to widespread destruction of property. Riots clearly carefully prepared, executed according to plan.
173	630300-630714	CPSU, CPC exchange series of open letters; dispute becomes increasingly acrimonious.
174	630300-650820	UK establishes Federation of Malaysia, sends in troops, interns patriots, sympathizers. UK, U.S., India, Thailand, Philippines collude, attempt to destroy Malayan national liberation movement [CP]. PRC denounces Federation, actively supports local opposition. Eventually Singapore withdraws, a defeat for UK, U.S. project.
175	630627-630630	Soviet citizens smash display window in front of PRC embassy in Moscow. Local police not very helpful. USSR demands recall of five members of Chinese embassy. PRC protests.

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**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
176	630805	USSR, other powers sign treaty banning atmospheric nuclear testing. Called fraud by PRC; seen as damaging Soviet defensive capabilities, collusion with West. Treaty leads to new arms race, nuclear proliferation.
177	630822-630902	Czechoslovakia closes down Chinese press office, later expels PRC diplomat. PRC protests.
178	630902	Anti-Chinese demonstrations held in front of PRC embassy in Moscow. PRC protests.
179	630907	Soviet border troops persecute Chinese train passengers, five military students, force all to depart USSR under armed escort. PRC protests strongly, denies Soviet allegations of outrages against Soviet border defenses.
180	630900-660800	U.S., SVN, Thai forces commit repeated provocations, intrusions, armed attacks into Cambodia. Latter protests, warns U.S. PRC repeatedly condemns aggressive acts of U.S. and its lackeys, declares support of Cambodia.
181	631031-631116	U.S. spy Barghoorn arrested in USSR, later released on U.S. protest. PRC accuses USSR of appeasement.
182	631000	USSR joins "Holy Alliance" of U.S., Japan against PRC. USSR colluding with West, betraying own people.

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Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
183	630000-640000	Yugoslavia leaves socialist camp; internal social system degenerates into capitalism.
184	640109	Riots break out in Canal Zone over flag issue. U.S. military suppress same violently; further riots explode in Panama City. PRC expresses concern, support to Panamanian President; mass demonstrations in Peking display fierce wrath against U.S. atrocities.
185	640100-641129	Armed revolt breaks out east of Leopoldville. 6408: U.S. intervenes, sends troops, equipment. Stanleyville seized by invaders, but U.S., Belgium forced to withdraw. Over 10,000 Congolese killed. PRC, world condemn imperialist aggression; Mao calls events very grave matter; mass rallies held in Peking.
186	640324-630520	Thousands march in Seoul, demonstrate against South Korean talks with Japan, regime. Police, soldiers attack demonstrators, arrest many.
187	640419-650131	U.S. instigates right-wing coup in Laos; unrest continues as two battalions stage armed uprising. Internal fighting causes great losses in property, lives. PRC demands release of imprisoned officials.
188	640400	Bhutanese Prime Minister is assassinated. PRC denies Indian charges of complicity, accuses India of involvement.

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Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
189	640400-650421	Brazilian President Goulart ousted by military coup instigated by U.S. New government arrests, tortures Chinese citizens, later tries, imprisons same. PRC seriously upset, demands halt. Brazil eventually releases prisoner.
190	640611	U.S. fighter-bombers hit quarters of Chinese mission, killing, wounding several. PRC protests strongly.
191	640611-641218	Two KMT reconnaissance planes shot down over PRC territory. A third is downed by Chinese Navy.
192	640700-650108	U.S.-KMT agents continue to try to infiltrate PRC, agents are captured or killed by PLA.
193	640700-651212	India resumes ground, air intrusions into PRC. Armed clashes on 19 September, 13, 24 November, 12 December. PRC denies Indian accusations of intrusions into Sikkim. PRC protests, warns India to halt provocations, warns of consequences; issues ultimatum 650919; Indians flee.
194	640802-750430	So-called Tonkin incident leads to U.S. dispatch of ground forces to Vietnam, air attacks on DRV, mining of Haiphong harbor. Long war ends with signing of Paris agreement on 730127, departure of U.S. troops on 730329. Major victories by DRV, People's Liberation Army lead to collapse of regime, liberation of Saigon.
195	641014	Khrushchev ousted; seen as good, justified by PRC as great victory for Marxist-Leninists of world.

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Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
196	641111	Exposure of U.S. scheme to subvert new government of Tanzania leads to wave of protests, mammoth demonstrations. PRC provides military assistance, hails overthrow of U.S. plot.
197	641100	Under new Brezhnev regime, USSR increases disruption of status quo along Sino-Soviet border, encroachments on Chinese sovereignty.
198	641200	Convocation by CPSU of drafting committee composed of representatives of pro-Moscow CP's seen by CPC as day of great split in international movement.
199	650129	Burundi suddenly breaks diplomatic ties with PRC, evicts entire Chinese embassy staff. U.S., Belgium arrange assassination of Burundian Prime Minister.
200	650200	Thai Patriotic Front formed, launches struggle to evict U.S. Clashes with police, executions of local officials, extensive guerrilla activity in N.E. Thailand. 6507: Upsurge; 761006: especially bloody incident.
201	650301-650305	Despite widespread opposition, CPSU convenes meeting of CP's in Moscow; an extremely grave step leading to split in international movement.
202	650301-650305	Over 200 Third World students demonstrate in front of U.S. embassy in Moscow in protest against U.S.

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Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		aggression in Vietnam. Soviet police, soldiers suppress demonstration. PRC protests, especially maltreatment of Chinese participants.
203	650303	Vietnamese students in Leningrad protesting U.S. aggression are brutally attacked by Soviet police; many arrested, maltreated.
204	650300-660100	USSR accuses PRC of delaying transit of Soviet military aid to DRV.
205	650424-651219	Coup d'etat against traitorous Dominican Republic dictatorship breaks out. 650428: U.S. sends in armed forces, uses OAS to impose "settlement." Mao condemns U.S. action, declares PRC support of Dominican people; massive rally in Peking, worldwide approval of PRC stand. Invaders eventually depart and armed struggle resumes.
206	650711-650802	U.S. military aircraft renew intrusions into PRC airspace, this time from south. U.S. aircraft attack PRC fishing boats on high seas. PRC protests strongly, condemns U.S. atrocities.
207	650806-651114	U.S./Taiwanese naval intrusions. PRC Navy sinks 3 KMT warships.
208	650820-650827	Further violent demonstrations in Seoul oppose South Korean treaty with Japan, U.S. presence, Pak regime, leaving capital in chaos. Gov't. resorts again to harsh repression, closure of universities.

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Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
209	650800-690800	Civil rights struggle in U.S. spreads, takes on class character. Police battles in Chicago; state of insurrection in California, 20,000 police troops battle in Los Angeles. Gov't. suppression a provocation against Africa, whole world. Other battles in Cleveland, NYC, Jackson, Detroit. Mao publicly supports struggle for racial equality.
210	650906-650923	India launches armed attack on Pakistan. U.S., UK, USSR instigate Indian aggression.
211	650930-660400	Sept. 30 Movement attacks CIA-front council of generals in Indonesia. Suharto, Indonesian military react with wholesale assault on Indonesian CP. Over 300,000 patriots massacred, over 150,000 jailed. Indonesian CP takes resistance struggle to countryside. USSR supplies arms to fascist Suharto regime, opposes CPI.
212	650900	PRC acts to prevent Soviet participation in Afro-Asian conference.
213	651015-660205	Anti-Vietnam War protest in U.S. reaches mammoth proportions; tens of thousands march in Berkeley, New York, Washington; hunger strikes; draft card burning. Antiwar propaganda appears among U.S. troops in Vietnam.
214	651009-651022	USSR attempts to use 6th World Trade Union Congress as platform to attack PRC. Soviet delegation blocks speakers, arranges attacks on opposition, interrupts with shouting, noise. Behavior scandalous, undemocratic.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
215	651111-651117	South Rhodesia brazenly declares independence. Thousands involved in protest marches, strikes, resistance. Smith regime responds with campaign of terror, murder. PRC strongly condemns declaration, protests UK inaction, supports Zimbabwe people.
216	651113	SVN puppet navy attacks 2 Chinese fishing boats, board, apprehend fishermen. PRC warns SVN to stop, return people, property.
217	651129-680200	Anti-Communist pogrom extended by Indonesian gov't. to encompass overseas Chinese. Violent attacks result in widespread destruction of property, massive persecution. PRC demands halt, repatriation of Chinese in Indonesia. Several thousand survivors return to PRC.
218	651100	4 U.S. fighter-bombers attack, hit PRC mission at Khang Khay; Laos; PRC protests.
219	651222-660103	Army Chief of Staff assumes power in Dahomey following political crisis; new gov't. breaks diplomatic ties with PRC, suddenly evicts all embassy staff. PRC denies charge of imperialism; U.S. clearly at fault.
220	660101-660102	Military coup in Central African Republic ousts former government. New chief of state, Gen. Bokassa, suddenly breaks ties with PRC; latter highly indignant.

Continued

Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
221	660102	Indian gov't. uses Dalai Lama to interfere in Tibetan internal affairs; PRC protests strongly.
222	660102-660206	Castro attacks PRC publicly, accuses PRC of monstrous crimes, contempt for, ignorance of Cuba.
223	660203-671000	Indonesian hooligans, armed soldiers make series of attacks on PRC embassy, consulates, other diplomatic facilities; loot, wreck, beat up, shoot diplomats, other PRC officials. PRC protests strongly, demands halt, compensation, protection. Indonesian gov't. demands closure of PRC embassy; PRC agrees under protest.
224	660218-660324	U.S. fighter-bombers attack PRC consulate in Phong Saly and PRC mission in Khang Khay, Laos, resulting in heavy damage. PRC protests U.S. crimes, warns of consequences.
225	660224-661120	U.S. imperialists engineer military coup in Ghana. New rulers suspend constitution, jail parliament, ban parties; maltreat, expel all Chinese, socialist advisors. Gov't. eventually suspends diplomatic ties. PRC unhappy, protests anti-Chinese incidents, kidnapping of Guinean delegation.
226	660311-660327	In Indonesia, Suharto assumes complete power from Sukarno by coup d'etat.
227	660322	CPC refuses to send delegation to XXIII CPSU Congress; other CP's follow suit.

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**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
228	660407	2 U.S. military planes attack Chinese fishing boat from Kwangtung Province.
229	660503	Thai gov't. decides to send armed forces to Vietnam; PRC warns Thailand of the consequences, predicts downfall of gov't.
230	660512	5 U.S. fighter planes attack PRC training aircraft; 1 shot down. U.S. planes flee when counter-attacked. PRC protests extremely grave incident, warns U.S.
231	660609-660610	USSR attempts to sabotage Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau meeting; caught, denounced by PRC.
232	660630-660829	U.S. military aircraft attack PRC cargo ships on high seas en route to DRV. PRC protests, sternly warns U.S. to halt.
233	660700	Somali people struggle for national liberation; PRC declares support for movement, denounces atrocities by French colonialists.
234	660700	Niger: PRC declares support for Sawaba Party, condemns local puppet regime.
235	660700	Ethiopia: National liberation struggle by Eritrean people ongoing; PRC declares support.
236	660900-661027	Soviet border guards confiscate over 500 volumes of Marxist-Leninist writings published in PRC; Western materials left untouched. Chinese students attempting to rebut anti-PRC

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**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
237	661000	lecture at Leningrad University are attacked, beaten up. USSR eventually expels all Chinese students in USSR. PRC protests, sees USSR as afraid.
238	661000-661200	Albanian CP attacked maliciously, slandered by Khrushchevite revisionists.
239	661115-661211	Unrest in India grows to massive proportions, involves millions. Uprising, riots, attacks on gov't. buildings, clashes with police lead to intensified state repression. Situation is excellent according to PRC.
240	661117	Police, troops repeatedly involved in violent repression of Chinese residents of Macao; many killed, wounded. PRC responds with massive rally, protests, demands, stern warning to Portuguese authorities.
241	661130-661201	Hungary sabotages relations with PRC, expels 5 Chinese students. PRC protests. USSR obviously behind act.
242	660000-670220	U.S. military planes bomb PRC fishing boats on high seas in Tonkin Gulf; 6 are sunk; many Chinese killed, wounded. PRC protests strongly, seriously warns U.S. PRC in battle array, prepared.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		bombing pause to force peace talks, intrigues between U.S., USSR to promote same.
243	670107	Brezhnev attacks Cultural Revolution in PRC, openly declares support for Liu Shao-chi clique.
244	670123-690000	Taking advantage of ice, Soviet frontier guards intrude into area of Chenpao Island, wounding Chinese border guards on several occasions. Other violations include aircraft overflights of Chinese territory.
245	670125	Soviet police savagely assault Chinese students visiting Stalin's tomb in Moscow; over 30 injured. PRC protests vehemently.
246	670100	PRC refutes Soviet claims that it has intercepted, blocked shipments of Soviet war materials en route to DRV.
247	670100-670200	U.S. abducts 48 Chinese fishermen, takes some to SVN for imprisonment; released one month later. PRC protests.
248	670203	Soviet gov't. instigates hooligans to break into PRC embassy, beat up Chinese personnel. PRC protests vehemently.
249	670320-670400	U.S. warships renew intrusions into Chinese territorial waters; others ram, strafe, damage PRC fishing vessels on the high seas. PRC protests, gives U.S. serious warning.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
250	670300	The members of Chinese embassy in Moscow are declared <u>persona non grata</u> due to anti-Soviet activities.
251	670300	Japanese CP revisionists attack Chinese nationals in Japan; PRC protests.
252	670424-670800	U.S. combat aircraft intrude into PRC airspace, clash with PRC air force; several U.S. aggressor aircraft shot down.
253	670506-671000	Strikes, unrest among Chinese workers in Hong Kong lead to violent suppression by UK authorities, movement of naval units to Hong Kong. PRC repeatedly protests UK outrages, "new gunboat diplomacy."
254	670500	Mongolian revisionist gov't. makes brutal attacks against Chinese diplomats, journalists, persecutes Chinese nationals. PRC protests strongly.
255	670602-670605	U.S., Israel prepare, launch massive armed attack against Arab states. Latter forced to accept UN ceasefire. UK, Soviet collusion in Israeli aggression also clear, despite Soviet dispatch of fleet to Eastern Mediterranean. PRC declares firm support of Arabs.
256	670625	U.S.-Soviet summit conference at Glassboro, N.J.; excoriated by PRC as new phase in superpower collaboration.
257	670600	Kenyan gov't. expels PRC charge d'affairs, instigates gangs repeatedly to deface PRC embassy.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
258	670600-681000	Burmese gov't. embarks upon major persecution campaign against overseas Chinese; leaders jailed, murdered in prison. PRC protests strongly.
259	670708	UK authorities in Hong Kong commit armed provocation along PRC border; PRC demands apology, punishment of offenders, holds rally in Peking to protest.
260	670700	Czechoslovakia abrogates cultural cooperation agreement with PRC; latter protests.
261	670700	Nepalese gov't. condones anti-Chinese activities in Katmandu.
262	670700-671100	Burmese gov't. takes series of hostile steps towards PRC: kills advisor, invades Chinese embassy, conducts border provocations and airspace violations, expels Chinese technicians.
263	670700-680600	Resurgence of border intrusions, Indian attacks on Chinese border guards from Sikkim. PRC protests.
264	670800	Local citizens steal merchandise from PRC vessel in Port of Colombo, Sri Lanka; PRC protests serious provocation against Chinese people.
265	670908	Yet another KMT U-2 spy plane shot down, the 5th since 1962.
266	670908-670909	Japanese gov't. sends police to attack PRC embassy personnel.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
267	671000	Thousands of Japanese students riot at Tokoyo airport in protest against U.S. imperialism.
268	680123-681223	Pueblo incident; PRC declares support of North Korea.
269	680100	U.S. aircraft bomb Chinese freighter; PRC protests strongly.
270	680100-680300	Further intrusions into PRC air-space, bombing by U.S. military aircraft; PRC protests.
271	680200-680800	U.S.-Saudi attempt to subvert South Yemeni gov't. fails due to influence of Mao thought. U.S. bombs living quarters of Chinese personnel in South Yemen; PRC condemns U.S. crime.
272	680300	UK authorities persecute Chinese filmmakers in Hong Kong; PRC protests seriously.
273	680300-680400	Rhodesian gov't. executes 5 Zimbabwean freedom fighters. PRC condemns act, accuses U.S., UK of share in guilt. Antigov't. forces launch attacks.
274	680400	PRC warns USSR against conducting espionage activities in Chinese territorial waters.
275	680400-680800	Afro-American clergyman named King assassinated, leading to mass rising of blacks all over U.S. Manifestation of comprehensive political, economic crisis gripping U.S.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
276	680500-680900	Unrest, general strike by French workers, students; people's struggle betrayed by revisionists. PRC declares support of French people, holds mass rally in Peking.
277	680820-680821	USSR invades, occupies Czechoslovakia, provoking storm of criticism from other CP's, condemnation by PRC. Act seen as most flagrant instance of armed aggression in Europe since World War II; Chou, in speech at Rumanian embassy, for first time labels Soviets as "social imperialists."
278	680800	Workers, students, peasants attack U.S. military installations on Taiwan. Resistance to Chiang Kaishek grows.
279	680900	Following events in Czechoslovakia, Rumania faces danger of foreign intervention, aggression.
280	680900	Albania denounces Warsaw Pact, withdraws from same.
281	681100-700200	Czechs stage series of demonstrations of opposition to Soviet occupation, leading Soviet gov't. to order local regime to control masses or else. PRC declares admiration for Czech people.
282	690100	Indian gov't. instigates ruffians to attack PRC embassy.
283	690100	UK authorities in Hong Kong institute emergency measures, maltreat, imprison local Chinese. PRC demands halt, abrogation of emergency measures, release of prisoners.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
284	690100-691000	Japanese students, others, heavily influenced by thoughts of Mao, intensify anti-U.S. campaign, carry out strikes, demonstrations.
285	690302-690315	Soviet armed forces violate Chinese territory repeatedly on and in vicinity of Chenpao Island, killing and wounding Chinese frontier guards; Soviet aircraft also intrude several times into PRC airspace. USSR attempts to provoke fresh armed conflicts. Soviet hooligans stage wild demonstrations in front of PRC embassy in Moscow; several Chinese diplomats are beaten. PRC protests, warns USSR.
286	690307-690312	Soviet authorities organize series of provocations against PRC embassy in Moscow. Ruffians damage embassy, attack Chinese personnel. A Soviet major general is observed on the scene in command of the demonstrators.
287	690415-690426	North Korea downs giant U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over high seas. USSR rescues downed U.S. airmen, another sign of superpower collusion.
288	690500	Malaysian gov't. carries out massacres, arrests, suppression of Malaysian people; over 300 are killed.
289	690600-690800	Soviet forces continue to provoke incidents along PRC border, to include intrusions on Heilung River at Pacha Island, near Tiehliekti. Some bloodshed. PRC protests strongly.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
290	691000	PLA downs U.S. recce plane over PRC territory.
291	691100-711000	Sato-Nixon talks strengthen U.S.-Japanese military alliance, U.S. position in East Asia. Dangerous increase in Japanese militarism, economic expansion into Asia observed. PRC denounces agreement on Okinawa.
292	700120-700200	Israeli troops intrude into UAR at Shadwan Island; Israel intensifies air aggression against Egypt, bombs near Cairo. U.S. providing means. PRC condemns Israeli aggression, declares support of Egypt in struggle.
293	700300	Cambodia: Right-wing clique stages coup against Sihanouk; latter flees to Peking. U.S. widely held responsible.
294	700605	U.S. spy ship trespasses in North Korean waters; sunk.
295	700600	U.S. continues to violate PRC air-space and territorial waters. PRC declares accounts must be settled for past U.S. crimes.
296	700904	Allende wins election in Chile; PRC congratulates him on accession to power.
297	700900-710700	U.S. instigates Jordanian gov't. to attack Palestinian guerrillas. Syrian troops intrude into Jordan. U.S. prepares to intervene. PRC condemns Jordanian aggression, U.S. involvement.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
298	701000-710500	Japanese masses struggle against U.S.-Japanese agreement on Okinawa; strikes, demonstrations.
299	701121	With U.S. support, Portuguese colonialists launch surprise attack on Guinea. Latter defeats invaders. PRC strongly condemns monstrous crime.
300	701204	U.S. forces make series of intrusions into North Korean airspace, fire at border posts; grave provocations.
301	701208	USSR signs treaty with Federal Republic of Germany. Denounced by PRC as collusion with German militarists, betrayal of GDR people.
302	701213-701220	Demonstrations in Poland suppressed by troops and tanks. Gomulka, head of Polish revisionist clique, steps down, a sign of weakening Soviet colonial rule in East Europe. PRC sends congratulations on victory to Polish comrades, quotes other CP's criticism of ruthless suppression.
303	710100	Spanish regime suppresses Basque democratic fighters. PRC condemns same, other fascist crimes.
304	710200	Taiwanese stage several attacks on U.S. gov't. buildings on Taiwan in protest against U.S. seizure of farmland to expand military bases.
305	710423-711217	Indian army invades East Pakistan. USSR directs war, actively supports Indian expansionism. PRC denounces Indian aggression, Soviet involvement.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
306	710700	Philippine troops occupy Chungyeh and several other Chinese islands. PRC demands withdrawal.
307	711117	Military coup overthrows Thai gov't., abrogates constitution, institutes fascist rule.
308	711215	Indian aircraft intrude into PRC airspace; PRC protests to Indian gov't.
309	720100	Anti-Chinese provocations take place outside PRC embassy in India [over Tibet situation]. PRC lodges protest.
310	720100-720500	Japan attempts to annex Tiaoyu Island, nearby islands. PRC rejects Japanese claim to islands, proves they are Chinese territory.
311	720225-720916	Israel commits repeated aggression against Lebanon. PRC condemns same.
312	720200	UK troops perpetrate massacre of Irish people in Derry. PRC firmly supports struggle of Irish people; rally in Peking protests massacre.
313	720500	U.S. military aircraft attack 2 PRC merchant ships in Vietnam. PRC protests strongly, reserves right to demand compensation.
314	720526	U.S., USSR sign SALT I treaty; a failure in PRC eyes since USSR continued weapons testing, and arms race sped up.
315	720717	Sadat announces termination of mission of Soviet military advisors in

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
316	720822	Egypt; Soviet press retaliates with crude attacks on Egypt, other Arab countries. PRC lauds Sadat decision.
317	721200	North Vietnam: U.S. military aircraft attack PRC merchant ship, later attack fleeing lifeboats. PRC condemns act.
318	730100	Namibian people struggle for self-determination; PRC supports same.
319	730200	USSR increases military flights near northern Japanese islands.
320	730317-740600	Israel shoots down Libyan Arab Airlines passenger plane over Sinai. PRC condemns act.
321	730409-740900	Popular opposition to Cambodian regime grows. Patriotic officers repeatedly bomb presidential palace. Students strike, riot in Phnom Penh; puppet education minister is killed.
322	730400	India invades Sikkim, takes over entire administration of country under pretext of local unrest. PRC condemns shameful act, Indian dreams of subsuperpowerdom. USSR, continuing to support Indian expansionism, is alone in supporting Indian actions.
323	730629-730911	Under U.S. pressure, USSR agrees to let Soviet Jews emigrate more freely to Israel. Seen by PRC as fully equivalent to U.S. economic, military aid.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		military coup. New rulers institute mass arrests, some executions.
324	730805	Indonesian hooligans attack, loot, wreck Chinese-owned shops, attack residents in Bandung; many wounded, one killed. Widespread property damage. Attack planned, organized.
325	730810	Israeli military planes intrude into Lebanon, force Lebanese airliner to land at Israeli airfield; passengers searched. PRC denounces flagrant piracy.
326	730820	Laos: ultra-rightists attempt to oust Souvanna Phouma through a coup d'etat, fail.
327	731001-741200	USSR withdraws military experts on eve of conflict. Israeli forces launch surprise armed attack against Egypt, Syria. Algeria, Sudan, Morocco, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia send troops to participate. USSR plays ignominious role again, delivers paltry amount of arms. U.S. orders military alert in response to Soviet troop deployment proposal. PRC condemns Israeli aggression, declares support of Arabs. USSR cuts off aid, rejects arms requests.
328	731002-731200	South Korea: large-scale demonstrations in Seoul against Pak regime. 10,000 students participate. Police used to suppress demonstrators; however, unrest spreads throughout university system.
329	731006-731014	Massive student movement, demonstrations in Thailand force gov't. to

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		close all schools, commit police, troops to put down unrest. Many students killed, wounded. Thai Prime Minister resigns.
330	740100	USSR: Soviets kidnap Chinese diplomat. PRC protests.
331	740100	U.S.-Soviet arms race "intensifies;" USSR stresses multiple warheads, U.S. to produce cruise missiles.
332	740100	SVN forces encroach on Hsisha Islands in South Chinese Sea, ram PRC fishing boats, launch armed attacks on other islands. PLA, compelled to fight in self-defense, counterattacks. Casualties suffered by both sides; one SVN escort is sunk, rest flee. PRC warns SVN to cease all such provocations or bear consequences.
333	740100-740400	Pak regime decrees emergency measures, intensifies suppression of South Korean people.
334	740424-751127	Fascist regime in Portugal collapses; a victory for African people. Portuguese armed forces put down rebellion triggered by paratroop regiment.
335	740400	Gov't. of national union proclaimed in Laos; PRC congratulates Laotian gov't.
336	740400	Third World nations at U.N. demand complete change in current economic relations, demonstrate unity, opposition to superpowers.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
337	740400-740531	Israeli aggression against Syria repulsed; 17 Israeli aircraft are shot down. Kissinger succeeds in getting the two states to sign agreements in Geneva after much effort.
338	740513-740700	Israel repeatedly intrudes into Lebanon; port of Tyre is shelled by Israeli Navy.
339	740514-751229	Armed Soviet recce helicopter intrudes 70km into Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Downed by PLA, crew imprisoned, released on 751229. PRC accepts Soviet claim that intrusion was unintentional.
340	740500	India explodes nuclear device. Pakistan vows it will never allow itself to be victim of nuclear blackmail.
341	741000	Yugoslavia uncovers antiregime group trying to subvert govt.; associated with USSR. Part of Soviet expansionist efforts.
342	740000-770000	Vietnam starts anti-Chinese campaign. Border incursions, incidents mount rapidly. 1977: shooting incidents start.
343	750417	Phnom Penh falls to patriotic Cambodian armed forces.
344	750400-761100	Armed civil strife in Lebanon leading to great destruction, loss of life.
345	750512-750514	Cambodian govt. detains Mayaguez for intruding into its territorial

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		waters to carry out provocative activities. U.S. forces invade to rescue ship, crew. Cambodian troops fight in self-defense, kill over 30 U.S. Marines, down 5 helicopters. PRC condemns U.S. seizure of ship as serious provocation, act of piracy.
346	750500-770925	Cambodian forces repeatedly violate VN border, instigate armed clashes.
347	750600	Palestinian commandos attack Israeli missile, ammunition plants.
348	750700-	USSR stirs up internal conflict in Angola; over 20,000 Soviet, Cuban troops intervene flagrantly. Over 150,000 Angolans slaughtered; others thrown into concentration camps. President Kaunda of Zambia puts his country on full emergency status in response to the Soviet, Cuban invasion, sees his country as major Soviet target. Guerrilla activities against foreign occupation spread widely, result in Cuban casualties.
349	750815-750831	Rahman gov't overthrown by military coup. PRC recognizes People's Republic of Bangladesh on 31 August.
350	751000	India claims that PRC personnel ambushed an Indian patrol on Indian side of border, killing 4. PRC rejects allegation, makes counter-accusations.
351	751103-751107	Attempted military coup in Bangladesh is smashed.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
352	751207-780200	Indonesian paratroops, marines carry out large-scale invasion of newly independent East Timor. PRC denounces attack, firmly supports Timor people's struggle, demands Indonesian withdrawal. Fretolin continues guerrilla warfare following Indonesian seizure of island.
353	760119	Group of armed bandits cross from India into Bangladesh, attack 2 police stations several miles from border.
354	760223-770300	Rhodesian troops launch armed attacks on Mozambican border villages, killing, wounding many. PRC strongly condemns racists' crime, supports Mozambican gov't., people.
355	760225	U.S. military aircraft bomb Cambodian town of Siem Reap, killing and wounding dozens. Pol Pot gov't. condemns U.S. crime; PRC resolutely supports Cambodian position, denounces U.S. aggression.
356	760315	Egypt terminates treaty of friendship with USSR, a major blow to Soviet hegemonism.
357	760616-760619	South Africa: thousands of black students demonstrate in protest against mandatory study of Afrikaans; many killed, wounded. PRC firmly supports people's struggle against racism, colonialism for national independence.
358	760600	Filipino-Swedish consortium starts drilling for oil near Nansha Islands.

Continued

**Table I**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		PRC protests, claims Chinese sovereignty over islands, warns that foreign intrusion, exploration, drilling impermissible.
359	760600	Polish people repeatedly launch widespread protests against inclusion of provision on alliance with USSR in new constitution.
360	760818	14 U.S. aggressor bandits intrude into joint security area at Panmunjom to fell tree. 19 August: all North Korean military forces put on alert. 21 August: armed, 700-man U.S. force returns to fell tree, destroy part of North Korean side. PRC resolutely supports Korean stand, accusations of U.S. preparations for war.
361	770116	Imperialist, mercenary forces attack Benin airport. PRC sends congratulations to Benin gov't., people for successfully repelling invasion.
362	770308-770526	Zaire: Soviet mercenaries invade Shaba Province from Angola. Invasion, Soviet, Cuban roles therein openly worry 3rd World leaders. Cubans hirelings delegated to do Soviet's dirty work. Zairian armed forces, Moroccans oust invaders; other Arab African states help. France renders logistical support. PRC calls invasion intolerable.
363	770500-780500	Japan, South Korea sign agreement for joint development of East China Sea continental shelf. PRC protests seriously over illegal accord,

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		claims inviolable sovereignty over territory concerned.
364	770705	Pakistani armed forces seize power through coup d'etat, impose martial law, dissolve all assemblies.
365	770721-770810	Malaysian troops attempt again to mop up Malayan People's Armed Forces near Thai border, are defeated. Guerrillas continue combat operations.
366	770722	India continues to give support, encouragement to Tibetan rebel bandits, interfere in China's internal affairs. PRC lodges strong protest.
367	770900-780106	Vietnamese armed forces launch large-scale invasion of Cambodia. Many divisions, some air support involved. USSR supports Vietnam behind the scenes. Cambodians defeat, repel invaders.
368	771000-780600	Vietnamese regime embarks on persecution campaign against Chinese nationals; over 100,000 expelled, many maltreated, fired upon. Pro-VN spies sent along with expelled Chinese. USSR echoes VN attacks on China. PRC surprised, demands halt to uprooting of Chinese in border area, sees policy as grave anti-PRC move.
369	770000	USSR involved in subversive activities in Inner Mongolia aimed at possibly weakening ties with rest of PRC.
370	780314-780315	Over 25,000 Israeli troops with naval and air support overrun

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		southern Lebanon, raid Sidon, Tyre, attack Palestinian bases, slaughtering local population. PRC denounces new Israeli crime.
371	780427-780430	USSR engineers upheaval in Afghanistan in an effort to gain gateway to Indian Ocean.
372	780504	South African racist troops attack SWAPO camp in southern Angola.
373	780509	Soviet ground/air forces perpetrate new violation of PRC border near Wusuli. Soviet soldiers shoot, try to abduct Chinese inhabitants. USSR apologizes.
374	780512-780528	Soviet, Cuban mercenaries intrude again into Shaba Province, Zaire, seize Kolwezi. France, Morocco, Senegal send troops; Egypt sends aid. Angola-based invaders driven out. PRC strongly condemns Soviet, Cuban activities. Latter pointedly attacked for casting aside non-aligned role, interfering everywhere at Soviet bidding.
375	780500-780600	Vietnam attempts to engineer a coup d'etat in Cambodia, fails.
376	780615-780629	Vietnam launches second invasion of Cambodia; also smashed by Cambodian forces. Latter inflict heavy losses on invaders.
377	780710	PRC denies Vietnamese allegation of airspace violation by Chinese fighters.
378	780707	Albania breaks with PRC; PRC protests injustice of Albanian allegations.

Continued

Table 1  
Major International Crises  
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
379	780801-780825	Vietnamese authorities use hundreds of troops, police to drive out Chinese residents stranded on VN side of border. Many Chinese killed, wounded.
380	780825-780930	Armed VN troops repeatedly violate Chinese border, stone Chinese officials, set up fortifications, mines on PRC territory. Troop intrusions grow to multibattalion strength. PRC demands immediate halt, removal of fortifications, mines.
381	780900	USSR spreads story of PRC helicopter overflying Indian territory. PRC denies allegation, accuses USSR of trying to sour Sino-Indian ties, Chinese efforts to improve relations with India.
382	781101	Vietnamese soldiers set up ambush on PRC territory, fire at Chinese troops; many wounded, kidnapped. PRC becomes most indignant, accuses VN of being regional hegemonist, arrogant, hostile, Cuba in the East. PRC warns VN to halt provocations, intrusions, threatens certain punishment.
383	781203-781231	Vietnam sets up Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation, starts new effort to overthrow Pol Pot regime. Massive invasion results in rapid seizure of Phnom Penh. Pol Pot forces fade into jungle, revert to guerrilla role. Vietnamese saddled with insurgency USSR supporting VN effort.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Major International Crises**  
**Continued**

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
384	781209-781213	VN ships attack 3 PRC trawlers, killing, wounding many crew members. Vietnamese board, loot one vessel. PRC strongly protests incessant VN encroachments, bloody incidents.
385	781214-781216	Further Vietnamese incidents along PRC border: laying of mines, firing. PRC protests strongly, warns VN to halt.
386	781223	Vietnamese patrol penetrates into PRC near Ping Er Pass, fires on PRC militia, killing 9. Chinese forced to return fire, kill 3. PRC protests strongly again.

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## CHAPTER 4. THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE CRISIS CONCERNS

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### THE HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT

To derive meaningful insights from the mass of data assembled in the course of this research, it is necessary to establish some sort of contextual framework.

Most of the People's Republic of China's history has followed a difficult path. Its actual survival has been threatened -- or been so perceived by its leadership -- at a level of frequency rarely experienced by other powers of equal size and potential. Thus, both the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the People's Republic (PRC) itself were born and spent their formative years in a sea of hostility and struggle. Moreover, during this early, vulnerable period they were even denied the psychological and physical support of a trustworthy, external ally.<sup>1</sup>

Beyond mere continued existence, the Chinese leaders had other problems of an equally basic nature:

- The need to become an acceptable, and accepted, member of the international community with an individual role to play.
- The need to arrive at an adequate regional consensus as to what constitutes the area over which Peking was to exercise political sovereignty.
- Beyond that, the need to determine where and how the PRC could fit its own needs for a sphere of influence, friendly buffer states, and allies among the conflicting claims of rival Asiatic power centers.

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<sup>1</sup> For non-China specialists it is useful to recall that the legendary Long March of 1927 was a desperate effort to salvage something from the disastrous effects on the CPC of Stalin's China policy and that Soviet aid to Mao during the long civil war and the Japanese invasion was both limited (probably out of necessity) and self-serving.

This search for identity and security is amply reflected in the database collected on Chinese crisis concerns presented in Chapter 3.

In some ways, therefore, the PRC and the perceptions and goals of its leaders are not significantly different from those of other established nation states such as those found in the West. Such a view, however, misses a number of crucial factors. The following points, for instance, should be kept in mind while looking over the PRC's experience with crises and crisis management.

- Historically, China has looked on herself as the center of the world -- as the single, dominant sociopolitical culture on the planet, with all other polities being inferior and/or subservient. This permanent position at the center or apex of a hierarchy of peoples was seen as natural and fitting.
- From the Chinese perspective, historical experiences bore out the above model of international relations, with the exception of the 19th and early 20th centuries when China was forced to bow before the successive demands of the great European powers. China had, of course, been conquered before by alien barbarians, but inevitably had been able to absorb and dominate such intruders by force of her superior civilization.
- Given the traditional Chinese concern with peace and harmony, achieved when all are satisfied in their proper place in the natural hierarchy, the tension between the reality experienced over the past two centuries and the reality that ought to be (i.e., a world with China as the only major power) could not help but impose severe strain on the Chinese leadership, impelling them to give vent to a frustration that all the assurances of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao himself as to a guaranteed, glorious future could not assuage.

#### THE STATISTICAL ENVIRONMENT

As already noted, data collection yielded far more information than could usefully be digested, a circumstance forcing the research team to be

selective. Nevertheless, it would be beneficial to explicitly state the dimensions of the total database so as to better assess the implications of the subset presented in Chapter 3 subjected to analysis in this and subsequent chapters. Table 1 summarizes all events mentioned by the PRC in the sources examined (substantial amounts of double counting are represented here). Table 2 shows the distribution of the entire set of events by major actor.

#### The Selected Subset

Obviously, there are a number of reasons why the entire set of Chinese events could not be subjected to analysis. First, there were too many events. Second, as shown in Table 1, only some ten percent were codable due to lack of data. Much double counting was involved as well. Finally, meaningful comparison with the U.S. and Soviet databases necessitated a data set of similar dimensions. Thus, action was taken to reduce the set of event citations to more manageable and codable proportions, resulting in a selection of 386 crises (see Chapter 2 for details on selection criteria).<sup>2</sup>

#### Distribution Over Time

Figure 1 shows the frequency of crises of interest to the PRC over time. The first peak, occurring in 1950, shows the cumulative effect of continued efforts within the PRC to consolidate Communist power, push the Nationalists out of accessible areas such as Hainan, and the Korean Conflict. The sharp fall-off is the sign of success achieved in those areas. The second peak, in 1956, results from the confluence of a number of major events beyond the PRC's immediate sphere of interest such as the XX CPSU Congress and its impact on Eastern Europe and Suez. In 1959 comes an overall upsurge in international activity, with the most serious

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<sup>2</sup> This proliferation of often redundant event citations was largely due to the use of a weekly source -- Peking Review -- to identify crises.

TABLE 1  
Summary of all Events Noted in Sources

	<u>Phase I<sup>a</sup></u> <u>1945-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1945-1978</u>
Specifically identified and described events	310	1,029	262	1,601
All other (e.g., <sup>b</sup> summarized data)	9,891	2,360	1,738	13,989
Total	10,201	3,389	2,000	15,590

<sup>a</sup> Although for the purposes of this research project the time span examined started with the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949, the sources themselves treat events from 1945. Thus the data for Phase I of these two tables include events for 1945-1948.

<sup>b</sup> In many cases, particularly in Peking Review, sources note that the 290th serious warning to the U.S. concerning overflights was issued. Such an entry is treated here as a summary citation of 290 events.

TABLE 2  
Distribution of all Cited Events By Actor

	<u>Phase I<sup>a</sup></u> <u>1945-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1945-1978</u>
United States	9,578	2,405	81	12,064
USSR	26	65	47	138
India	13	340	14	367
Taiwan/KMT	151	84	1	236
Other West	369	190	32	591
Vietnam	7	9	1,733	1,749
Other	57	296	92	445
Total	10,201	3,389	2,000	15,590

<sup>a</sup> Although for the purposes of this research project the time span examined started with the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949, the sources themselves treat events from 1945. Thus the data for Phase I of these two tables include events for 1945-1948.




Figure 1. Yearly Frequency of Crises of Concern to The People's Republic of China

events being those leading to or growing out of the Tibetan rebellion. The climax of activity for the entire period is 1967 with both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in activities hostile to Chinese interests, the former in Southeast Asia and the latter in a wide variety of areas. Following 1967 is a precipitous falloff in crises to a low point in 1971 (despite the Bangladesh war). The next peak, in 1974, reflects an overall rise with no special pattern being observable. The final peak, in 1978, marks renewed Chinese concern with the activities of the USSR and its proteges abroad (notably Cuba) and -- closer to home -- Vietnam.

This time series divides naturally into 3 phases - 2 plateaus surrounding a crest. The first 9 years were a period of reconstruction following the proclamation of the People's Republic.<sup>3</sup> During the second phase 1959-1968, the number of events consistently exceeded the 30-year average of 13/year. During the final period (1969-1978) the yearly crisis frequencies were generally below the 30-year average.

#### Crisis Duration

Table 3 shows crisis distribution by duration across the three phases. Given the deliberate emphasis in this research project on crisis identification as the term is understood and applied in the West, the steady high percentage of short crises is not surprising.

#### Crisis Location

Table 4 shows the percentage of the 386 events occurring in each Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) region and by geopolitical locale (proximity to the Chinese homeland or to other areas of automatic concern).

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<sup>3</sup> Mao (cited in Schram, 1974) singles out this period in this way.

TABLE 3  
Distribution of Chinese Crisis Concerns by Duration  
(Percentage)

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1949-1978</u>
Short (less than one week)	43.6	42.9	55.2	46.4
Medium (8-30 days)	9.0	14.3	12.4	12.7
Long (31 days- 1 year)	28.2	28.1	17.1	25.1
Extra long (more than one year)	14.1	13.3	13.3	13.5
Uncodable	3.1	1.4	2.0	2.3

TABLE 4  
Geographic Focus of Chinese Crisis Concerns By Phase  
(Percentage)

<u>Region</u>	<u>Phase I 1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II 1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III 1969-1978</u>	<u>Total 1949-1978</u>
North America	1.3	2.5	0.0	1.6
Central, South America	0	4.0	1.9	2.6
Western Europe, Mediterranean, Atlantic	2.6	4.0	4.8	5.2
Eastern Europe, USSR	5.2	12.3	5.7	9.1
Middle East, North Africa	7.7	4.4	12.4	7.3
South Asia, Indian Ocean, Subsaharan Africa	2.6	18.7	19.0	15.5
Pacific, East Asia (PRC)	80.7 (42.3)	47.8 (18.7)	53.3 (16.2)	56.0 (22.8)
(SE Asia)	(12.8)	(16.7)	(22.8)	(17.6)
Other, Multiple Regions, World	0	3.9	2.9	2.9
 <u>Geopolitical Area</u>				
Present PRC homeland	33.3	18.7	13.3	20.2
Former Chinese territories	19.2	3.4	2.9	6.5
Other PRC territorial claims	5.1	4.4	4.8	4.7
States along PRC border	15.4	20.7	24.8	20.7
States with large Chinese Population	6.4	8.4	3.8	6.7
Other Soviet border states	2.6	2.5	1.9	2.3
Other Third World states	12.8	31.0	41.9	30.3
Other states (West, etc.)	5.1	10.8	4.8	8.0
Not geographical	0	0	1.9	0.5

A number of observations can be made from these figures:

- By far the largest percentage of crises of concern to the PRC took place in the Pacific-East Asia sector, with the share involving Chinese territory being over 50 percent of the sector total in Phase I but falling off sharply during Phases II and III. A look at the geopolitical distribution provides further clarification of this trend. In the latter portion of Table 4 it can be noted that while crises involving the present Chinese homeland itself declined noticeably over time, crises involving states along the Chinese border rose correspondingly (although not all of the latter necessarily involved the PRC as an actor).
- At the secondary level, the PRC noted measurable and rising concern over events in South and Southeast Asia.
- Farther afield, the geopolitical distribution data in Table 4 documents major growth in Chinese concerns with events more remote from their own borders, particularly in the Third World.

#### Character of Events

Table 5 depicts the distribution of crises by type of events. From the data it can be seen that the most frequent type of crisis among the set of 386 was conflict short of war or foreign intervention, which hovered at about one quarter of all events, with a noticeable drop during the last phase. Border incidents and/or territorial disputes, especially after 1968, were also frequently represented in the data set. Taken as a group, mass efforts to change internal political structure through violence (i.e., riot, civil disorder, revolt, war of national liberation) showed a gradual subsidence, while elite efforts to change regimes (i.e., the rulers but not the system) showed a steady increase.

#### Scale of Crises

Table 6 summarizes variables describing the overall scale of Chinese crisis concerns and perceived threats by phase. Violence in the set of 386

TABLE 5  
Distribution of Chinese Crises By Character  
(percentage)

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1962</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1947-1978</u>
Dangerous domestic trends	11.5	11.3	6.7	9.8
Riot, other civil disorder	10.3	12.3	14.3	12.4
Uprising, revolt, insurgency	10.3	4.5	6.7	6.2
War of national liberation	6.4	6.9	2.9	5.7
Coup d'etat	1.3	3.9	9.6	4.9
Structural change	11.6	14.8	9.6	12.7
Border incident, territorial dispute	14.1	15.3	21.9	16.8
War	9.0	2.5	9.6	5.7
Conflict short of war, foreign intervention	25.7	28.6	17.2	24.9

TABLE 6  
Scale of Chinese Crisis Concerns  
(percentage)

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1949-1978</u>
<b>Violent events (versus nonviolent)</b>				
Against property	12.8	11.3	10.5	11.4
Against people	53.8	61.1	70.5	62.2
<b>International events (versus domestic)</b>	80.8	76.8	75.2	77.2
<b>Strategic confrontation</b>				
Potential	3.9	1.5	0.0	1.6
Actual	3.8	0.5	0.0	1.0
<b>Threat to Communist party/regime/movement</b>				
Well-being	46.2	33.0	37.1	36.8
Political independence	3.8	1.0	2.9	2.1
Physical survival	6.4	6.9	7.6	7.0

cases started at a very high level and generally continued to increase, especially violence directed at people. The overwhelming majority of the crises coded were seen by the PRC as involving external actors or taking place between independent polities. The ultimate danger, however, i.e., threat of nuclear war, remained very low and declined to zero by the end of 1968. The breakdown of threats to Communist parties, regimes, or movements used in the data coding permitted a more explicit categorization of the actual nature of the threat; from this it can be noted that while the overall level of perceived danger to such entities remained substantial, the great majority of such threats were at a comparatively low level of hazard (i.e., only well being or major activities were seen as endangered), suggesting that, based on the material reviewed, the Chinese leadership did not seem to be worried about the continued existence -- or acceptable mode of existence -- of Communist polities worldwide, at least in the set of events surveyed.

#### Actor Involvement

Table 7 provides some evidence as to why the PRC saw such a high percentage of crises as international in scope. It can be seen that the chief power of concern to the PRC over the entire period has been the United States, although the USSR took on the role of major external actor during Phase III (for further details see Chapter 5). Also, as expected, India as a Chinese foreign policy concern increased substantially during Phase II, while Taiwan's role plummeted sharply to near zero by Phase III (see Chapter 6 for additional analysis). Since a crisis usually involves more than a single actor, it is useful to examine case distribution by actor mix. For this purpose, Table 8 has been assembled.

The increase in large power-large power conflicts in Phase II is a reflection in part of the rise in frequency of U.S.-Soviet interaction following the shift of Soviet foreign policy orientation in 1955. The subsequent decline in superpower conflict in Phase III is to a great extent

TABLE 7  
Involvement of Selected Actors in  
Crises of Concern to the PRC  
(percentage)

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1949-1978</u>
<b>United States</b>				
Major actor	25.6	23.6	14.3	21.5
Minor actor <sup>a</sup>	15.4	19.2	7.6	15.3
<b>Soviet Union</b>				
Major actor	9.0	20.7	16.2	17.1
Minor actor	3.8	5.9	19.0	9.1
<b>India</b>				
Major actor	2.6	7.9	5.7	6.2
Minor actor	2.6	2.0	1.0	1.8
<b>Taiwan/KMT</b>				
Major actor	20.5	6.4	1.0	7.8
Minor actor	2.6	3.0	0.0	2.1
<b>Total<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>65.4</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>65.3</b>

<sup>a</sup> This could be anything from behind-the-scenes instigation -- a type of "devil-under-the bed" ascription to which the PRC seemed particularly prone in trying to assess international and foreign domestic events alike -- to support of another actor's major involvement in a crisis (e.g., the U.S. and the USSR colluding in support of Israeli aggression against Chinese-supported Egypt or Syria).

<sup>b</sup> Arrived at by totaling major and minor actor raw data (number of crises) and subtracting cases where the actor was also the crisis locale (e.g., racial unrest in the U.S. or the Soviet militia suppressing an anti-Vietnam war demonstration by Third World students in Moscow).

TABLE 8  
Distribution of Chinese Crises By Actor Mix  
(percentage)

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1949-1978</u>
Domestic crises	19.2	17.2	23.8	19.4
Two or more large powers involved <sup>a</sup>	34.6	40.8	19.0	33.7
Large/middle power mix <sup>b</sup>	16.7	6.8	4.8	8.3
Large/small power mix	28.2	29.1	36.2	30.8
Middle/small power mix	0.0	3.9	1.9	2.6
Small/small power mix	1.2	1.9	14.3	5.2

<sup>a</sup> Includes U.S., USSR, and PRC only.

<sup>b</sup> Includes the UK, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan.

due to the effects of detente. Thus, although no lovers of "superpower collusion," the Chinese crisis database clearly documents U.S. and Soviet avoidance of direct or indirect confrontation in a crisis environment between 1969 and 1978.

Table 8 also depicts the changing role of middle-size powers over time; as with the large powers, their overall crisis involvement peaked during Phase II and then declined sharply, with middle-large power interactions falling off even more than middle-small power (34 percent as compared with 25 percent) from Phase II to Phase III. By way of contrast, the role of small powers as actors on the world crisis stage rose from Phase I, declining only slightly from Phase II to Phase III. Furthermore, the distribution of small power opponents shifted radically, with a sharp rise in the percentage of squabbles among small powers. These data are remarkably consistent with intuitive judgments as to activities in the international arena since 1949.

#### THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL CRISES

Tables 9 and 10 summarize Chinese verbal and physical involvement in the set of 386 crises examined respectively. The two tables contain much useful information, permitting numerous inferences or suggesting areas meriting additional research. Two examples would be:

- In the publications examined, the Chinese leadership and their communicators (reporters, editors, etc.) clearly felt the need both to evaluate world events -- especially in moralistic terms -- and to communicate their opinions. A reading of all of People's China and Peking Review leaves no question but that such sources are far longer on opinion than fact. This view is amply borne out by Table 9. Interestingly enough, that category about which the Chinese were most noncommittal was crises involving overseas Chinese (e.g., in Indonesia or India).

TABLE 9  
Chinese Verbal Involvement in Crises Since 1949  
(percentage)

	Phase I 1949-1957		Phase II 1958-1968		Phase III 1969-1978		Total 1949-1978	
	Notes Only <sup>a</sup>	Makes Comments <sup>b</sup>	Notes Only	Makes Comments	Notes Only	Makes Comments	Notes Only	Makes Comments
Chinese homeland	1.3	32.1	0	18.7	0	13.3	0.3	20.0
Former PRC territories	1.3	17.9	0.5	3.0	1.0	1.9	0.8	5.7
Other PRC territorial claims	1.3	3.8	0.5	3.9	0	4.8	0.5	4.2
States along PRC border	2.6	12.8	2.5	18.2	8.6	16.2	4.2	16.6
States with large Chinese population	1.3	5.1	2.0	6.4	3.8	0	2.3	4.4
Soviet border states not included in above categories	0	2.6	0.5	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.8
Other Third World states	1.3	11.5	3.0	28.1	14.3	27.6	5.7	24.6
Other states (the West, etc.)	0	5.1	2.5	8.4	1.9	2.9	1.8	6.2

<sup>a</sup> In these crises the PRC made verbal references adjudged by the study team to have lacked specific opinion as to the merits of what happened and who did what to whom.

<sup>b</sup> In the second column the PRC clearly went beyond mere mention of the crisis events and voiced views (approved, complained, warned the U.S. for the umpteenth time, gave India an ultimatum to withdraw her patrols from Chinese territory, etc.).

TABLE 10  
Chinese Physical Involvement in Crises Since 1949  
(percentage)

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1973</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1949-1973</u>
<u>Combat involving military units<sup>a</sup></u>				
Chinese homeland	10.3	2.0	1.0	3.4
Former PRC territories	2.6	0.5	1.0	1.0
States along PRC border	1.3	0	0	0.3
<u>Actions short of combat, military personnel in crisis area<sup>a</sup></u>				
Chinese homeland	21.8	13.8	12.4	15.0
Former PRC territories	1.3	0.5	0	0.5
Other PRC territorial claims	1.3	0.5	0	0.5
States along PRC border	0	1.0	1.9	1.0
Other Third World states	0	0.5	0	0.3
<u>Actions short of combat, no military personnel in crisis area<sup>a</sup></u>				
Chinese homeland	0	1.5	0	0.8
Former PRC territories	0	0.5	0	0.3
Other PRC territorial claims	0	1.0	0	0.5
States along PRC border	1.3	4.9	1.9	3.4
States with large Chinese population	1.3	2.0	0	1.3
Soviet border states not included in above categories	2.6	0	0	0.5
Other Third World states	2.6	4.4	1.9	3.4
Other states (the West, etc.)	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Actions short of combat, no details available</u>				
Present PRC homeland	1.3	1.5	0	1.0
Former PRC territories	3.8	0.5	0	1.0
Other PRC territorial claims	0	2.5	1.9	1.8
States along PRC border	6.4	8.4	8.6	8.0
States with large Chinese population	0	3.0	0	1.6
Soviet border states not included in above categories	0	0.5	0	0.3
Other Third World states	0	3.9	7.6	4.2
Other states (the West, etc.)	1.3	2.5	0	1.6

<sup>a</sup> All variables with no cases are omitted.

- Given the limitations of Chinese military capabilities, it is interesting to note both the frequency and location of Chinese commitment of its armed forces to crisis management, as well as the manner of such commitment. The predominant use of such forces has been within or along the immediate borders of the PRC as it currently exists (i.e., less the territories "stolen" by the imperialists during the period of Chinese weakness). Scale and manner of such use appears to have been mostly at less than combat level with actual resort to combat falling off sharply at the end of Phase I.

#### CHINESE CRISIS OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

Table 11 summarizes Chinese objectives with respect to the set of 386 cases as well as Chinese perceptions of how these crises turned out for them, for any allies who were actors, and for other polities of interest to Peking (i.e., those who were neither allies nor clients of the PRC). Chinese objectives with respect to in-theater supported actors (i.e., allies, clients, Communists, other "good guys") remained remarkably consistent throughout the period since 1949, with defensive objectives remaining in the majority. Matching this is the picture presented of Chinese objectives as regards their opponents (capitalists, colonialists, imperialists, social imperialists), where the major Chinese concern was to oppose efforts to alter the status quo. Very rarely did the PRC seem to be indifferent (i.e., "a pox on both your houses").

In looking over the data presented on crisis outcomes, the research team observed several interesting trends:

- In all three categories the percentage of unfavorable outcomes overshadowed favorable outcomes. The ratio of favorable to unfavorable outcomes for the PRC was better (from Peking's point of view) than for China's allies and clients; furthermore, the ratio improved steadily across the three phases. The picture for polities of interest to the PRC was significantly better than for either of the other two categories during Phases II and III. Of course, not all crises are of equal importance to Chinese interests, suggesting that the above inferences should not be leaned on too heavily.

TABLE 11<sup>a</sup>  
 Chinese Crisis Objectives and Outcomes  
 (percentage)

	Phase I 1949-1957	Phase II 1958-1968	Phase III 1969-1978	Total 1949-1978
<u>Chinese objectives with respect in-theater supported actors</u>				
Uncodable or N/A	7.8	8.0	10.5	8.6
Preserve status quo ante	52.5	53.5	57.1	54.4
Restore status quo ante	11.6	11.8	5.8	10.1
Change status quo ante	28.3	26.2	23.9	25.9
Indifference (both bad)	0	0.5	2.9	1.0
<u>Chinese objectives with respect to in-theater opposed actors</u>				
Uncodable or N/A	2.6	3.0	3.0	2.9
Oppose efforts to preserve status quo ante	30.8	27.7	28.4	28.5
Oppose efforts to restore status quo ante	6.5	1.5	0	2.1
Oppose efforts to change status quo ante	60.3	66.0	65.7	64.8
Indifference (both bad)	0	2.0	2.9	1.8
<u>Outcomes for PRC</u>				
Uncodable	10.2	3.5	5.9	5.4
Favorable	14.1	24.2	27.7	23.1
Mixed -- Chinese world view confirmed	16.7	15.4	24.8	18.1
Mixed -- in functional sense	16.8	12.0	5.7	11.1
Unfavorable	42.3	44.3	31.6	40.4
PRC indifferent to outcome	0	1.0	4.8	1.8
<u>Outcomes for Chinese client/ally</u>				
No apparent ally/client	82.0	69.9	84.8	75.7
Uncodable	3.9	4.0	1.1	3.1
Favorable	2.6	2.5	2.9	2.6
Mixed	1.3	6.5	1.9	4.2
Unfavorable	10.4	17.3	9.7	13.7

Continued

**Table 11**  
**Chinese Crisis Objectives and Outcomes**  
**Continued**

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1949-1978</u>
<u>Outcomes for polities of interest to PRC</u>				
N/A	69.4	58.6	43.9	56.7
Uncodable	3.9	7.4	6.7	6.7
Favorable	3.9	11.4	16.3	11.1
Mixed	9.0	7.4	13.5	9.6
Unfavorable	14.1	14.9	20.0	16.1

<sup>a</sup> Definitions for certain of the terms used are as follows:

- Outcome - Immediate results only.
- In-theater supported actor - That group of identified crisis actors resident or functioning within a crisis area whose goals and/or activities are supported by Chinese writings, statements, and/or observable activity.
- Status quo ante - Situation immediately prior to onset of crisis.
- Mixed outcome, Chinese world view confirmed - Crisis events where the functional outcome may have been disappointing to the Chinese leadership, but at least some good could be seen as emerging from the crisis in that it demonstrated once again to audiences of interest to the PRC, both domestic and foreign, the validity of the Chinese view of action to be expected from the latter's opponents of the moment (e.g., imperialism, former colonial powers, expansionist India, or Soviet social imperialism).

- Although the judgments used to evaluate and segregate the mixed outcomes involved a substantial element of intuition, the contrasting trends between changes in "functional" mixed outcomes (i.e., where both good and bad results in a real sense can be observed) and "ideological" (i.e., where even though the PRC or a Chinese ally failed to achieve its goals at least the events as they transpired made clear to the rest of the world that the Chinese perceptions of reality -- and opinions about their opponents of the moment -- were supported by observable facts) are clear enough to be considered a reliable indicator. In combination with the trend in favorable to unfavorable outcomes for the PRC, they paint a picture of a steadily improving world environment in which the "good guys" and "bad guys" can continue to be clearly segregated and where the latter, while still powerful and troublesome, are steadily losing ground.
- The steadily high percentage of crises where there was neither an identifiable Chinese ally, client, or even a polity with which the PRC could in some manner sympathize is a reflection of the continued isolation of the PRC from most of the mainstream of international events, part of which was self-imposed and part the result of deliberate policy on the part of several major powers, notably the United States and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union.

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CHAPTER 5: CHINESE RELATIONS WITH THE TWO SUPERPOWERS

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INTRODUCTION

As already described, the tension inherent in the contrast between the ideal Chinese model of the world (and China's traditional and deserved place in it) and the realities of international power distribution since 1949 could not help but present difficult, and often painful, problems for the Chinese leadership. However, such realities need not have guaranteed automatic hostility between the "Central Kingdom" under Mao Tsetung and his successors and the two, radically different superpowers; on the contrary the past thirty years have witnessed occasions when Chinese ties with one or the other superpower have been far from disagreeable. It is entirely feasible to construct a case that, at least in Chinese eyes, hostile relations between the PRC and the U.S. or USSR developed to a great extent out of behavior toward the Chinese and their interests so unacceptable as probably to have led to war had positions and circumstances been reversed. Despite this, it would be extremely careless to equate Sino-U.S. relations with Sino-Soviet relations, due to the gross asymmetries involved. This chapter will be devoted to an examination of how the Chinese perceived the role of each superpower in world events and its interactions with the PRC to include frequency of interaction, frequency of published reference, and summary outcomes assessments.

THE UNITED STATES

Statistical Survey

Table 1 summarizes the overall role played by the United States in world events as portrayed by the data drawn from the Chinese sources used.

TABLE 1  
The United States and World Crisis  
(Percentage)

	<u>PHASE I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>PHASE II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>PHASE III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>1949-1978</u>
<u>Total Event Database (from Table 2, Chapter 4)</u>				
U.S. Involved	93.9	71.0	4.1	77.4
U.S. Interacts with PRC	93.1	12.3	0.5	63.7
<u>386 Crises of Concern to the PRC</u>				
U.S. as Crisis Arena	1.3	3.0	0	1.8
U.S. as Major Actor	25.6	23.6	14.3	21.5
U.S. as Minor Actor (instigator, etc.)	15.4	19.2	7.6	15.3
Total U.S. Involvement	41.0	42.8	21.9	36.8

While there has been an absolute decline over time in the relative perceived role of the United States in world affairs as well as in interactions with the PRC, this and other trends are skewed in the total event database by the inclusion of bulk quantities of repetitive incidents, such as aircraft overflights, raids, etc.; naval intrusions during the Korean Conflict, the Taiwan Straits crises, and the period of heavy U.S. participation in the Vietnam war; as well as border intrusions perpetrated successively by India, the USSR, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. For this reason, the study team feels that the picture portrayed by the 386 crisis set is more representative of reality. Therefore, while not ignoring the implications of the total event database, predominant attention has been devoted to analysis of the crises themselves -- the principal objects of our inquiry.

From Table 1 the following observations can be made:

- The extremely low level of crises noted as having taken place in the United States is due to several factors, one of which is possibly the degree of Chinese isolation from, and ignorance of, events within the bastion of capitalism and imperialism (other possible explanations are the effect of looking at world events through Marxist-Leninist glasses or simply that, comparatively speaking, not much of a crisis nature happened in the U.S. since 1949).
- The fluctuations from phase to phase in the ratio of crises in which the U.S. was a major actor to crises where the U.S. played only a supporting or indirect role are consistent with the successive shifts in U.S. policy style from the activism of the Dulles era to the low profile of the Nixon Doctrine; in addition, they also trace changes in Chinese perceptions of world events and of the relative capability of the actors therein to play a role independent of U.S. tutelage or instigation.

In order to garner further insights, it was decided to make additional passes through the data; the first was aimed at gauging the overall frequency of Chinese reference to the United States, the general tenor of such references, and some of the more prominent themes, part of which has been summarized in Table 2.

TABLE 2  
Frequency of Articles About the U.S.  
in People's China/Peking Review

	PHASE I 1949-1957	PHASE II 1958-1968	PHASE III 1969-1978	TOTAL 1949-1978
U.S. Domestic Situation	10	94	55	159
U.S. Foreign Policy, Actions Abroad	21	103	49	173

On the basis of the above, it would be more accurate to suggest that Chinese interest in, and understanding of, events within the United States did not remain at a constant level, but instead grew over time, only to fall somewhat in the final period. Examination of specific thematic trends clearly substantiate the intuitive expectation as to the contamination -- or selectivity -- effect of using the Chinese version of Marxism-Leninism as a data screening and evaluation tool, since the topics addressed were uniformly negative in nature (e.g., race riots, antiwar demonstrations, governmental maltreatment of the CPUSA, economic problems, official discrimination against Indians, etc.). Even the watershed Kissinger-Nixon visits, with all that they portended in terms of world power balance and subsequent Sino-U.S. ties, were treated in neutral terms.

Table 3 portrays the overall results of Sino-U.S. crisis interactions across the entire period. Observations from Table 3 include:

- There was a sharp drop in overall Sino-U.S. crisis interactions in Phase III.

TABLE 3  
 Distribution of Outcomes  
 for Crises of Concern to the  
 PRC Involving the United States  
 (Percentage)

	PHASE I 1949-1957	PHASE II 1958-1968	PHASE III 1969-1978	TOTAL 1947-1978
<u>Chinese interests involved in crisis outcome</u>				
Favorable	3.8	2.0	1.0	2.1
Mixed, Chinese World View Confirmed	5.1	0.5	0	1.3
Mixed in Functional Sense	1.3	3.4	0	2.1
Unfavorable	15.4	11.8	2.9	10.1
PRC Indifferent to Outcome	0	0	0	0
Uncodable or N/A	5.1	1.0	0	1.6
Total Sino-U.S. Crisis Interactions Where PRC Interests at Stake	30.8	18.7	3.8	17.1
<u>Chinese Interests not Involved in Crisis Outcome</u>				
Favorable	1.3	7.4	4.8	5.5
Mixed, Chinese World View Confirmed	6.4	6.9	9.5	7.5
Mixed in Functional Sense	0	2.5	1.9	1.8
Unfavorable	2.6	3.9	1.0	2.9
PRC Indifferent to Outcome	0	0.5	0	0.3
Uncodable or N/A	0	1.0	0	0.5

Continued

**TABLE 3**  
**Distribution of Outcomes**  
**Continued**

	<b>PHASE I</b> <b>1949-1957</b>	<b>PHASE II</b> <b>1958-1968</b>	<b>PHASE III</b> <b>1969-1978</b>	<b>TOTAL</b> <b>1949-1978</b>
Total Sino-U.S. crisis interactions where PRC interests not at stake	<u>10.3</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>17.1</u>	<u>18.4</u>
Grand total of Sino-U.S. crisis interactions <sup>a</sup> as percentage of all 386 crises	41.1	40.9	20.9	35.5

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<sup>a</sup> Differences between these percentages and those in the second part of Table 1 are due to independent rounding.

- The proportion of such interactions involving Chinese interests fell off even more precipitously across the three phases.
- Throughout all three phases the United States got the better of the PRC in crisis interactions where Chinese interests were involved (e.g., protection of the homeland from foreign intrusion); however, the PRC's "batting average" in crises where its own interests were not directly involved was significantly better on the whole, particularly during Phases II and III.

#### THE SOVIET UNION

##### General Comment

In order to facilitate comparison, an initial effort was made to structure this section to parallel the one on Sino-U.S. relations. However, the drastic differences between the PRC's experiences in dealing with the two superpowers necessitated certain alterations in analytic approach.

##### Statistical Survey

Table 4 compares the relative role of the USSR in international crises as seen in the total event database versus the selected set of 386 crises. The radical differences in the Soviet versus the U.S. role in world events once the extraneous data (i.e., all but the 386 cases) have been removed -- i.e., with the USSR emerging as an external force fully comparable with the U.S. on the world scene -- are consistent with the intuitive judgments of the vast majority of specialists in international relations and, therefore, reinforce the validity of the study team's data selection decision in this respect.

TABLE 4

The Soviet Union and World Crises  
(Percentage)

	PHASE I 1949-1957	PHASE II 1958-1968	PHASE III 1969-1978	TOTAL 1949-1978
<b>Total Event Database (from Table 2, Chapter 4)</b>				
USSR Involved	0.3	1.9	2.4	0.9
USSR Interacts with PRC	0.1	1.2	0.9	0.4
<b>386 Crises of Concern to the PRC</b>				
USSR as Crisis Arena	3.8	8.4	2.9	4.7
USSR as Major Actor	9.0	21.6	16.2	17.1
USSR as Minor Actor (instigator, etc.)	3.8	7.9	19.0	9.1
Total Soviet Involvement	12.8	29.5	35.2	26.2

From the material presented in Table 4 emerges a basic picture of Chinese perceptions of the Soviet part in international affairs as compared with that of its superpower rival:

- The Chinese were clearly more concerned with events taking place within the USSR than those within the U.S. due to a number of factors, such as shared ideological concerns, proximity, and the relative percentage of Soviet domestic events involving groups of Chinese or agencies representing the Chinese Government itself (e.g., Soviet-organized demonstrations in front of the PRC embassy in Moscow).
- The shift in Chinese perceptions of the USSR as predominantly a major crisis actor in Phase I and II to more of a mix between major and minor -- with the latter role exceeding the former by several percentage points in Phase III -- reflects in much simplified terms well-known developments in Sino-Soviet relations from alliance to family quarrels, to active hostility, and finally to more controlled (in a physical sense) opposition. A somewhat less commonly realized corollary of these changes in the USSR's active role was the transfer by the PRC to the USSR of much of the "devil-under-the-bed" odium previously targeted at the United States. This almost blanket Chinese ascription to the Soviet Union of indirect responsibility for undesirable events abroad is particularly noticeable starting in 1977.

#### Chinese Reference to the USSR

Figure 1 depicts the relative attention devoted to the USSR in Peking Review. In Figure 2 this curve has been superimposed on curves showing frequency by year of Soviet crisis involvement both as a major and as a minor actor. In Figure 3 a separate pass was made through the data in a search for Soviet crisis-related activities of specific interest to the PRC. This included net Soviet policy error (actions disapproved of by the Chinese less those Peking agreed with) and all events in which the Soviets took political or military action towards the PRC seen by the Chinese as being unfriendly or hostile in nature. In order to make




Figure 1. Yearly Frequency of Reference to the USSR in *People's China/Peking Review*





Figure 2. USSR as Major and Minor Event Actor as Compared with Frequency of Reference to the USSR in People's China/Peking Review



<sup>a</sup> Compiled by subtracting Soviet actions approved of by the PRC from actions disapproved of.

Figure 3. Comparison Between Frequency of Reference to the USSR in People's China/Peking Review and Soviet Hostile Acts Towards the PRC

the fluctuations in the latter two figures more discernable, the vertical scale was magnified in comparison with that used for frequency of Chinese reference to the USSR.

Definitions of terms used in Figure 3 are:

- Military acts: use of armed forces (invasion, border violation, etc.).
- Political acts: propaganda attacks in public forums (e.g., at a party congress of a Communist state), harassment of opponent's citizens or official representatives, diplomatic conflict, withdrawal of economic assistance, etc.
- Hostile acts: events where personnel or property are seized, endangered, or injured/damaged, or where opponent is publicly attacked verbally.
- Unfriendly acts: acts perceived and identified by the PRC as being prejudicial to an existing state of friendship, alliance, and/or mutual trust; also, events the PRC disapproves of but which are too remote to affect Chinese interests more than peripherally.
- Soviet foreign policy errors: acts by the USSR abroad that are publicly criticized by the PRC as tactical/strategic mistakes.

Several observations emerge from these figures:

- Although the curve in Figure 1 depicts, roughly speaking, an overall rise in Chinese attention to the Soviet Union and its policies over time, there are two gross anomalies in the data, namely, the deep dip from 1970 through 1972 and the huge drop from 1974 to 1975.
- The cross-correlation between frequency of Chinese reference to the USSR and references to Soviet involvement in events (see Figure 2) shows at best only a modest causal tie, with neither of the above anomalies being well explained. Further,

the sharp relative rise in Soviet event involvement during 1977-1978, although admittedly mostly indirect in nature, overshadows the modest rise in PRC reference to the USSR during the same period.

- Elimination of all but those Soviet-involved events aimed directly or indirectly at the PRC or those Soviet actions concerning which the Chinese felt impelled to pass critical judgment (see Figure 3) improves the degree of correspondence but still leaves unanswered questions, in particular the abrupt deviation in 1973-1974.

One possible explanation for these patterns<sup>1</sup> is the continued increase in Sino-Soviet tension from 1963 climaxing in the series of armed clashes in 1969, coupled with the escalating U.S. presence in Vietnam and renewed American military pressure on the PRC. These events forced the Chinese leadership to reconsider the advisability of continuing their policy of hostility toward both superpowers. Added to this was the role Defense Minister Lin Piao, who for personal and institutional reasons fostered the military aspect of the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Thus, when his attempted coup failed in the fall of 1970 and Lin was no longer a political factor, the Chinese leadership turned their attention to ongoing but low-key negotiations with the Americans, leading to the epochal Kissinger-Nixon visits and ultimately to mutual diplomatic recognition in January 1979.

According to this explanation, the fluctuations in Chinese reference to the USSR during the later 1960's as well as the lack of recognizable correlation between that and Soviet behavior towards the PRC as reflected in the middle section of Figure 3 is due not only to unstable relationships and division of power among the top Chinese leaders during this period but also to their continued uncertainty as to what to do about the rising

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<sup>1</sup> The information in this section was obtained by telephone consultation with Major David H. Russell, resident China foreign area specialist at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College on 18 and 21 May 1979.

temperature of their quarrel with their Soviet rival, the long-term implications of which looked increasingly undesirable. The first of the anomalies mentioned, the apparently unexplainable 1970-1972 gap in attention to the USSR thus coincides with the climax of their internal uncertainty. This hesitation was reflected in a lack of coherent policy guidance, at least to those public communicators of Chinese policy on the Peking Review editorial staff, and resulted in a lack of printed articles.

The Kissinger-Nixon visits, it appears, were met with caution on the part of the Chinese leadership, with both they and their American counterparts feeling their way through highly unfamiliar territory. In any event, somewhere around 1972-1973 a decision was finally made that if only one major external enemy could be afforded, it was not to be the United States, whose desire to get out of Southeast Asia had become obvious. One result was a flood of articles about Soviet activities abroad, none of which were particularly sympathetic.

The final anomaly -- the precipitous decline in reference to the USSR starting in 1975 -- was apparently due to renewed internal turmoil, this time as Chou En-lai and Mao Tsetung left the scene and the notorious "gang of four" made their abortive attempt to dominate Chinese policy.

#### Soviet Outcomes

Table 5 shows the overall results of Sino-Soviet crisis interactions from 1949 through 1978. One difficulty in attempting to extract inferences from Table 5 is shifts over time in Sino-Soviet relations. The fact remains that there were Sino-Soviet interactions, or Soviet involvement in crises, in which the Chinese approved of what Moscow was doing, both during Phase I and even Phase II (the exact total is one crisis involving Chinese interests with a favorable outcome, and

TABLE 5

Distribution of Outcomes for  
 Crises of Concern to the PRC  
 Involving the USSR  
 (Percentage)

	PHASE I 1949-1957	PHASE II 1958-1968	PHASE III 1969-1978	TOTAL 1949-1978
<u>Chinese Interests Involved in Crisis Outcome</u>				
Favorable	1.3	2.0	1.0	1.6
Mixed, Chinese World View Confirmed	0	3.0	0	1.6
Mixed in Functional Sense	1.3	2.5	1.9	2.1
Unfavorable	0	9.4	4.8	6.5
PRC Indifferent to Outcome	0	0	0	0
Uncodable or N/A	1.3	0	0	0.3
Total Sino-Soviet Crisis Interactions Where PRC Interests at Stake	3.8	16.9	7.7	12.1
<u>Chinese Interests not Involved in Crisis Outcome</u>				
Favorable	1.3	3.0	6.7	3.6
Mixed, Chinese World View Confirmed	3.9	3.5	7.6	4.7
Mixed in Functional Sense	2.6	1.0	0	1.0
Unfavorable	1.3	3.9	3.8	3.4
PRC Indifferent to Outcome	0	0	0	0
Uncodable or N/A	0	0.5	0	0.3

Continued

TABLE 5  
Distribution of Outcomes  
Continued

	PHASE I 1949-1957	PHASE II 1958-1968	PHASE III 1969-1978	TOTAL 1949-1978
Total Sino-Soviet Crisis Interactions Where PRC Interests not at Stake	8.8	11.9	18.1	13.0
Grand Total of Sino-Soviet Crisis Interactions <sup>a</sup> as Percentage of all 386 crises	12.6	28.8	25.8 <sup>a</sup>	25.1

<sup>a</sup> As before, rounding off produced minor differences with Table 4. The discrepancy between the total of 25.8 percent for Phase III and the higher figure found for Phase III Soviet involvement in Table 4 is due to differences in data inclusion criteria. The data for Table 5 came from that section of the crisis coding forms that was used to identify key crisis actors as perceived by the PRC. During Phase III the Chinese saw the USSR as repeatedly playing a non-key (e.g., behind-the-scene) role in a variety of Third World crises of interest to them, such as instigating the Vietnamese to harass and eventually eliminate the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia or as being behind the rash of Vietnamese incursions across the PRC border. Thus the total list of crises during Phase III involving the USSR was bound to be larger than a list including only crises in which the USSR was seen as the key actor.

nine crises not involving Chinese interests with outcomes ranging from favorable (3), mixed, Chinese world view confirmed (4), and mixed in a functional sense (1) to uncodable (1).

The changes in both absolute quantity of Sino-Soviet interactions as well as the unfavorable/favorable outcome ratio across the three phases for crises where Chinese interests were at stake are more than adequately consistent with the commonly accepted ebb and flow of Sino-Soviet relations since the founding of the PRC.

Also of interest are the figures for similar variables pertaining to Soviet-involved crises where Chinese interests were not involved. By comparing these with the data extracted just above, it can be noted that when the USSR shifted its attention from its squabble with the PRC on the latter's home grounds to competition in areas more remote from China proper (between Phases II and III) its success/failure ratio reversed itself, something that ought to have been more than a little heartening to the PRC. A hazard in leaning too hard on this inference is the fact that the Chinese were much more apt to comment on Soviet failure abroad than success, particularly during the later years.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This aspect of research into Chinese crisis management has yielded valuable insights into Chinese perceptions of world events and the roles played therein by the two superpowers. Some of these are:

- Although the basic tension between the natural order and the actual realities of world power distribution show no signs of being solved (i.e., with the resumption of acknowledged Chinese world dominance), at least in a cultural sense the PRC appears well able to live with this, provided at least adequate allowance is made by the superpowers and China's neighbors for the PRC to share a place in the sun.

- The key to dampening, if not resolving, the long-term bitter hostility between the U.S. and the PRC apparently has lain with the willingness -- and ability -- of Washington to accept China as she is. Clearly, however, the basic incompatibility between U.S. and Chinese ideological concerns and pictures of a desirable world order limit the extent to which Sino-U.S. friendship can establish itself as a viable alternative to hostile confrontation. Nevertheless, continued U.S. disinclination to renew its former willingness to intervene militarily in crises close to China's borders bodes well for at least an acceptable degree of mutual accommodation, especially given the intractible nature of Chinese and U.S. problems in dealing with the USSR.
- Sino-Soviet relations are much less easy to contain conceptually. Although the Chinese do not appear to share the more visceral aspects of the Soviets' dislike and worry about their (i.e., Chinese) intentions, there is nothing in the data examined to suggest that their present antipathy toward the USSR is of a short-term nature or that they are at all willing to accept the repeated Soviet overtures aimed at restoration of amity -- more or less on Soviet terms, of course.
- The likelihood of renewed armed conflict along the Sino-Soviet border is impossible to assess based on the material available to the study team, primarily because too little is known regarding such basic circumstances as who actually started each of the clashes and why. For instance, there is the possibility that individual Chinese leaders like Lin Piao may well have "stirred up the pot" not out of hatred for an alien menace but in order to serve more parochial political purposes at home.
- The anomalies discovered in the pattern of Chinese published references to the USSR and Soviet activities abroad are without doubt one of the more fascinating outcomes of the research conducted thus far, even more so given their continued resistance to explanation from the database developed. The

hypotheses put forward by Major Russell of the Strategic Studies Institute certainly merit being checked into further. In sum, however, it must be concluded that while a causal tie among published Chinese concerns -- especially about the USSR, actual crisis seriousness and/or frequency, and the exigencies of internal political competition for power within the PRC may exist, the best that can be said at this stage is that such a tie remains to be satisfactorily established.

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## CHAPTER 6. CHINESE RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN AND INDIA

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### INTRODUCTION

Since the founding of the People's Republic, the KMT regime on Taiwan and the Republic of India have been key regional actors of concern to Chinese leaders. Taiwan has been a threat because the Nationalist regime, both by its activities and very existence, has presented a direct challenge to the legitimacy, stability, and international acceptability of Communist rule on the mainland. For her part, India has laid China's pretensions to Asian leadership open to question; further, the different politico-economic system enjoyed by the South Asian power has continued to present a competing model for national development and lifestyle to Third World states, especially in Asia.

### TAIWAN

Table 1 compares the role played by Taiwan in world events as shown in the total event data set versus the 386-crisis set. Elimination of extraneous, repetitive data -- even though as defined these would be expected to include numerous KMT violations of PRC airspace, raids, and infiltration attempts -- results in an absolute decrease in the relative role of the Nationalists among the crises of interest to the PRC since 1949. One of the reasons for this was the persistent Chinese tendency to blame the United States for almost all of the repetitive acts where Taiwan government efforts were involved (usually stated "U.S.-KMT agents did thus and so"), thereby obliterating what might have been useful data.

The dramatic decline in the role of Nationalist China as an actor of concern to the PRC is as much a reflection of the growing security and self-assurance of the Communist regime in Peking as the absolute decrease in mutually hostile activity between Taiwan and the mainland. The continued

TABLE 1

Taiwan and World Crises  
(percentage)

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1949-1978</u>
Total Event Database (from Table 2 Chapter 4)	1.4	2.5	0.05	1.5
<u>386 Crises of Concern to the PRC</u>				
Taiwan as Crisis Arena	10.3	1.5	1.0	3.1
Taiwan as Major Actor	20.5	6.4	1.0	7.8
Taiwan as Minor Actor	2.6	3.0	0	2.1
Total Taiwan Involvement as Crisis Actor (as percentage of all 386 crises)	23.1	9.4	1.0	9.9

percentage of crises in which Taiwan served as a minor actor is again a reflection of both the limited Peking need to see "KMT devils under the bed" and the modest, behind-the-scenes role the Taiwan regime could, or chose to, play in post-Civil War Asian affairs.

#### Chinese Reference to Taiwan

Figure 1 depicts the annual frequency of reference to Taiwan noted in the sources examined. In Figure 2 this curve has been combined with the annual frequency of crises from the set of 386 in which Taiwan was perceived by the PRC as being an actor. As can be seen, the three main peaks in the topical reference curve are temporally consistent with the three major post-Civil War Sino-Taiwan crises, namely, the PRC consolidation push of 1950 and the two Taiwan Straits crises, identified by the numbers 1 through 3 respectively.

The peaks in Chinese reference to Taiwan in 1962-1963, 1965, and 1970-1971 were not immediately evident from the selected set of 386 crises, however, an examination of thematic coverage of these periods supplemented by other sources<sup>1</sup> provided additional information including:

- 1962 saw a third Taiwan Straits crisis, with a major upsurge of PRC concern about a possible invasion of the mainland by Chiang Kai-shek backed by the United States. Although the Peking Review naturally did not go into detail about the major troop movements, to include positioning of Soviet combat aircraft on Chinese bases,<sup>2</sup> there were reports of KMT harassment, agent infiltration, U-2 overflights, and collusion with U.S. puppet regimes in Seoul and Saigon continuing over the next several years.

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<sup>1</sup> For instance, Khrushchev (1970, 1974), Kalicki (1975), and North (1978).

<sup>2</sup> North (1978: 117).





Figure 1. Yearly Frequency of Reference to Taiwan in People's China/Peking Daily



- The second upsurge in 1970-1971 grew out of PRC worries about expanding Japanese presence in Taiwan, internal Taiwanese unrest over the presence of U.S. bases, and renewed discussion in the United Nations as the United States fought its last rearguard action to permit Taiwan to have some residual involvement in the organization once it had lost its place to the PRC.

The contrast in the reference/crisis involvement ratio between the 1950 period and the two Taiwan Straits crises suggests that the latter two crises were qualitatively different from the former. In 1950 the PRC was still busily engaged in consolidating its hold over the mainland and in seizing those more accessible outlying regions (e.g., Hainan Island) still in KMT hands. In the case of the two straits crises, Peking's goals were more psychological than military in nature; i.e., they did not include definite primary aims of further major territorial acquisitions.

#### Crisis Outcomes

Table 2 depicts the results of Sino-Taiwanese crisis interactions for the three phases. The ratio of unfavorable to favorable outcomes for crises during Phase I where PRC interests were involved reflects the high level of frustration experienced by the Communist regime as it attempted to complete the work started in October 1949. This level of relative frustration is even higher if to the above ratio are added on the unfavorable side all mixed outcomes (in general, all "mixed, Chinese world view confirmed" outcomes were, functionally speaking, unfavorable while the good/bad ratio of the "mixed in functional sense" outcomes also tended to favor the negative side). A major cause of this frustration was, of course, direct intervention by the United States.

The low level of Sino-Taiwanese interactions where PRC interests were not at stake is consistent with findings in Table 1, i.e., in that when the PRC and the KMT had occasion to clash, it was generally direct and at a time when their relative power/security balance was closer to even.

TABLE 2

Distribution of Outcomes for Crises  
of Concern to the PRC Involving Taiwan  
(percentage)

	Phase I 1949-1957	Phase II 1958-1968	Phase III 1969-1978	Total 1949-1978
<u>Chinese Interests Involved in Crisis Outcome</u>				
Favorable	3.8	2.5	0	3.1
Mixed, Chinese World View Confirmed	2.6	1.0	0	1.0
Mixed in Functional Sense	5.1	1.0	0	1.6
Unfavorable	11.5	2.0	0	3.4
PRC Indifferent to Outcome	0	0	0	0
Uncodable or N/A	0	1.0	0	0.5
Total Sino-Taiwanese Crisis Interactions Where PRC Interests at Stake	23.0	7.5	0	9.6
<u>Chinese Interests not Involved in Crisis Outcome</u>				
Favorable	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.0
Mixed, Chinese World View Confirmed	0	0.5	0	0.3
Total Sino-Taiwanese Crisis, Interactions Where PRC Interests at Stake	1.3	1.5	1.0	1.3
Grand Total of Sino-Taiwanese Crisis Interactions*	24.3	9.0	1.0	10.9

\* As before, the differences between these figures and those in Table 7, Chapter 4 are due to rounding.

### Conclusion

All in all, no anomalies were observed either within the data or between them and commonly accepted views of Sino-Taiwanese relations.

### INDIA

Table 3 presents comparative percentages of Sino-Indian interactions using the total event data set and the group of 386 crises. As with Taiwan, paring of data to the 386-crisis set brings India's role in international affairs -- as seen by the PRC -- into more realistic focus.

Although in absolute terms, India's role could be said to have been less critical to the PRC than Taiwan's, it remained a problem of measurable dimensions to Peking on a much more sustained basis. Figures 3 and 4 interpret the fluctuations of Sino-Indian tensions both with respect to references to India in People's China/Peking Review and Indian involvement as a crisis actor.

### Observations

The following observations emerge from Figures 3 and 4:

- In 1959 the latent Sino-Indian rivalry broke out with a rash of border incidents and bitter Chinese resentment towards what was seen as shameful Indian meddling in the PRC's internal affairs, namely the rebellion in Tibet.
- The climactic peak in 1962-1963, of course, was in response to the Sino-Indian border war, with the PRC consistently laying the blame for both tension and ultimate armed conflict on India. Interestingly enough, the "devil-under-the-bed" syndrome raised its head again as the PRC repeatedly accused the United States of being behind Indian aggression, with New Delhi calmly trading its involvement for U.S. aid. The high level of attention to Sino-Indian affairs continued

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1949-1978</u>
<b>Total Event Database (from Table 2, Chapter 4)</b>	0.1	10.0	0.7	2.4
<b><u>386 Crises of Concern to the PRC</u></b>				
India as Crisis Arena	1.3	4.4	7.6	4.7
India as Major Actor	2.6	7.9	5.7	6.2
India as Minor Actor	2.6	2.0	1.0	1.8
<b>Total Indian Involvement as Crisis Actor (as percentage of all 386 crises)</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>8.0</b>




Figure 3. Yearly Frequency of Reference to India in People's China/Peking Daily




Figure 4. India as Crisis Actor as Compared With Frequency of Reference to India in People's China/Peking Review

TABLE 4

Distribution of Outcomes for Crises  
of Concern to the PRC Involving India  
(percentage)

	<u>Phase I</u> <u>1949-1957</u>	<u>Phase II</u> <u>1958-1968</u>	<u>Phase III</u> <u>1969-1978</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>1949-1978</u>
<u>Chinese Interests Involved in Crisis Outcome</u>				
Favorable	0	0.5	0	0.3
Mixed, Chinese World View Confirmed	0	0.5	1.0	0.5
Mixed in Functional Sense	0	1.0	0	0.5
Unfavorable	2.6	3.4	2.9	3.1
PRC Indifferent to Outcome	0	0	0	0
Uncodable or N/A	1.3	0.5	1.0	0.8
Total Sino-Indian Crisis Interactions Where PRC Interest at Stake	3.9	5.9	4.9	5.2
<u>Chinese Interests not Involved in Crisis Outcome</u>				
Favorable	0	0.5	0	0.3
Mixed, Chinese World View Confirmed	1.3	0	0	0.3
Mixed in Functional Sense	0	1.5	0	0.8
Unfavorable	0	0.5	2.9	1.0
Total Sino-Indian Crisis Interactions Where PRC Interests Not at Stake	1.3	2.5	2.9	2.3
Grand Total of Sino-Indian Crisis Interactions <sup>a</sup>	5.2	8.4	7.8	7.5

<sup>a</sup> The differences between these figures and those in Table 7, Chapter 4 are due to rounding.

into the following year, with the Chinese protesting numerous Indian incursions across the border and accusing India of expansionism -- probably justly -- and of supporting the exiled Dalai Lama.

- The peak in 1965, interestingly enough, is not the result of India's war with Pakistan but of a resurgence of Sino-Indian border clashes along the Sikkim-Tibet boundary.
- The peak in 1971 comes from the Indian war with Pakistan resulting in the breakaway of Bangladesh. This time the "devil-under-the-bed" is the Soviet Union, which is condemned for egging India on to new acts of expansionist aggression.
- The last high point of Chinese concern, in 1974, was in reaction to what the PRC saw as Indian military annexation of Sikkim, one of the chain of buffer states between the two powers, in addition, of course, to India's detonation of its first nuclear device. The Chinese also continued to observe and comment upon developments in India's internal revolution, manifested by food shortages, strikes, inflation, unemployment, and excessive defense expenditures.

In general, if due allowance is made for large-scale crises like the 1962 war or clusters of crisis events, the two curves in Figure 4 show remarkable internal consistency and match well with intuitive judgments as to the dynamics of Sino-Indian relations over time.

#### Crisis Outcomes

Table 4 depicts in summary form how Sino-Indian crisis interactions turned out from the Chinese perspective. Observations may be made from the data:

- In both Sino-Taiwanese and Sino-Indian crisis interactions the PRC did not perceive overall success, however, unlike the case with Taiwan, the unfavorable/favorable outcome ratio for Indian crises remained at what must have been seen as an undesirable level.
- The ratio of Indian crises where Chinese interests were involved to crises where such interests were

absent, as with overall crisis frequency and outcomes, remained far more stable across the three phases than was the case with Taiwanese crises.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Many useful insights can be drawn from analyses of Chinese interactions with Taiwan and India. Although there were no particular surprises, the data permitted more explicit identification of the dynamics of crisis relations between the powers, particularly as perceived by the Chinese. In general, it can be stated on the basis of the material examined that the People's Republic (in its own eyes) successfully weathered the challenges to its national security and legitimacy posed by the Nationalist regime on Taiwan and, for the most part, has been able to adjust and respond to Indian challenges, whether over disputed territory or regional prestige.

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## CHAPTER 7. CHINESE CRISIS CONCERNS IN CONTEXT

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### INTRODUCTION

Most analyses of Chinese crisis behavior involve the study of a single case or a comparison of a small number of cases.<sup>1</sup> Such case studies are valuable, even essential, given the very limited understanding the Western analytical community has of Chinese crises perceptions and actions. (The recent works of Kalicki (1975) and Whiting (1975) are particularly notable contributions in this regard.)

Despite their evident value and the pressing need for more indepth analyses of Chinese crises, by their very nature such studies exclude several major aspects of Chinese crisis concerns, such as aggregate patterns and trends and their relations with other facets of postwar international relations. These broader facets of Chinese crisis concerns can only be understood by relating crisis events to other contextual factors.

This chapter relates the set of 386 crises of concern to the People's Republic of China to other events and patterns over the 1949-1978 period. It begins with a brief review of previous research dealing with U.S. and Soviet crisis concerns and operations in context (CACI, 1978e). These earlier findings are then used to guide the search for the correlates of Chinese crisis concerns.

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<sup>1</sup> Bobrow *et al.* (forthcoming) review the few systematic studies that have been conducted. Given the very limited understanding the Western analytical community has of the ways in which Chinese actions and concerns have fit into broader frameworks and structures, any analysis, including those presented here, must be regarded as preliminary by nature.

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON U.S. AND SOVIET CRISES<sup>2</sup>

### U.S. Crises

Mahoney (1978) examined 215 U.S. political-military crisis operations conducted between 1946 and 1975, relying on a DARPA-sponsored database developed by Blechman and Kaplan (1978). While the operations differed in many respects, each shared the characteristic of being an instance in which U.S. armed forces were used for political-military ends. As a result, the relative frequency of crisis operations over time provided a partial perspective on the incidence of U.S. political-military operations and of the propensity of U.S. leaders to use the Armed Forces as policy instruments.

Analysis revealed that the 215 U.S. crisis operations examined fell into a pattern that was shared, to varying degrees, by four other factors:<sup>3</sup>

- The state of the strategic balance, as perceived by Western observers,
- Soviet-U.S. interactions,
- The level of conflict throughout the world, and
- U.S. involvement in limited wars.

The multiple correlation between indicators of these four factors and the frequency of U.S. crisis operations was .84, indicating that 70 percent of the variance in the latter was held in common with the patterns taken by the former over the 30-year period surveyed.

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<sup>2</sup> Only brief, to the point of being cursory, reviews are provided in this section. CACI (1978e) provides a much more detailed presentation.

<sup>3</sup> These variables are discussed at greater length below.

### Analysis of Soviet Crisis Concerns

CACI's analysis (1978e) of postwar crises of concern to the Soviet Union (1946-1975), identified a number of correlates of Soviet crisis concern:<sup>4</sup>

- Indicators denoting the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which reflected the formal Soviet policy process,
- A Soviet assessment of stages in the correlation of forces between East and West (Zhurkin, 1975),
- Soviet expressions of tension concerning the U.S.,
- The frequency of conflict through the world,
- The frequency of U.S. crisis operations,
- Conflict behaviors directed by the People's Republic of China toward the Soviet Union, and
- Soviet conflict toward the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Multiple regression analysis revealed that 386 postwar Soviet crisis events shared 73 percent of their variance in common with these correlates.

### POTENTIAL CORRELATES OF CHINESE CRISIS CONCERNs

Based on the analyses of Soviet and U.S. crisis operations and concerns reviewed in the preceding section, several classes of potential predictors of the frequency of Chinese crisis concerns can be identified:

- Superpower crisis operations and concerns,
- The level of conflict throughout the world,

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<sup>4</sup> These events are the Soviet analogs of the crises of concern to China presented in Chapter 3.

- Interactions among nations,
- Perceptions of the balance of power/correlation of forces,
- Leadership periods, and
- Congresses of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

#### Superpower Crisis Operations and Concerns

It would not be surprising to find correlations between the crisis concerns of the PRC and the crisis concerns and actions of the United States and the Soviet Union. In their writings (Bobrow et al., forthcoming) the Chinese make extensive references to the principal opponent of China at any given point in time as one major reference point for developing crisis assessments. Given that both the United States and the Soviet Union have both had, at various times during the post-1949 period, the dubious honor of being considered the "principal opponent," relationships between these two powers' behaviors and perceptions and those of the Chinese would not be out of the ordinary.

U.S. crisis operations are indexed using DARPA-sponsored databases developed by the Brookings Institution (1978) and CACI (1978a, 1976), plus a data file of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps crisis responses produced at the Center for Naval Analyses (Mahoney, 1977a). Soviet crisis concerns, which encompass both Western-style crisis operations as well as instances in which the Soviets, while concerned about the events in question, did not conduct a Western-style operation, are taken from a DARPA-sponsored database (CACI, 1978e).

#### The Level of Conflict Throughout the World

As noted in Chapter 2, the Chinese place relatively more stress on the relevance of intranational events for international crises than is commonly the case in the West (Bobrow et al. (forthcoming) develop this

point at some length). To index both domestic and interstate conflicts throughout the world, a frequency index developed by Edward E. Azar is employed (Azar, 1970). The file contains a wide variety of conflicts: coups and other irregular regime transfers, border incidents and wars, and major domestic disturbances.

#### Interactions Among Nations

Nations' behaviors toward one another (both verbal and physical) can be loosely categorized into two sets: conflict and cooperation. Given the salience of the two superpowers for China, it would not be surprising if there were appreciable correlations between the conflict behaviors exchanged among the PRC, USSR, and U.S. and the set of crisis concerns presented in Chapter 3. Accordingly, this aspect of the actions of nations is indexed using event data collected by Azar and Sloan (1975).<sup>5</sup>

#### Perceptions of the Balance of Power/Correlation of Forces

Marxist-Leninist and Western commentators differ in the way in which they assess the overall balance between East and West. The former tend to focus on the correlation of forces, which encompasses military affairs, but also includes economic, political, psychological, and cultural components. The Western notion of the balance has a more narrowly focused military referent.

In the absence of a detailed Chinese treatment of the stages through which the correlation of forces has passed since 1949, a Soviet assessment (Zhurkin, 1975) which has been previously shown (CACI, 1978e) to correlate with Soviet crisis concerns is employed. Zhurkin (1975), in his analysis of contemporary international conflicts, identifies four

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<sup>5</sup> Mahoney (1974) presents more detailed information concerning the way in which these event data are employed, for example, the treatment of missing data.

stages in the evolution of "imperialism's" policies. The first stage, from the end of the 1940's through the mid-1950's, coincided with the beginning of the Cold War and what he sees as preparations by Western states for an attack on the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist countries. The second stage (the latter half of the 1950's) saw a rapid strengthening of Soviet military power, which made threats of war an ineffective strategy for the imperialists. During the 1960's imperialism tried a new tack, shifting the center of gravity of its struggle against the world socialist system to the Third World and conducting operations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia behind the strategic shield provided by U.S. forces. The 1970's saw a new phase, with the further strengthening of Soviet power as the most important change responsible for this shift.

As is common in Soviet analyses of international relations, Zhurkin does not focus solely on the strategic balance and/or other purely military factors in delineating these stages. As noted, the Soviet conception of the "correlation of forces" encompasses more than is entailed by Western concepts of the balance of power or strategic balance (for example, Tomashevsky, 1974). However, we can use these stages, which have been formulated by a very senior Soviet analyst, to provide an approximation of a "strategic" balance measure that is somewhat analogous to the indicator of the nuclear balance presented below. Four dichotomous indicators are used for this purpose to index the years cited above.

Western perceptions of the strategic balance (which along with U.S. conflict toward the USSR, the frequency of conflicts throughout the world, and U.S. limited war involvement, was found in previous analyses to be a significant correlate of U.S. crisis operations since World War II (Mahoney, 1978, 1977a)) is indexed by a four value ordinal variable based on an interpretation of Goldmann's (1974) analysis of the postwar strategic competition. In this scheme a low number indexes a low level of "objective" tension in the balance. In Goldmann's assessment, the

most balanced (and least tense) period has been the phase of mutual second strike capabilities (parity) since the mid-1960's. The next most stable/least tense phase was 1948-1956, when only the United States possessed the capability to attack the other superpower's homeland with a major strategic strike. This was followed (1946-1947) by the period in which neither superpower had significant nuclear forces. Finally, the period with the most "objective" tension was 1957-1965, when both superpowers had counterhomeland nuclear capabilities, but where the United States had a significant lead over the Soviet Union. Parity (achieved at some time during the mid-1960's) ended this imbalance.

#### Leadership Periods

National leaders have an obvious impact upon the crisis perceptions and actions of their nations. While it is extremely difficult for foreigners to precisely delineate patterns of power within the People's Republic of China, some general stages can be outlined. From 1949 through 1958, Mao Tsetung was the undisputed primary political leader in China. On April 27, 1959, Mao was replaced as Chairman of the National People's Congress (the chief state administrative position within China) by Liu Shao-Chi. In 1966 Mao made a successful bid to regain greater influence through the medium of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which was formally announced on May Day. (In actuality, the Cultural Revolution was already well underway at that point.) By December of the same year Liu Shao-Chi was being subjected to public criticism which led to his ouster. The Cultural Revolution lasted, at least in its most intense phase, through 1969. Though he was in declining health in the later years, it is not unreasonable to describe the period from 1969 through his death in 1976 as another period of Mao Tsetung's leadership.

A series of dichotomous indicators is employed to represent these leadership phases:

- The early Mao years (1949-1958),

- Liu Shao-Chi's period (1959-1965),
- The Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution (1966-1969),
- The post-Cultural Revolution Mao years (1970-1976), and
- The post-Mao period (1977-1978).

### Party Congresses

Party Congresses play a major role in the formal policy cycles of Marxist-Leninist states. In the case of the Soviet Union, it has been found that the frequency of Soviet crisis concerns varies in accordance with the rhythm of recent Party Congresses (CACI, 1978e). It would not be surprising to find similar patterns for the Chinese Communist Party (CPC).

Unfortunately for present purposes, the CPC has not developed a pattern of periodic meetings comparable to the regular pattern evolved in recent years in the Soviet Union. Following the proclamation of the People's Republic in 1949, the 8th Congress of the CPC took place in 1956. There was then a substantial interval until the 9th Congress, in 1969, followed by a series of Congresses at shorter intervals: with the 10th Congress occurring in 1973 and the 11th in 1977. Despite these variations, which reduce the analytical utility of the Party Congresses as indices of the formal Chinese policy process, it is of interest to determine how, if at all, the rhythm of Chinese crisis concerns matches the irregular cycle of Congresses. Accordingly, dummy variables are used to index the period between the founding of the PRC and the 8th Congress and the periods following the 8th through 11th Congresses.

### ANALYSIS

Relating Chinese crisis events to other, contextual factors is a complex process. Because of the limited amount of research that has been done on this subject, no strong "priors" are available to guide the selection of variables for inclusion in structural equations. As a result, the

stronger forms of regression-based inference (such as path analysis and systems of simultaneous equations) are not available to us.<sup>6</sup> A methodologically supportable alternative, which will be employed here, is to ask noncausal research questions, relying on the pattern-matching components of regression -- variance explained and residuals. The substantive question at issue is the extent to which the crises presented in Chapter 3, when viewed in the aggregate, take on patterns similar to those assumed by the contextual elements. To the extent such common profiles are uncovered, they provide suggestive evidence for the proposition that the events of concern were part of a larger structure of postwar international relations and also suggest some of the potential influences (and effects), of Chinese perceptions and actions.<sup>7</sup>

Table 1 presents the bivariate correlations of the contextual factor and the crisis concerns.

Reviewing the results, it is apparent that there is almost an embarrassment of riches, with 13 factors have correlations at or above the .30 threshold. Since there are only 30 "cases" (years) some selective culling of data is required to preserve degrees of freedom:

- From the first set of indicators, the strongest US and Soviet crisis variables will be employed,
- The solitary variable in the second category will be included,

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<sup>6</sup> Mahoney (1977) presents in greater detail the research strategy employed to respond to the problems of incomplete specification and multicollinearity.

<sup>7</sup> The frequency of crisis events over time is but one very limited aspect of Chinese crisis perceptions and actions. Even so, the pattern taken by these events since 1949 is of interest, if only because the previously reviewed sixteen analyses of Soviet and U.S. crisis frequencies produced substantively meaningful results.

TABLE 1  
Correlates of Chinese Crisis Concerns<sup>a</sup>

<u>Category/Factor</u>	<u>Correlation<sup>b</sup></u>
<u>Superpower Crises Operations and Concerns</u>	
U.S. Crises, Brookings	.38
U.S. Crises, CNA	.19
U.S. Crises, CACI	.19 <sup>c</sup>
Soviet Crises, CACI	.47
<u>The Level of Conflict Throughout the World</u>	
Azar Frequency of Conflicts	.47
<u>Interactions Among Nations</u>	
Soviet Conflict Towards China	.35
Chinese Conflict Toward USSR	.38
U.S. Conflict Toward China	-.08
Chinese Conflict Toward U.S.	-.03
<u>Perceptions of the Balance of Power/Correlation of Forces</u>	
Zhurkin's Phases in Correlation of Forces	
1949-1955	-.43
1956-1960	.19
1960-1969	.49
1970-1978	-.25
Goldmann's Phases in the Strategic Balance	.27
<u>Leadership Periods</u>	
Mao, 1949 to removal in 1959	-.43
Liu Shao-Chi	.59
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution	.34
Mao, post-Cultural Revolution	-.27
Mao, all periods	-.45
<u>CPC Congresses</u>	
Prior to 8th Congress	-.39
8th Congress	.62
9th Congress	-.24

Continued

Table 1  
Correlates of Chinese Crisis Concerns  
Continued

10th Congress	-.18
11th Congress	.13

<sup>a</sup> All statistics in this chapter are computed using the pair-wise deletion option of SPSS.

<sup>b</sup> Pearson's r's are presented in this column; r's  $\geq 1.301$  are underlined.

<sup>c</sup> The difference between the correlations of the U.S. CACI variable and the Brookings database appears to be largely attributable to the earliest years covered (1949-1955) wherein the correlation with Chinese concerns is -.24. (This difference between the U.S. databases the early postwar years is discussed in CACI 1978e.) Another factor may be the inclusion of domestic U.S. events in the CACI database.

- Both Soviet conflict behavior to the PRC (primarily verbal acts) and Chinese conflict directed at the USSR will be carried forward to the multiple regression analyses.
- Both of the Zhurkin correlations of forces variables will be included,
- Of the leadership measures, only the strongest (composite) Mao-period variable and the Liu Shao-Chi measures will be included, and
- Neither of the Party Congress measures scoring above the .30 criterion will be incorporated in the subsequent regression analysis. This is done for two reasons -- the irregularity of the Congress cycle, which makes these indicators less useful proxies for the formal Chinese policy process than would otherwise be the case, and because when regressed on the variables already selected, both are highly redundant ( $R^2$ 's exceed .90 in both cases).

This leaves 9 contextual indicators:

- The frequency of U.S. crisis operations,
- The frequency of Soviet crisis concerns,
- The frequency of conflict throughout the world,
- Soviet conflict towards China,
- Chinese conflict towards the PRC,
- Two of Zhurkin's phases in the correlations of forces, and
- Leadership measures having to do with Mao and Liu.

Regressing the frequency of Chinese crisis concerns upon the set of factors produces the following results:

$$R = .84$$

$$R^2 = 70$$

$$F = 4.0$$

$$SEE = 4.1$$

$$\text{Durbin-Watson Statistic} = 2.0$$

The crises of concern to the PRC share 70 percent of their variance in common with the set of predictors. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that autocorrelation (often a concern in time series analyses) is not a problem.

Figure 1 confirms this pattern of congruence. The fit between actual and estimated values begin quite poorly, with a serious underestimation in 1950 -- the year in which the Korean war began. After 1950, the fit between the actual and estimated values is fairly close until 1967 when another substantial underestimation of the number of events of concern to the Chinese occurs, concomitant with (*inter alia*) the Cultural Revolution. After that point, the fit between the two profiles is relatively close in 7 years, and fairly poor in 4: 1969-1970, 1973, and 1977.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Three inferences are warranted, based on the analyses considered in this section. The first has to do with the character of the Chinese crisis concerns data set. In any data collection effort a danger exists that application of methodologies will produce idiosyncratic data that have no appreciable interrelationship with other factors of interest. The results of the analysis clearly indicate that this is not the case for Chinese crisis concerns.

A second, closely related point has to do with the standing of Chinese crisis perceptions and actions within the broader framework of postwar international relations. The results suggest that Chinese concerns were part and parcel of larger contexts of interstate relations, varying in accordance with such factors as superpower crisis operations and concerns, the level of conflict throughout the world, Soviet-Chinese interactions, the correlation of forces, phases in Chinese leadership, and the pattern traced by the initial postwar Party Congresses.




Figure 1. Actual and Estimated Crisis Frequencies

Finally, and more speculatively the analyses suggest (without definitively demonstrating) a number of factors that may be related to Chinese crisis perceptions and actions:

- The frequency of U.S. and Soviet crisis operations and concerns,
- The level of conflict (intra- and interstate) throughout the world,
- Soviet-Chinese conflict behaviors,
- Zhurkin's correlation of forces indices,
- The Mao Tsetung and Lui Shao-Chi leadership periods, and
- The periods denoted by the 8th Congress of the CPC.

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## CHAPTER 8. THE CHINESE CRISIS MANAGEMENT DATA SYSTEM

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### INTRODUCTION

Any single report can present only a fraction of the potential analyses that could be conducted using the database of Chinese crisis characteristics developed in this project. Accordingly, a Chinese Crisis Management Data System module has been developed for CACI's Executive Aid for Crisis Management (CACI, 1978b, 1978f) which allows users to conduct their own analyses.

The Management Data System Aid is a user-oriented, self-prompting computer aiding system. It is designed to allow users to rapidly search for precedents in the course of considering action options for ongoing or anticipated crises.

The Chinese Crisis Management Data System is available to users in two forms: as part of the integrated system of crisis indications and warning and management aids provided at DARPA's Demonstration and Development Facility (DDF) and in a stand-alone Tektronix 4051 Minicomputer version. The two versions differ only in minor details. The DDF version is written in FORTRAN and implemented on the PDP-11/70 at that site. The stand-alone version is written in BASIC.

The Chinese Crisis Management Data System allows users to structure the Chinese crisis descriptor database to produce a set of crisis types that are maximally focused to each user's concerns. All structuring and selecting is done in simple English language dialogs with the aiding system. The aiding system allow users to:

- List the 386 Chinese crises,
- List the 24 descriptors,

- Search for all crises that are typified by a user-specified set of the 24 descriptors,
- Plot the frequency of crises over time that are typified by a user-specified set of the 24 descriptors, and
- Display the characteristics of a user-specified crisis.

A special HELP program is provided that allows users to obtain additional information concerning the operation of the total crisis management aiding system and the particular program the user is executing.

The Chinese Crisis Management Data System is one of a number of executive aids for crisis decision-making developed by CACI, Inc.-Federal for the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA/CTO). Other aiding systems available in both stand-alone microprocessor and DDF versions allow users to examine the characteristics of 314 nonwar U.S. crises and to identify U.S. actions, objectives, and problems for a subset of 101 of these incidents. A similar set of aids has been developed for 386 Soviet crises. The U.S. aiding system and databases are described in CACI (1978a, 1978b, and 1976). The Soviet aids and databases are described in CACI (1978e and 1978f).

Without endeavoring to duplicate the functions of the sample output that will be provided in conjunction with the Final Technical Report, brief examples are presented here to illustrate the use and capabilities of the Chinese Crisis Management Data System.

## SAMPLE OUTPUT

### Crisis Characteristics

One option of the aid presents a case by case listing of crisis data. Each frame presents a compact summary of each crisis. The heading provides:

- The number of crisis (crises are listed in chronological sequence by initiation date),
- The year in which the crisis began, and
- A short title for the event.

Following the heading, standard variables present:

- Crisis location (JCS region).
- Geopolitical location (looking outward from China).
- Scope (domestic/international).
- Duration.
- The general character of the events (riots, coups, interstate wars, and so forth. A residual "Other" category is used for hard to classify events).
- Actor mix (combination of large and small powers involved in the incident).
- Violence level.
- Strategic confrontation (actual or potential; cases involving neither actual nor potential strategic confrontations are coded N/A).
- Chinese in-theater crisis management capabilities.
- Chinese objectives towards those nations supported and opposed by the PRC in the incident.
- Chinese behaviors during the crisis.

- Crisis outcomes -- for China, its clients and allies, and for states other than clients and allies supported by the PRC. Outcomes are coded as favorable, unfavorable, or mixed. Mixed outcomes include two varieties: those mixed cases consistent with the Chinese world view (e.g., cases in which imperialist states act as the Chinese would expect) and those simply mixed in a functional sense.

Some illustrative frames of output follow.

58 1955 KMT ASSISTS DALAI LAMA REBELLION:W SZECHUAN

CRISIS LOCATION	:	Pacific Area, East Asia
GEOPOLITICAL LOCATION	:	Present PRC
SCOPE	:	International
DURATION	:	Long (31 days - 1 year)
CHARACTER	:	Attempted
TYPE	:	Revolt
ACTOR MIX	:	Large/Small Powers
VIOLENCE LEVEL	:	Violent Events-People Injured
STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION	:	N/A
PERCEIVED THREAT TO CPs	:	Well-Being Threatened
CRISIS MGT CAPABILITIES	:	Substantial
CHINESE OBJECTIVES		
SUPPORTED SET	:	Change Status Quo Ante
OPPOSED SET	:	Other
BEHAVIOR		
VERBAL	:	Goes Beyond Notins
PHYSICAL	:	Combat
CRISIS OUTCOMES		
FOR PRC	:	Mixed - In Functional Sense
FOR PRC CLIENT,ALLY	:	N/A
FOR OTHER SUPPORTED STATES	:	N/A

286 1969 SOVIET RUFFIANS ATTACK PRC EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

CRISIS LOCATION	:	Eastern Europe, USSR
GEOPOLITICAL LOCATION	:	PRC Border States
SCOPE	:	International
DURATION	:	Short (< one week)
CHARACTER	:	Other
TYPE	:	Riot, Disorder
ACTOR MIX	:	Two or More Large Powers
VIOLENCE LEVEL	:	Violent Events-People Injured
STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION	:	N/A
PERCEIVED THREAT TO CPs	:	Well-Being Threatened
CRISIS MGT CAPABILITIES	:	Negligible/Highly Limited
CHINESE OBJECTIVES		
SUPPORTED SET	:	Restore Status Quo Ante
OPPOSED SET	:	Other
BEHAVIOR		
VERBAL	:	Goes Beyond Notins
PHYSICAL	:	Action Less Than Combat; No Military Personnel
CRISIS OUTCOMES		
FOR PRC	:	Unfavorable
FOR PRC CLIENT,ALLY	:	N/A
FOR OTHER SUPPORTED STATES	:	N/A

2 1949 KMT RETREATS TO TAIWAN

CRISIS LOCATION	: Pacific Area, East Asia
GEOPOLITICAL LOCATION	: Former PRC Territory
SCOPE	: International
DURATION	: Long (31 days - 1 year)
CHARACTER	: Other
TYPE	: Structural Change
ACTOR MIX	: N/A-Internal Crisis
VIOLENCE LEVEL	: Violent Events-People Injured
STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION	: N/A
PERCEIVED THREAT TO CPs	: Well-Being Threatened
CRISIS MGT CAPABILITIES	: Negligible/Hightly Limited
CHINESE OBJECTIVES	
SUPPORTED SET	: Support Efforts to Change SQA
OPPOSED SET	: Oppose Efforts to Preserve SQA
VERBAL	: Goes Beyond Notins
PHYSICAL	: Combat
FOR PRC	: Mixed - In Functional Sense
FOR PRC CLIENT,ALLY	: N/A
FOR OTHER SUPPORTED STATES	: N/A

285 1969 SOVIET TROOPS VIOLATE PRC BORDER AT CHENPAO ISLAND.

CRISIS LOCATION	: Pacific Area, East Asia
GEOPOLITICAL LOCATION	: Present PRC
SCOPE	: International
DURATION	: Medium (8-30 days)
CHARACTER	: Other
TYPE	: Border Incident
ACTOR MIX	: Two or More Large Powers
VIOLENCE LEVEL	: Violent Events-People Injured
STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION	: N/A
PERCEIVED THREAT TO CPs	: Well-Being Threatened
CRISIS MGT CAPABILITIES	: Substantial
CHINESE OBJECTIVES	
SUPPORTED SET	: Restore Status Quo Ante
OPPOSED SET	: Other
BEHAVIOR	
VERBAL	: Goes Beyond Notins
PHYSICAL	: Combat
CRISIS OUTCOMES	
FOR PRC	: Unfavorable
FOR PRC CLIENT,ALLY	: N/A
FOR OTHER SUPPORTED STATES	: N/A

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## APPENDIX A. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

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This appendix deals with the reliability and validity of the set of 386 crises of concern to the leadership of the People's Republic of China since 1949 and the crisis descriptor data collected for these incidents. The first section deals with general reliability and validity issues. The second section compares the Chinese crisis concerns lists with three other databases.

### RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Data are reliable to the extent that two independent coders would produce the same results (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). During the processes of case identification and crisis coding, reliability was maintained in a number of ways. One was the employment of researchers who were experienced in the analysis of Chinese affairs and crisis management behavior. Another was the use of independent coding checks to ensure consistency across coders.

Validity has to do with the extent to which measures accurately index what they are intended to measure (Caporaso and Roos, 1973). In the identification of Chinese crisis concerns, validity was maintained in two ways. First, Chinese sources (published and approved by the PRC) were used to identify the incidents. These open source materials, published by the Chinese for dissemination in the West, are a form of crisis-related communication to other nations, and communication is an essential component of crisis management. The second factor contributing to validity was the use of multiple categories of Chinese sources:

- Periodicals (Peking Review and People's China),
- Books and pamphlets dealing with international affairs,

- Party Congress materials, and
- Chronologies of world affairs published in China.

Use of multiple sources helps to counteract whatever biases might characterize any particular category of information.

#### COMPARISON OF CRISIS LISTS

##### Overview

One of the best ways in which to validate a database is by comparing it to a similar compilation of information (for example, Mahoney's (1977a) comparison of the U.S. crisis lists produced by the Center for Naval Analyses and the Brookings Institution). Strictly speaking, the Chinese crisis concerns list presented in Chapter 3 cannot be evaluated in this way, because no Chinese database has been produced using sufficiently similar criteria. Hence, formal validation involving either a one-to-one comparison of lists or comparisons of aggregate patterns cannot be performed.

It is possible, however, to gain some insights into the list of crises of concern to the People's Republic of China by comparing it to some partially comparable databases. These analyses delineate the types of patterns and concerns found in the Chinese list and show how they differ from other actors' self-defined interests and concerns.

The databases that will be examined in this fashion are:

- A file of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union during the postwar period developed by CACI (1978e).
- Data on over 300 postwar U.S. crisis operations (CACI, 1976).
- Information contained in statements by Mao Tsetung that were not officially published by the People's Republic of China (for example, Schram, 1974).

In the first two comparisons, attention will be focused on events involving the PRC.

#### Comparison With CACI's Soviet Crisis List

A comparison of the set of Soviet crisis concerns identified by CACI in a previous project (1978e) with this project's China database, reveals 49 cases in which the People's Republic of China was clearly involved in an incident of concern to the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> In slightly under two-thirds of these cases, there is a counterpart incident on the Chinese crisis concerns list presented in Chapter 3. Matching cases include such incidents as:

- The Korean War, and the concomitant commitment of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits,
- Troubles in Tibet beginning in the 1950's and continuing until the Tibetan rebellion and the final integration of the province into China in 1959,
- The Tachens Islands crisis of 1954-1955 and Quemoy crisis of 1958,
- Sino-Indian border clashes in the late 1950's that culminated in the Sino-Indian War of 1962,
- Some of the most significant milestones in the Sino-Soviet dispute:
  - The 1961 publication of Long Live Leninism! by the PRC, which initiated the public doctrinal confrontation,
  - The Sinkiang migration/border issue of 1962,
  - The 1963 exchanges of charges by both parties and the series of unsuccessful negotiations between them in the early and mid-1960's.
  - The Sino-Soviet border clash of March 1969, and the following series of lesser border incidents.

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<sup>1</sup> Since the China database deliberately excludes events internal to the PRC, any such events on the Soviet crisis concerns list, for example, Chinese domestic announcements regarding the Soviets, are excluded from this comparison.

- The 1974-1975 intrusion of a Soviet helicopter into Chinese territory in which it was captured, the crew held by the PRC, and later released to the USSR.

Turning to the 17 instances on the Soviet crisis concerns list involving the PRC for which there are no corresponding entries in the Chinese crisis concerns list (Table 1), some common patterns emerge. The most important point is a negative one: none of the major crises involving the Chinese and/or the Soviet Union appear. Instead, the entries consist of cases involving some of the minor Sino-Soviet border and diplomatic incidents, events relating to the Vietnam War (and Soviet allegations of Chinese interference with the USSR's fraternal assistance to the DRV, including transit and shipping incidents), and alleged Chinese actions against the nationals of the Soviet Union and its allies resident within the People's Republic.

#### Comparison With CACI's U.S. Crisis List

Comparison of CACI's list of U.S. crisis operations involving China and the Chinese crisis concerns list presented in Chapter 3 reveals a pattern quite similar to that shown for the Soviets in the preceding section. Two-thirds of the U.S. cases have Chinese counterparts (20/30). Once again, the major events overlap:

- The end of the Chinese Civil War,
- The evacuation of KMT forces to the province of Taiwan,
- The Korean War,
- The movement of the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits concomitant with the Korean War,
- The 1954/1955, 1958, and 1962 offshore islands crises,
- The 1957 anti-American riots in Taipei, Taiwan,
- Sino-Indian border disputes and conflict in 1959 and 1962, and

TABLE I  
Soviet Crisis Concerns Not Reflected  
on the Chinese Crisis Concerns List<sup>a</sup>

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Events Through Soviet Eyes</u>
58-59	PRC: Mac angrily refuses to allow the Soviet Union to build communications stations on Chinese territory, even in exchange for shared use of Murmansk.
60-	Chinese provoke border conflict near Buz Aigyar some time during summer 1960.
6112-62	PRC: From the end of 1961, the People's Republic of China conducts an open, anti-Soviet propaganda campaign; thousands of border violations in this period. <sup>b</sup>
6209	Chinese authorities allow the harassment of Soviet citizens in Harbin, Manchuria; the Soviet Union closes its consulates in Harbin and Shanghai.
640225-640822	PRC-Soviet border talks resume and are then broken off; China refuses to continue dialogue. During the same period, China stages numerous border incidents on its Mongolian frontier, indicating that it no longer accepts the 1962 delineation; most Chinese technical workers withdrawn from Mongolia in this period.
6404-640505	China attempts to have the Soviet Union excluded from the 2nd Afro-Asian Summit Conference.
6501	Chinese public statements indicate that the People's Republic of China has no intention of fighting anyone unless China itself is attacked; shows lack of support for Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Soviet Crisis Concerns**  
**Continued**

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Events Through Soviet Eyes</u>
6502	Soviet Union appeals to People's Republic of China to provide additional assistance in transporting Soviet aid to Democratic Republic of Vietnam; People's Republic of China refuses.
660820-6612	Soviet citizens in China subjected to abuse; mutual expulsion of students; Soviet Embassy abused; Chinese attempt to organize anti-Soviet riots in foreign nations.
6610	PRC: People's Liberation Army units arrive in Pamir border region and begin photo reconnaissance of Soviet territory, threatening exercises.
661208-661228	PRC: Chinese detain and harass Soviet vessel <u>Zagorsk</u> in Darien.
670126-670213	Siege of Soviet Embassy in Peking: the Soviet Union recalls the families of Soviet diplomats from China; departing Soviet citizens subjected to abuse; nationals of other Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states and Mongolia also abused. <sup>c</sup>
670809-670810	PRC: Abuse of Mongolian diplomatic personnel; ambassador's car overturned, set on fire, hoodlums invade Mongolian Embassy.
680403-680404	Armed Chinese board Soviet vessel in PRC port and seize its captain; latter released after sharp Soviet protests; ship was carrying materiel to Democratic Republic of Vietnam. <sup>c</sup>
680629-690814	The People's Republic of China delays shipments of Soviet supplies to Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Continued

**Table 1**  
**Soviet Crisis Concerns**  
**Continued**

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Events Through Soviet Eyes</u>
681119-681120	Coup in Mali; Keita socialist regime ousted, in part because of perceptions of "Chinese threat"/PRC actions in Mali.
740119	The Soviet Union protests concerning the treatment of its diplomatic personnel in China; the Soviet Union and China expel selected members of one another's diplomatic missions.

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**a** Crises are taken from CACI (1978e). The crises are written from a Soviet perspective.

**b** Chinese sources reflect the doctrinal break, but do not emphasize the border incidents at this early stage in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

**c** An April 1968 entry on the Chinese crisis concerns list referring to a PRC warning to the USSR regarding espionage activities by the latter in Chinese waters may be related to this case.

- Sino-Soviet incidents in 1967 and 1969.

Table 2 presents the nonoverlapping cases from the U.S. list. Once again, relatively minor cases predominate, notably:

- POW riots during the Korean conflict, and
- Aircraft/airspace incidents.

#### Comparison With Mao's "Unofficial" Writings

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Red Guard cadres produced copies of Mao Tsetung's speeches, letters, and articles that had not as yet been made available to the general public (Chinese or foreign). It is apparent from internal evidence that these were regarded as "sensitive" materials. For example, the introduction to the largest collection of these materials (Miscellany of Mao Tsetung Thought..., 1974: 1) states explicitly that "these publications are offered for internal study only and are not to be quoted publicly." Similarly, the editor's postscript to the same collection states: "We hope all readers will refrain from making public reference to these materials or passing them to unauthorized hands, and will use them only for internal reference," (p. 498).

While unauthorized,<sup>2</sup> these documents provide a unique opportunity to compare public and private Chinese statements on international crises.

An examination of two of the most prominent compendia of these materials (Schram, 1974; Miscellany of Mao Tsetung Thought (1974) reveals 32 crises referred to by Mao. Of these cases, only 5 (16 percent) do not

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<sup>2</sup> Schram (1974) makes an excellent case for the authenticity of the documents.

TABLE 2

U.S. Crisis Operations Not Reflected  
in the Chinese Crisis Concerns List<sup>a</sup>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Events Through U.S. Eyes</u>
491029-491123	Chinese Communists arrest Angus Ward, U.S. Consul General, and four aids in Mukden, Manchuria.
520507-520619	Communist prisoners-of-war seize Brig. Gen. Dodd, camp commandant on Koje Island.
521001	Chinese Communist prisoners riot on Cheju Island.
521215-521222	U.N. POW command reports new outbreak of rioting at camp on Pongnam.
530118	Navy bomber shot down off South China while patrolling Formosa Straits.
530122	People's Republic of China claims it shot down a U.S. B-29 bomber over Manchuria.
570613	Peking radio alleges it damaged a U.S. carrier-based aircraft with antiaircraft fire.
590517	Matsu Islands heavily bombarded. <sup>b</sup>
641116	Communist China claims it shot down a pilotless U.S. reconnaissance plane over south-central China.
660916	Chinese Defense Minister accuses the United States of bombing Chinese territory. <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> U.S. crises taken from CACI (1976).<sup>b</sup> The 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis is included in both data files.<sup>c</sup> Earlier Chinese charges on this subject are included in the list presented in Chapter 3.

have corresponding entries on the list of Chinese crisis concerns presented in Chapter 3. These nonoverlapping crises are:

- Krushchev's 1957 actions in which he convened a special meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU to counter opposition he had encountered in the Politbureau.
- Krushchev's 1958 proposals for a joint Soviet-Chinese fleet, viewed by Mao as an affront to the PRC's sovereignty.
- Mao's 1959 criticism, following the Lushan Plenum of the CPC, of Soviet interference in internal Chinese affairs and of party members who have unsanctioned contacts with foreign parties.
- Mao's citation of a 1963 coup in Iraq.<sup>3</sup>
- Rumania's attempts, in 1964, to obtain greater independence from the Soviet Union.

At least four of the incidents share one facet: they involve sensitive issues in which the Soviet Union is being opposed by China in action and/or attitude. Turning to the cases that overlap, we find a wide variety of events: Hungarian and Polish internal disorders in 1956 (topics that occur with frequency in Mao's commentaries), major national liberation struggles (for example, Algeria), major East-West crises (for example, Berlin, 1958), and aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute (for example, criticism of China at the 1960 Bucharest meeting of the Rumanian Communist Party, which the Soviet Union used as a forum for its anti-Chinese propaganda).

#### CONCLUSION

As stated at the outset of this section, the comparisons of crisis lists do not constitute a formal validation of the database of Chinese concerns

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<sup>3</sup> It is not clear which of the two Iraqi coups of 1963 is covered by this reference.

presented in Chapter 3. Even so, some significant points emerge. When compared with either Soviet crisis concerns, U.S. crisis operations, or the private record of Mao Tsetung's statements, the Chinese crisis concerns databases show a high degree of overlap, particularly for major postwar crisis events.

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This Summary Report presents an analysis of China's crisis management experience from the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 through 1978. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the DARPA Crisis Management Program into which this research effort fits and shows its relations with other crisis management research being conducted by CACI for DARPA. Chapter 2 presents the methodology used to identify 386 crises of concern to the People's Republic of China, using Chinese sources; Chapter 3 presents short descriptions of these crises. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present descriptive analyses of the characteristics of the crises that		

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20. were of interest to the Chinese. Chapter 7 locates Chinese crisis concerns within the broader context of postwar international relations, while Chapter 8 illustrates some of the capabilities of the Chinese crisis characteristics component of the Executive Aid for Crisis Management, which has been developed to make these data available to policy planners and decision-makers. Appendix A evaluates the reliability and validity of the set of Chinese crises identified in the study.

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